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IT'S TIME TO MAKE THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT ADMINISTRATIVE
Edward Rubint
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) has been out of date from the
day it was written because it fails to address the administrative character of
the modern state. The APA imposes procedural requirements on agency
rulemaking and adjudication, two activities that are singled out because
they resemble legislation and judicial decision making in the premodern
state. The requirements for adjudication are based on the procedural rules
that govern courts; the requirements for rulemaking would be based on the
procedural rules that govern legislatures, but because very few such rules
exist, they are also based on the rules that govern courts. Courts then enforce
these requirements according to vague, nearly incomprehensible standards,
further judicializing the APA 's requirements.
This Article recommends that a new, administratively oriented APA be
drafted. The statute should reflect the premise that the modern administra-
tive state is a distinctively new mode of governance, founded on the principle
of instrumental rationality. Procedural requirements should be based on this
principle and should apply to all administrative action-not only rulemak-
ing and adjudication, but also the policy making and implementation func-
tions that comprise the bulk of administrative action. These requirements
would ensure that agency action be reasonably designed to achieve the goals
stated by the legislature or by the agency itself They would be enforced by
Congress and the administrative hierarchy as well as by courts, and the stan-
dards for court enforcement would be clarified to avoid judicialization.
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INTRODUCTION
It is time to rewrite the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
The reason is that the APA is out of date. This is not because of some
significant event that occurred between 1946, when the APA was
promulgated, and the present time. There have, of course, been vast
increases in the scope and scale of regulation during the intervening
half century, as several important innovations in regulatory strategy
have been implemented,2 and further changes have been widely dis-
cussed.3 Nevertheless, the basic structure of our administrative state
has remained relatively unchanged and will probably remain un-
changed for the foreseeable future. The real problem is that the APA
was out of date at the time it was enacted. The cause of this prema-
ture obsolescence was the American government's epochal transfor-
mation in the half century preceding the APA's enactment. This
change was the advent of the administrative state itself, the transition
from a system of rules elaborated and implemented by the judiciary to
a system of comprehensive regulation elaborated and implemented by
administrative agencies.4
1 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2000).
2 See, e.g., Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3536 (2000); Exec.
Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981) (Ronald Reagan), amended by Exec.
Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (William Clinton), amended by Exec.
Order No. 13,258, 67 Fed. Reg. 9,385 (Feb. 26, 2002) (George W. Bush).
3 See, e.g.,JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE REGULATION 29-43
(2002); JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: PUBLIC OPINION AND DEMOCRACY
134-76(1995); AL GORE, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING A GOVERNMENTi THAT
WORKS BETTER & COSTS LESS 33-34 (1993); LAWRENCE K. GROSSMAN, THE ELECTRONIC RE-
PUBLIC: RESHAPING DEMOCRACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 190-217, 218-36 (1995).
4 With respect to the development of the administrative state in the United States,
see, for example, RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, YANKEE LEVIATHAN: THE ORIGINS OF CENTRAL
STATE AUTHORITY IN AMERICA, 1859-1877, at ixx (1990); 7 HAROLD U. FAULKNER, THE DE-
CLINE OF LAISSEZ FAIRE: 1897-1917, at 366-82 (1951); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF
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The APA responds to these changes operationally, but not con-
ceptually. While it imposes several procedural requirements on the
manner in which administrative agencies may act, these requirements
are derived from pre-administrative modes of governance, namely leg-
islative rulemaking and judicial adjudication. More basically, they are
derived from an essentially judicial concept of governance in which
laws are discovered rather than invented and policy making is always
incremental. The statute fails to recognize the new modes of govern-
ance that characterize the administrative state, such as priority setting,
resource allocation, research, planning, targeting, guidance, and stra-
tegic enforcement. It fails to craft requirements that are appropriate
to these activities, either leaving them essentially unregulated or sub-
jecting them to inappropriate procedural rigidities. Most signifi-
cantly, it never addresses the administrative process itself, the essential
and distinctive mode of governmental action that results from the
existence of administrative agencies and from the underlying public
purposes that led to their creation.
Criticism of the APA is nothing new. According to one group of
critics, the statute imposes too many legal requirements and restric-
tions on the administrative process, impeding the ability of agencies to
carry out their assigned responsibilities. 5 According to another
group, it imposes too few requirements and restrictions, allowing
agencies to act over-aggressively and irresponsibly. 6 These opposing
AMERICAN BuREAucRAcY: 1830-1900, at 113-55 (1982); JOHN A. ROHR, To RUN A CONSTITU-
TION: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 13-53 (1986); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK,
BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES,
1877-1920, at 3-35 (1982); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIV-
INC THE REGULATORY STATE 12-31 (1990). With respect to the more general development
of bureaucracy worldwide, see, for example, ERNEST BARKER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC
SERVICES IN WESTERN EUROPE: 1660-1930 (Archon Books 1966) (1944); HOWARD G.
BROWN, WVAR, REVOLUTION, AND THE BUREAUCRATIC STATE: POLITICS AND ARMY ADMINISTRA-
TION IN FRANCE, 1791-1799 (1995); THE FORMATION OF NATIONAL STATES IN WESTERN EU-
ROPE (Charles Tilly ed., 1975); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING
SOCIETIES (1968); HENRY PARRIS, CONSTITUTIONAL BUREAUCRACY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
BRITISH CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION SINCE THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (1969); GLANFRANCO
POGGI, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN STATE 1-15(1978).
5 See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, INSTITUTIONAL DISABILITY: THE SAGA OF TRANSPORTATION
POLICY FOR THE DISABLED 152-87 (1986); R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS:
THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 387-93 (1983);Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regula-
tion and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALEJ. ON REG. 257, 289-302 (1987);
Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J.
1385, 1385-1436 (1992); RichardJ. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political
Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988
DUKE L.J. 300, 308-13; Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for
Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 173, 217-36 (1997); Patricia M. Wald,
Regulation at Risk: Are Courts Part of the Solution or Most of the Problem?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 621,
625-32 (1994).
6 See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 27-51
(1969); THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED
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groups mirror the debate that occurred when the APA was drafted 7
and, to a large extent, the continuing division between progressive
and conservative, or proregulatory and antiregulatory, opinion.8 In
fact, both groups of critics are correct. The APA imposes excessive
and counterproductive constraints on administrative agencies, while
imposing too little control on agency action to the detriment of both
fairness and efficiency in the administrative process. This remarkable
feat of failing in opposite ways at the same time is achieved by a divi-
sion of responsibility. In those areas where the APA imposes rules, it
frequently imposes the wrong rules, leading to counterproductive
constraints; in many other areas, however, the APA fails to impose any
rules at all, leaving agencies unguided and unsupervised. Thus, the
APA generously provides its critics, whether liberal or conservative,
with a great deal of empirical ammunition, but the noise of the result-
ing bombardment has tended to drown out the recognition that the
two groups are responding to the same underlying problem, a prob-
lem that is more basic than many of the critics have acknowledged: 9
the APA fails to address the true character of the administrative state,
and to recognize both the virtues and the dangers of this relatively
recent mode of governance.
A number of writers, including John Stuart Mill, 10 Charles Dick-
ens,1' and Nikolai Gogol, 12 had noted the advent of the administrative
STATES 92-126 (2d ed. 1979); DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How
CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 135-52, 165-79 (1993); Robert A.
Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like-Should Federal
Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DuKE L.J. 1311, 1312-19 (1992); Peter H. Aranson
et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 52-62 (1982); Gary Lawson,
The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1231, 1237-41 (1994); W. Kip
Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 1423, 1457-60 (1996).
7 See ROHR, supra note 4, at 111-70; Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical
Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1262-72 (1986); Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Fu-
ture, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 452-54 (1986) [hereinafter Shapiro, APA].
8 See Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487,
1495-1500 (1983); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1713-16 (1975).
9 But see Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1998) (stating that the differing theories share commonalities).
10 SeeJOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESEN-
TATIVE GOVERNMENT 360-64 (Geraint Williams ed., 1993).
11 See CHARLES DICKENS, LITTLE DORRIT 104-23 (1992). Dickens names his archetypi-
cal agency the Circumlocution Office; it is staffed by a number of officials from the Barna-
cle family, and its motto is: "How Not to Do It." See id.
12 Most of Gogol's best-known works address the issue of bureaucracy in one form or
another. See NIKOLAI GOGOL, DEAD SOULS 49-61 (George Gibian ed., 1985) (a swindler
buys title to serfs, or "souls," who have died but are still listed as alive on the public tax
registry); N.V. GOGOL, THE GOVERNMENT INSPECTOR (M. Beresford ed., 1996) (a lowly clerk
is mistaken for a government inspector by the officials of a small town); Nicolai V. Gogol,
The Nose, in THE OVERCOAT AND OTHER TALES OF GOOD AND EVIL 203 (David Magarshack
trans., 1957) (a civil servant of the eighth rank finds his nose traveling around town as a
civil servant of the fifth rank); Nicolai V. Gogol, The Overcoat, in THE OVERCOAT AND OTHER
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state by the end of the nineteenth century. The classic characteriza-
tion of it as a novel and distinctive mode of governance was formu-
lated by Max Weber about three decades before Congress drafted the
APA.13 In essence, Weber identified administrative, or bureaucratic,
government, as a rational-legal regime in which groups of full-time,
salaried officials, chosen on the basis of their credentials and placed
within hierarchical organizations, conduct official business according
to established rules within a defined jurisdiction and for defined in-
strumental purposes. 14 It is unfair to expect American legislators,
working during World War II, to pay attention to the work of a Ger-
man sociologist. But it is not unfair to expect us to do so now.
Weber's conception has become the dominant account of modern
government, and the basis for a massive body of research in political
science, sociology, economics, and related fields. 15
There has been, particularly in recent years, sustained criticism of
the Weberian model of government. Government, it is argued,
should be made less bureaucratic; authority should be decentralized,
with subordinate bureaucrats becoming more responsible,' 6 and pri-
vate entities possessing greater responsibility. 17 Many of these sugges-
tions are creative and potentially advantageous, though some are
nostalgia-driven and unrealistic.' 8 But all are modifications of a mas-
sive bureaucratic system whose basic structure has evolved during the
last two hundred years, that has defined the texture of the modern
world and remains securely in place at the present time. Serious pro-
posals for government reform must be framed against the background
of this incontrovertible reality.' 9 The problem with the APA is that
TALES OF GOOD AND EVIL, at 233, 261-64 (a poor clerk whose overcoat is stolen is viciously
abused when he complains to the Very Important Person about police inefficiency in re-
trieving it).
13 1, 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 217-26, 956-1003 (Guenther Roth & Claus
Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., 1978); see also 2 WEBER, supra, at 1393-1405
(discussing the role of the bureaucracy in "reconstructed" Germany).
14 See 2 WEBER, supra note 13, at 956-63.
15 1 WEBER, supra note 13, at xxxiii-cvii; see REINHARD BENDIX, MAX WEBER: AN INTEL-
LECTUAL PORTRAIT 458-68 (1977); 1 JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE
ACTION 143-271 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984); KARL LowITH, MAX WEBER AND KARL
MARx (Tom Bottomore & William Outhwaite eds., 1993).
16 See, e.g., GORE, supra note 3, at 39-40; PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON
SENSE: How LAW Is SUFFOCATING AMERICA 57-110 (1994); DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER,
REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: How THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT Is TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC
SECTOR 12-16 (1992).
17 See WILLIAM D. EGGERS &JOHN O'LEARY, REVOLUTION AT THE ROOTS: MAKING OUR
GOVERNMENT SMALLER, BETTER, AND CLOSER TO HOME 58-93(1995); FISHEIN, supra note 3,
at 134-76; GROSSMAN, supra note 3, at 218-36; Michael C. Dorf& Charles F. Sabel, A Consti-
tution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 316-23 (1998).
18 Weber was among those who were repelled by the grim reality of the bureaucratic
state. See BENDIX, supra note 15, at 458-63.
19 SeeJerry L. Mashaw, Reinventing Government and Regulatory Reform: Studies in the Neg-
lect and Abuse of Administrative Law, 57 U. Prrr. L. REV. 405, 410-15 (1996).
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this basic reality is nowhere in sight. The statute is derived from tradi-
tional models of government and is simply oblivious to the transform-
ative developments that Weber identified, and that contemporary
reformers must acknowledge.
This Article has two purposes. The first, which animates Part I, is
to demonstrate that the APA is largely based on premodern concep-
tions of government, specifically on the idea that governmental action
consists of legislation and adjudication, and more specifically on the
idea that government is an essentially judicial function. The second
purpose, which animates Part II, is to suggest an alternative approach
to regulating administrative agencies based on the contemporary un-
derstanding of the administrative state that we have inherited from
Weber. The Article does not attempt to draft a new statute or resolve
all of the issues that must be addressed before a new statute could be
drafted. Rather, its purpose is to suggest alternatives to the basic pro-
visions of the APA and to provide a new perspective on the task of
imposing legal controls on a modern administrative state.
I
PERPLEXITIES OF THE APA
A. The Dominant Principle: Control Through Private
Participation
The APA imposes three types of requirements on the administra-
tive process. First, it requires that various governmental actions be
publicized, or made available to public scrutiny.2 0 This requirement,
the least developed of the three in the original statute, has been the
subject of its most extensive amendments, which include the Freedom
of Information Act2 ' and the Government in the Sunshine Act. 22 Sec-
ond, the APA imposes various procedural requirements on rulemak-
ing and adjudication. To make a rule, an agency 23 must publish a
proposed version of the rule or a statement of the rule's subject mat-
20 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2) (2000).
21 Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552).
22 Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552b).
23 The APA defines an agency as "each authority of the Government of the United
States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency." 5 U.S.C.
§ 551(1). This definition will be used throughout this Article. It leaves unresolved some
complex theoretical questions regarding the way a group of individuals functions as an
entity, and the way boundaries are defined so that the group is separated from its sur-
roundings and maintains its identity. See Ninths LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS 16-41 (John
Bednarz, Jr. & Dick Baecker eds., 1995); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES:
ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 41-57 (1975); Mary Douglas, Converging on Auton-
omy: Anthropology and Institutional Economics, in ORGANIZATION THEORY: FROM CHESTER BAR-
NARD TO THE PRESENT AND BEYOND 98, 109-11 (Oliver E. Williamson ed., 1990). However,
the basic principle that any identifiable group of government officials capable of taking
collective action is an agency suffices for present purposes.
[Vol. 89:95
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
ter, allow a period of time for private parties to file written comments
with the agency and, after the comments have been received, publish
a final version of the rule with a statement of basis and purpose. 24 To
adjudicate an issue, the agency must provide interested parties with
notice of the subject matter to be decided, conduct a hearing, and
then issue a decision based upon the record of the hearing. 25 Third,
the APA grants aggrieved parties the opportunity to challenge agency
action in court on the grounds that it violates the Constitution or fed-
eral statutory law, including, of course, the procedural requirements
of the APA. 26
Commentators have written at length about alternative models of
administration that might serve as the basis for imposing legal restric-
tions on agencies, such as the formalist model, the expertise model, or
the pluralist model. 27 But the structure of the APA itself reveals that
the statute is essentially a one-trick pony. All of its basic provisions
rely on a single method for controlling the actions of administrative
agencies, namely, participation by private parties. The publication
provisions inform private parties of the agencies' actions. 28 The
rulemaking and adjudication provisions enable private parties to com-
municate their views to the agency decision makers.29 The judicial
review provisions give private parties an opportunity to challenge the
legality of those decisions. 30 Any other methods of controlling admin-
istrative action, including executive, legislative, and internal supervi-
sion, are largely absent from the statute, although one means of
legislative supervision, the report and wait requirement, 31 was added
in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision in INS v. Chadha.3 2
This represents a significant lacuna because an Administrative Proce-
dure Act should address the entire range.
One obvious difficulty with the APA's reliance on public partici-
pation is that it forces the statute to depend for its effectiveness on
24 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c).
25 Id. § 554.
26 Id. §§ 702, 704.
27 See Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REv.
1276, 1296-1377 (1984) (discussing and rejecting the formalist, expertise, judicial review
and pluralist models for justifying agency action); Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Reform of the
American Administrative Process: The Contemporary Debate, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 385, 392-97 (dis-
tinguishing among formalist, instrumentalist, and participatory models of agency action);
Stewart, supra note 8, at 1688-1711, 1802-05 (examining the formalist and expertise mod-
els of agency discretion in the context of evaluating agency alternatives, and rejecting the
pluralist model).
28 See5 U.S.C. § 552.
29 See id. §§ 553, 554.
30 See id. §§ 702, 704.
31 Id. § 801 (requiring INS to present proposed agency rules to Congress and allowing
the legislature to pass a 'joint resolution of disapproval" invalidating "major" rules).
32 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding one of these legislative vetoes unconstitutional).
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large organizations-business firms, labor unions and, most character-
istically, organized interest groups.3, Very few people other than pro-
fessional lobbyists or lawyers employed by such organizations read the
Federal Register, send comments to agencies regarding proposed
rules, or challenge the legality of such rules in federal court. The liti-
gants in leading cases involving the legality of rulemaking are gener-
ally entities such as the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC),
the Sierra Club, the Defenders of Wildlife, the Motor Vehicle Manu-
facturers Association, the Association of Data Processing Service Orga-
nizations, the Chocolate Manufacturers Association, and the Toilet
Goods Association. 34 Adjudications involve individuals, of course, and
the APA does grant them important mechanisms for controlling the
agency's decision.3 5 But even in this case, sustained challenges to gen-
eral agency practices under the judicial review provisions are often
mounted by large organizations.3 6
The disadvantages of the APA's monochromatic approach to
agency control goes well beyond the obvious unfairness of relying on
large private organizations, however. Supervision exercised by private
parties is necessarily external, and usually adversarial as well. It is ex-
ternal in that it comes from individuals and organizations outside the
administrative apparatus and, indeed, outside the government in its
33 See WILLIAM F. WEST, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING: POLITICS AND PROCESSES 86-88
(1985) (stating that participation in rulemaking is generally limited to well-organized, well-
funded interests); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 66-87 (1991) (observing that litigation is subject to similar limits
as participation in the legislative process); see generally MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 53-57 (1965) (noting that
only small groups whose members have high stakes in the outcome are able to participate
in government). Olson's insight regarding the size of the group has been undermined by
the subsequent development of mass social movements. See, e.g., BARRY D. ADAM, THE RISE
OF A GAY AND LESBIAN MOVEMENT (2d ed. 1995); DENNIS CHONG, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1991); SARA EVANS, PERSONAL POLITICS: THE ROOTS OF Wo-
MEN'S LIBERATION IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE NEW LEFT (Vintage Books
1980); ANDREW SZASZ, EcoPoPULISM: TOXIC WASTE AND THE MOVEMENT FOR ENVIRONMEN-
TAL JUSTICE (1994); Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature
and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5-12, 76-83 (2001). However, these sources
emphasize the importance of organization and the ability to obtain resources.
34 These specific illustrations are amongst the leading rulemaking cases in modern
administrative law: Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978); Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs.,
Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967);
Chocolate Mfrs. Ass'n v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1985); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657
F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
35 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 705; supra note 26 and accompanying text.
36 See, e.g., Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985); FTC v.
Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948); Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species
Comm., 984 F.2d 1534 (9th Cir. 1993); Profl Air Traffic Controllers Org. v. Fed. Labor
Relations Auth., 685 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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entirety. This limits the effectiveness of the control, since those exer-
cising it, however assiduous, are less likely to understand the internal
operation of the agency, less likely to speak in its own language, and
less capable of imposing direct sanctions for disobedience. Second,
private party control is often adversarial. Adjudications and judicial
review are necessarily So.37 Rulemaking comments may support the
agency's proposal, but most private comments are motivated by disap-
proval. Thus, private parties can be relied upon to tell the agency
what it is doing wrong, but not how it might improve.
Perhaps the most serious limitation of private party participation,
however, is that it is almost always incremental. Private parties tend to
be reactive; they will review published regulations, comment on regu-
latory proposals, lobby for or against regulatory initiatives, and sue
when they feel aggrieved, but they are less likely to generate any of
these proposals or initiatives, and are even less likely to plan a long-
term administrative strategy. Even if they did so, the APA provides
them with no opportunities for communicating such initiatives or
long-term strategies to the agency. Rather, it restricts their role to the
ambit of particular agency decisions-to the rule on which they are
commenting, the adjudication in which they are making an appear-
ance, or the agency action that they are challenging in court.38
37 See generally ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW
3-6 (2001) (describing the general culture of adversarial, litigation-oriented dispute reso-
lution in the United States, in contrast to the means employed in other advanced, indus-
trial nations).
38 Some observers, notably those who subscribe to public choice theory, would argue
that most government institutions reflect private party views, and that there is very little
likelihood that supervision or control by such institutions, as opposed to private parties,
will make any difference. See, e.g.,JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS
OF CONSENT 283-95(1962); JOHN A. FEREJOHN, PoRK BARREL POLITICS 47-68 (1974); MOR-
RIS P. FIORINA, REPRESENTATIVES, ROLL CALLS, AND CONSTITUENCIES 29-40, 83-86 (1974);
OLSON, supra note 33. For general descriptions of public choice theory, see DANIEL A.
FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBUC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 12-37
(1991); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11 (1989). This position has been sharply con-
tested, however. See DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY. A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 47-71 (1994); RICHARD L.
HALL, PARTICIPATION IN CONGRESS 157-61 (1996); STEVEN KELMAN, MAKING PUBLIC POLICY
231-70 (1987); Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and
"Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199 (1988). Nonetheless,
virtually any legislative proposal is premised on some incremental advantage to particular
statutory mechanisms. The extreme and fatalistic claim that nothing makes a difference
should not be accepted and acted upon without much stronger evidence than that which
public choice can advance. See Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 7 (2000); Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the
Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 24-30 (1991); Edward L. Rubin, Legisla-
tive Methodology: Some Lessons from the Truth-in-Lending Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 233, 240-41 (1991).
This is particularly true in light of the fact that public choice insights can be incorporated
into proposals for improving governmental processes. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra, at
116-43; JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IM.
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The inherently incremental nature of the control functions that
the APA prescribes is hardly accidental. Rather, it emerges from the
conception of government that prevailed in premodern times, and
that survives in contemporary governance as the rationale for com-
mon law. In the Middle Ages, government was regarded as an essen-
tially judicial function and all its officials, including the king, were
viewed as magistrates. 39 Their purpose was to discern, apply and ex-
trapolate the eternal verities that were conceived in terms of natural
law, that is, as law that God had inscribed in the nature of the uni-
verse. 40 In fact, kings and other officials in medieval times did a good
deal of genuine legislating, and often demonstrated impressive legal
creativity, 4' but the justification for their exercise of political authority
was that they were discovering existing law or legislating in its intersti-
ces. The common law preserves this rationale 42-it allows judges to
make new doctrine, 4 3 while simultaneously maintaining that they are
not authorized to do so, by asserting thatjudges are simply discerning
the principles embedded in Anglo-American legal culture. This con-
PROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997); Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenology, and the Meaning of
the Modern State: Keep the Bathwater, but Throw Out That Baby, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 309 (2002).
39 CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT AND ITS SUPREMACY
42-44, 109-13 (Archon Books 1962).
40 FRITZ KERN, KINGSHIP AND LAW IN THE MIDDLE AGES 149-65 (S.B. Chrimes trans.,
1968); MCILWAIN, supra note 39, at 44-45; R. van Caenegem, Government, Law and Society, in
THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THOUGHT, C. 350-C. 1450, at 174, 192-95
(J.H. Burns ed., 1988).
41 See JOSEPH CANNING, A HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THOUGHT, 300-1450, at
22-25 (1996); JANET L. NELSON, POLITICS AND RITUAL IN EARLY MEDIEVAL EUROPE 61-62
(1986).
42 J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW 30-55 (1987);
GERALDJ. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 4-29 (1986); MARTIN SHA-
PIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 35-37 (1981).
43 There is virtually universal agreement among political scientists who study the legal
system that judges make new policy in essentially the same sense that legislators do. See,
e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, AMERICAN COURTS: PROCESS AND POLICY 310-59 (4th ed. 1998);
HENRY R. GLICK, COURTS, POLITICS, AND JUSTICE 352-418 (3d ed. 1993); CHARLES A. JOHN-
SON & BRADLEY C. CANON, JUDICIAL POLICIES: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT (1984); VICTOR
G. ROSENBLUM, LAW AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT 4-11 (1955); C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A.
CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 3-6 (1996); GLENDON SCHU-
BERT, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING: THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE COURTS (rev. ed. 1974);JEFFREY
A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATrITUDINAL MODEL 1-31
(1993); HAROLDJ. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT POLICY MAKING (1979); BARBARA M. YARNOLD,
POLITICS AND THE COURTS: TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF PUBLIC LAW 3-52 (1992); Robert
A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6J. PUB.
L. 279 (1957). Even the opposing view that doctrine matters does not deny that judges
make public policy in many cases. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUDGES
MAKE 22-23 (1998); MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND
T1HE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS 204-48 (1998).
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ception is now described as formalism, 44 and is generally rejected, 45
but its revival in the work of Ronald Dworkin indicates its continuing
appeal. 46
Because judges are merely "discovering" law, in the medieval and
common law conception, they must proceed on a case-by-case basis as
the specifics of each case reveal a new aspect of the pre-existing legal
rules. 47 The administrative state displaces this approach. Its defining
feature is conscious policy intervention in the economic and social
system by various means, among them the promulgation of explicitly
new laws.48 While incremental decision making is not necessarily pre-
cluded, the hallmarks of the administrative state-the rationale be-
hind the creation of administrative agencies-are its comprehensive
programs and long-term planning in pursuit of these policy objec-
tives.49 Thus, by relying on the necessarily incremental device of pri-
vate party participation, the APA ignores the essential feature of the
administrative state and adopts a means of control characterized by a
specifically pre-administrative approach to governance.
44 See Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 6-11, 32-39 (1983);
Dennis Patterson, Langdell's Legacy, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 196 (1995); G. Edward White, The
Impact of Legal Science on Tort Law, 1880-1910, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 213, 220-25 (1978);John
Henry Schlegel, Langdell's Legacy or, The Case of the Empty Envelope, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1517,
1528-33 (1984) (book review).
45 In the United States, the initial critique came from legal realism, with subsequent
schools of scholarship, including legal process, law and economics and critical legal stud-
ies, building on that critique. See BRIAN Bix, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 164-75,
177-202, 203-20 (2d ed. 1999); GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END 13--61 (1995); Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the
Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1393, 1394-1402
(1996). The work of political scientists who study the legal system can also be seen as a
critique of the formalist position, see supra note 44, although they generally do not identify
their observations in these terms.
46 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERI-
OUSLY (1977). Dworkin argues that there is always a right answer in a legal controversy and
that this answer, if not immediately apparent, can be found in principles that inhere in the
legal system. While the specifics of this thesis have changed over time, see Ronald Dworkin,
A Reply &y Ronald Dworkin, in RONALD DWORKIN AND CONTEMPORARYJURISPRUDENCE 247, 248
(Marshall Cohen ed., 1983), the central point is that judges do not make policy in the
same sense that legislators do, see id. It is thus opposed to the position taken by most legal
scholars and political scientists. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
47 See Bix, supra note 45, at 133-36; MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE
COMMON LAW (1988); EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION To LEGAL REASONING 1-27
(1948); SHAPIRO, supra note 42, at 28-35; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITI-
CAL CONFLICT (1996).
48 See HABERMAS, supra note 15, at 243-71; NiKLAS LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
OF LAW (Elizabeth King & Martin Albrow trans., 1972); 1 WEBER, supra note 13, at 217-26
(describing displacement of the patriarchical system of justice by the rational-formalistic
approach that characterizes bureaucratic governance).
49 See Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 369, 369, 372-85 (1989).
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B. Categories of Administrative Action
In order to define opportunities for private party participation in
the administrative process, the APA must characterize that process
and identify the specific junctures where participation is to be en-
couraged. It does so by making two distinctions, one between
rulemaking and adjudication, and the other between formal and in-
formal process. A rule is defined as "the whole or a part of an agency
statement of general or particular applicability and future effect."50
Any other agency action is an adjudication. 5' The APA defines a for-
mal process as one "required by statute to be made on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing."52 Any other process is informal.
These two categorizations, each with a defined and a residual
concept, might appear to represent a conceptual advance, an effort to
describe modem administrative government on its own terms. In fact,
like the reliance on private party participation, the categorization
merely reproduces the conceptual framework of the pre-administra-
tive state. 53 Rulemaking is a generic term for legislation, and thus one
that can be used when the legislation, that is, an authoritative govern-
ment pronouncement of general applicability, is not being enacted by
a legislature. Adjudication likewise is a generic term that can be used
for a judicial process that is carried out by someone who is not a
judge.54 Similarly, the formal and informal distinction largely tracks
the division between nonjudicial and judicial action, although formal
action is certainly a more capacious term than legislation.
As observers have pointed out since the enactment of the APA,
the statute's two independent dichotomies, when combined, produce
a classic four-box grid. 55 The four boxes, or cells, are formal rulemak-
ing, informal rulemaking, formal adjudication and informal adjudica-
tion. Of these, however, formal rulemaking has turned out to be a
null set. It requires the agency to provide private parties potentially
affected by the rule with an oral hearing in which they can present
witnesses and cross examine opposing witnesses. 56 In a complex regu-
50 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2000).
51 See id. § 551(6), (7).
52 Id. § 553(c); see id. § 554(a).
53 See supra Part I.A.
54 At the time the APA was drafted, the officials who presided over administrative
adjudications were described as hearing officers. But the statute's traditionalism enabled
some of them to demand that they be described as judges, a demand that they were able to
achieve through viciously effective lobbying. See PAUL VERKUIL ET AL., THE FEDERAL ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE JUDICIARY (1992); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Presiding Officials Today, 46
ADMIN. L. REV. 271 (1994);Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Federal Administrative Law Judges: A Focus on
Our InvisibleJudiciary, 33 ADMIN. L. REv. 109 (1981).
55 See The Federal Administrative Procedure Act: Codification or Reform?, 56 YALE L.J. 670,
705 (1947).
56 See5 U.S.C. § 556(d).
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latory setting, with multiple parties, multiple issues and assiduous at-
torneys, the direct, cross, redirect and recross examinations of
hundreds of witnesses by dozens of parties on dozens of issues pro-
duces interminable and often terminal delay.57 The notorious exam-
ple is the hearing, held pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act,58 to determine whether the peanut content of peanut
butter should be 87.5% or 90%, which spanned a nine-year period
and produced a 7,736 page transcript.59 Because the impracticalities
of formal rulemaking are well known, Congress rarely requires this
technique, and courts avoid interpreting statutes to require it, even in
the rare cases where the statute seems to do so. 60 In effect, the Court
has made clear that if Congress wants formal rulemaking-rulemak-
ing "on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing"-it must
enact a statute that uses the words "on the record after opportunity
for an agency hearing."6 1
One of the other cells in the grid, informal adjudication, suffers
from the opposite problem. Defined by two residual principles, 62 it
includes the vast majority of administrative action. That is, all actions
that do not fit within the fairly narrow categories of rulemaking or
formal adjudication fall under informal adjudication. 63 Every time an
agency plans its future actions or evaluates its prior ones, allocates its
resources, gives advice, makes a promise, issues a threat, negotiates,
57 See Robert W. Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The
Need for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CAL. L. REv. 1276, 1283-1313
(1972); Robert W. Hamilton, Rulemaking on a Record by the Food and Drug Administration, 50
TEX. L. REv. 1132, 1142-50 (1972) [hereinafter Hamilton, Rulemaking]; RichardJ. Pierce,
Jr., The Choice Between Adjudicating and Rulemaking for Formulating and Implementing Energy
Policy, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 5-30 (1979).
58 21 U.S.C. § 341.
59 Paul M. Booth, FDA Implementation of Standards Developed by the International Confer-
ence of Harmonization, 52 FooD & DRUG L.J. 203, 214 n.79 (1997); see Ass'n of Nat'l Advertis-
ers v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1167 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (describing rulemaking); Corn
Prods. Co. v. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 427 F.2d 511 (3rd Cir. 1970) (upholding
resulting rule regarding content of peanut butter against a procedural challenge); see also
Hamilton, Rulemaking, supra note 57, at 1143-45 (describing the peanut butter proceed-
ings and eventual rule affirmation by the Third Circuit). Nor was this the most extensive
proceeding under the FDA's formal rulemaking provision. An ultimately unsuccessful ef-
fort to promulgate rules for foods that were claimed to have special dietary uses generated
a record about five times as long, with 162 witnesses and more than 2,000 documents. See
id. at 1145-50.
60 See United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 225 n.1, 241 (1973) (finding
that statute requiring the Interstate Commerce Commission to act only "after hearing" and
authorizing it to make specified findings of fact did not trigger formal rulemaking); United
States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 756-57 (1972) (same).
61 The Supreme Court denies that this is the case, however. See Allegheny-Ludlum, 406
U.S. at 757.
62 See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
63 SeeJames 0. Freedman, Summary Action by Administrative Agencies, 40 U. CHi. L. REv.
1, 1 (1972).
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conducts an investigation, and most of the time it denies an applica-
tion or makes an exception, it is at least arguably engaged in informal
adjudication. Thus, this cell of the APA's four-box grid, unlike the
formal rulemaking cell, does not lack content. Unfortunately, how-
ever, the APA is virtually silent with respect to it. Whereas the statute
imposes such elaborate requirements on formal rulemaking that the
mechanism is virtually unusable, it imposes few, if any, requirements
on informal adjudication. 64 In fact, the APA does not actually use the
term informal adjudication at all, and barely acknowledges the con-
cept. Rather, the term and its underlying concept are simply logical
emanations of the statute's structure that commentators have noted
and discussed.65 The drafters have so little to say about it because they
did not conceptualize it as an identifiable category of governmental
action.
The fact that the APA does not impose any practical procedural
requirements on either formal rulemaking or informal adjudication
results from very different difficulties, but springs from a similar
source. Both are conceived as adjudication, while neither one actually
is. Formal rulemaking is called rulemaking, not adjudication, but the
requirements that accompany it are entirely adjudicatory in nature.
All its specified features-oaths, subpoenas, depositions, settlement
conferences, direct examinations, cross examinations, transcripts, ex-
hibits-are familiar attributes of judicial trials. 66 The problem, of
64 The one possible exception is the APA section dealing with "ancillary matters." 5
U.S.C. § 555 (2000). Section 555(e) states: "Prompt notice shall be given of the denial in
whole or in part of a written application, petition, or other request of an interested person
made in connection with any agency proceeding." It further requires that "the notice shall
be accompanied by a brief statement of the grounds for denial." This is, in essence, a
decision without a hearing. It provides something, in that the applicant or petitioner is
told that his application has been denied and is given some reason for the denial. How-
ever, the provision's effect seems restricted to settings that bear some relationship to a
traditional adjudication, in that the outcome of an informal adjudication constitutes a de-
termination of a person's status. Apparently, courts have interpreted the provision's scope
in this way. See Roelofs v. Sec'y of the Air Force, 628 F.2d 594, 599-601 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(holding that reasons must be given for denial of a serviceman's request that his discharge
resulting from conviction for heroin possession be upgraded to an honorable discharge);
Bowman v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 411 F. Supp. 329, 330 (W.D. Wis. 1976) (holding that rea-
sons must be given for denial of parole application). But cf Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v.
LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 653-56 (1990) (requiring statement of reasons under § 555(e)
violates the principle set forth in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), which states that courts may not add to the APA's proce-
dural requirements).
65 See, e.g., David P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative
Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 54-61 (19/5); Freedman, supra
note 63, at 41-42; Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L.
REv. 739 (1976); Keith Werhan, Delegalizing Administrative Law, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 423,
442 & n.143.
66 This adjudicatory character is apparent from the structure of the statute. The
rulemaking requirements appear in § 553, which describes the notice and comment pro-
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course, is that rulemaking is not an adjudicatory process, and any ef-
fort to treat it as one is bound to produce an unusable monstrosity.
Informal adjudication, on the other hand, is described, at least implic-
itly, as adjudication, but it is not adjudication at all. 67 It would be
much more accurately described as executive action, or some similar
term that did not refer to adjudication. Most of the innumerable ad-
ministrative actions that fall within this category are unrelated to adju-
dication, as that term is generally conceived. What is adjudicatory
about planning a strategy, allocating resources, giving advice, or con-
ducting an investigation? Conceiving these models of administrative
action as adjudications brings absolutely nothing to mind. Like or-
ange music or a rainy principle, it is an inapposite juxtaposition, a
koan that cannot generate criteria for addressing a real situation.
Because the APA proceduralizes formal rulemaking out of exis-
tence and ignores informal adjudication, the four-box grid that it es-
tablishes reduces to two usable sets of procedural requirements, one
for informal rulemaking and the other for formal adjudication.
These are, of course, immediately recognizable as analogues of legisla-
tion and judicial trials, the two standard modes of governmental ac-
tion in the traditional, pre-administrative state. Legislatures are
regarded as making rules, that is, statements with future effect, and
the amorphous, open-ended process that they employ strongly sug-
gests informality. Courts, conversely, are regarded as determining the
rights of private parties. Civil trials, the means of adjudicating non-
criminal matters, are essentially reproduced in §§ 556 and 557. These
are the most ritualized, carefully defined governmental processes that
exists in our society; as such, they are properly described as formal.
Thus, the APA's apparent aspiration to conceptualize the administra-
tive process reduces to the reproduction of existing pre-administrative
categories of governmental action. Its implicit four-box grid morphs
into a simple dichotomy between legislation and adjudication, a di-
chotomy that emerges directly from our standard, three-branch
cess. But the section states: "When rules are required by statute to be made on the record
after opportunity for an agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title apply instead of
this subsection." 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000). Sections 556 and 557 impose requirements on
formal adjudication and are obviously designed with adjudication in mind. See 5 U.S.C.
§§ 556, 557.
67 See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
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model of government,68 and from the pages of Baron Montesquieu's
mid-eighteenth century discussion of separated powers. 69
C. Modes of Administrative Action: Rulemaking
The APA's treatment of formal adjudication has created relatively
few difficulties. We are, after all, a society that knows how to adjudi-
cate disputes between private parties or between private parties and
the state. We have been adjudicating such disputes for at least eight
hundred years, ever since trial by ordeal was abolished and trial by
battle began to fall into disuse, 70 and this lengthy cultural experience
has provided us with a deep reservoir of skills and knowledge. As a
result, the APA provisions for formal adjudication meet American cul-
tural standards of adjudicatory fairness reasonably well. 7 1 A greater
concern with formal adjudication is that it may be too formal, and that
the civil trial standards it imposes encumber agencies that must adju-
dicate thousands, or, in the case of the Social Security Administration,
millions of cases annually. 72 Jerry Mashaw has explored this issue at
some length, but his general conclusion is that agencies have been
68 For arguments that this model is not fully applicable to a modern administrative
state, see Edward Rubin, Independence as a Governance Mechanism, inJUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 56 (Stephen Burbank & Barry Fried-
man eds., 2002); William C. Banks, Efficiency in Government: Separation of Powers Reconsidered,
35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 715, 730-33 (1984); M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in
Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 603-06 (2001); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of
Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573,
581-83 (1984).
69 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAws 156-66 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds & trans.,
1989).
70 Trial by ordeal was abolished by the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215, while trial by
combat gradually sank into disfavor as a result of changing social conditions. See ROBERT
BARTLETT, TRIAL BY FIRE AND WATER: THE MEDIEVAL JUDICIAL ORDEAL 34-69, 103-26
(1986); 1 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 308-12 (7th ed. 1956);
GEORGE NEILSON, TRIAL BY COMBAT 122-26, 160-61 (1890); R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, THE
BIRTH OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW 68-70 (1973).
71 Some questions continue to arise, however. Controversy continues, for example,
surrounding the requirements of impartiality for agency adjudicators. See Arnett v. Ken-
nedy, 416 U.S. 134, 196-99 (1974) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(asserting that decision maker in hearing regarding fairness of employee's dismissal should
not have been the employee's regular supervisor); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S.
33, 46-47 (1950) (concluding that the APA could not have intended that same person
serve as prosecutor and decision maker in deportation hearing), judgment modified by 339
U.S. 908 (1950). Nonetheless, the basic requirements are well understood and almost uni-
versally applied, even in the absence of a specific statutory requirement. See, e.g., Gibson v.
Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578-79 (1973) (holding that board composed of optometrists in
private practice may not rule on question of whether other optometrists should have their
licenses revoked for being employed by business corporations); Ward v. Vill. of
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 57-60 (1972) (holding that mayor who benefits from traffic fines
may not adjudicate traffic offenses); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136-39 (1955) (finding
that judge may not also act as one-person grand jury).
72 SeeJERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY
CLAIMS 18 (1983).
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able to adapt the APA requirements to produce a practical yet fair
adjudicatory process. 73 In Heckler v. Campbell,74 the Supreme Court
validated one of the most extensive of these adaptations: an effort to
replace individualized fact-finding regarding vocational opportunities
with generally-applicable guidelines. 75
Experience with the APA's rulemaking requirements has been
much less satisfactory. 76 Courts and commentators have disagreed
about the core meaning of these requirements: their scope, content,
and value. Perhaps the most important reason for this conceptual in-
stability is that the pre-administrative model on which informal
rulemaking is based, the enactment of a statute by a legislature, does
not include procedural requirements. While there are techniques for
legislation, and every legislature adopts internal rules of procedure,
the only procedural requirements involve the rules for valid enact-
ment. Hans Linde has proposed to remedy this situation by defining
a due process of lawmaking,77 but his suggestion has not been
adopted. In any event, his suggestions do not correspond to the pro-
cedures the APA requires. Instead, the APA, finding that the analogy
between informal rulemaking and legislation provides no guidance
for procedural requirements, resorts to the only other model of tradi-
tional governmental action, namely, adjudication. The APA's require-
ments of notice, comments, and a statement of basis and purpose
reiterate, in a diluted and adapted form, the due process require-
ments of notice, a hearing, and an impartial decision maker for adju-
dicatory decisions.78 As Peter Strauss, Todd Rakoff, and Cynthia
Farina have suggested, courts expand the adjudicatory implications of
the statute because of their own familiarity with the adjudicatory pro-
cess. 79 The result is that rulemaking, although conceived as agency
73 See id. at 222-27; see aloJERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND
APPEALS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION HEARING SYSTEM xix (1978)
("While the problems that have been identified . . .do infect the . . . system in various
degrees, we do not find the problems to be so overwhelming that an entirely new system is
required.").
74 461 U.S. 458 (1983).
75 See id. at 466-68.
76 But see Peter L. Strauss, Changing Times: The APA at Fifty, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 1389,
1391-93 (1996) (contending that the open-ended nature of the APA's provisions has ena-
bled them to be applied, without amendment, for fifty years.) Professor Strauss suggests,
however, that the APA's survival resulted from flexible judicial interpretation, and that the
more rigid interpretive approach of the current Supreme Court may lead to its ultimate
demise. See id. at 1393, 1422.
77 See generally Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197 (1976)
(comparing absence of due process concerns in lawmaking with the prevalence of due
process considerations in adjudication).
78 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-71 (1970) (discussing the requirements of
the Due Process Clause in an administrative hearing).
79 See PETER L. STRAUSS, TODD D. RAKOFF & CYNTHIA R. FARINA, GELLHORN AND BYSE'S
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 510-15, 549 (10th ed. 2003).
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legislation, has been subjected to requirements that are largely judi-
cial in nature.
1. The Notice Requirement
The first element under the APA informal rulemaking provisions
requires that the agency give general notice of "either the terms or
substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and
issues involved." 80 Some of the disputes arising under this provision
involve behavior that might trouble us in a truly legislative context.
For example, in AFL-CIO v. Donovan,"' the court struck down a propo-
sal to make amendments to an existing federal regulation because the
agency had simply published the entire regulation, running forty
pages in the Federal Register, without indicating the sections it wished
to amend.82 Had a legislature adopted the same approach, interest
groups could complain, quite plausibly, that they were not informed
of the issues at stake, even though they would not have a legal cause of
action.
The more typical challenge involving the notice requirement oc-
curs when the agency changes the proposed rule in the course of its
decision making process. In Chocolate Manufacturers Ass'n v. Block,83
the court overturned a Department of Agriculture regulation regard-
ing the foods that would qualify for government subsidies because it
excluded chocolate milk, although the notice did not indicate that
such an exclusion was contemplated.8 4 Similarly, in Shell Oil Co. v.
EPA,85 the District of Columbia Circuit overturned a regulation speci-
fying criteria for the identification of hazardous wastes because the
final rules included materials derived from hazardous wastes and
materials that mixed hazardous wastes with nonhazardous substances,
even though no notice was given that such materials were under con-
sideration. 86 However, in United Steelworkers of America v. Schuylkill Met-
als Corp.,8 7 the Fifth Circuit upheld a regulation that set wage levels for
80 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (2000).
81 757 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
82 See id. at 337-40.
83 755 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1985).
84 Id. at 1106-07. The agency argued, in its defense, that the prohibition resulted
from comments received in response to the proposed regulation. See id. at 1102.
85 950 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
86 See id. at 747-52; see also Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 279 F.3d 1180, 1186-88
(9th Cir. 2002) (overturning final rule because it represented a "paradigm shift" from one-
acre zones of deposit for woody debris to zones exceeding one acre); Am. Frozen Foods
Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107, 135 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (overturning final rule because a new
substance was added to list of controlled pollutants).
87 828 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1987), appeal after remand, 916 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1990).
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employees transferred for health reasons, although the regulation had
been extended to overtime pay and bonuses.88
Such cases illustrate the inapposite character of the APA's notice
requirement for agency rulemaking.89 The entire point of the com-
ment process is to effect changes in the proposed rule.90 Agency
rulemaking is a policy process that should involve the collection of
new information and the use of that information to design optimal
solutions. Giving notice that definitively determines the boundaries
of the matter under consideration is an essentially judicial concept. It
derives from the due process concern that the government should not
determine the legal position of a particular party without giving that
party an opportunity to be heard. Clearly, this opportunity is under-
mined if the party cannot prepare for the hearing, and preparation
will often be seriously impaired if the party does not know the exact
nature of the matters that the court will consider. Such due process
considerations, however, do not apply to policy formation. When a
legislature or an agency is setting a generally applicable policy, the
issue is not the fair treatment of particular individuals, but the alloca-
tion of benefits and burdens to groups for the overall advantage of
society.91 One may argue, of course, that policy making will be more
88 See id. at 317-18. This is the more common result of challenges to the adequacy of
notice. See, e.g., Am. Med. Ass'n v. United States, 887 F.2d 760, 768-69 (7th Cir. 1989)
(finding that the adoption of an allocation scheme that differed from the one originally
proposed did not violate the notice requirement); S. Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646,
656-59 (1st Cir. 1974) (concluding that the adoption of more extensive rules for control-
ling pollution than originally represented, including a freeze on new parking structures
and on-street parking, did not violate the notice requirement); Int'l Harvester Co. v. Ruck-
elshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 622, 632 & n.51 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (finding that adoption of a new
methodology for analyzing auto emissions data does not violate notice requirement).
89 The prevailing judicial test for determining whether changes to the proposed rule
violate the notice requirement signals this disjunction. This test requires that the final rule
be a "logical outgrowth" of the initial notice. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co., 950 F.2d at 750-52
(discussing and employing the logical outgrowth test). But logic refers to a process for
deriving statements from prior principles by reasoning alone, i.e., All men are mortal, Soc-
rates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal. The ways in which the final rule differs from
the initial proposal should be the result of new information gathering; that is, they should
be empirical. To paraphrase Justice Holmes, the life of the administrative rulemaking pro-
cess is not logic but experience. See OLVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1
(1881). Thus, the logical outgrowth test, in its effort to make sense of the APA's notice
requirement, inaccurately describes the administrative process and provides no clarifica-
tion of the way that notice should be applied to informal rulemaking.
90 See Trans-Pac. Freight Conference v. Fed. Mktg. Comm'n, 650 F.2d 1235, 1249
(D.C. Cir. 1980) ("The whole rationale of notice and comment rests on the expectation
that the final rules will be somewhat different-and improved-from the rules originally
proposed by the agency.").
91 Compare Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (hold-
ing that a hearing was not required before the Colorado Tax Commission could increase
the valuation of all taxable property in the city by forty percent) with Londoner v. City of
Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) (holding that a hearing was required before taxes could be
assessed on individual properties). See Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative
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effective if all parties know the issues and have the opportunity to con-
tribute their views, but policy formation concerns a much less strict
conception of notice, grounded in considerations of optimal informa-
tion flow, not fairness to individuals. As such, notice would be tested
by the quality of the agency's decision making, not by the rights or
opportunities of any particular private party.
Moreover, the idea of definitive notice only makes sense if the
ultimate decision must be based entirely on the record. This is pre-
cisely the criterion that the APA recognizes as the essence of formality
and the opposite of informal rulemaking. 92 Notice establishes the
subject matter on which a record, based on evidence presented in a
hearing, is to be compiled. Because evidence on any other matter can
be declared irrelevant, the notice determines the range of factual evi-
dence that can be collected and provides a standard against which the
record requirement can be enforced. If there is no requirement that
the decision need not be based on a record-if the agency can con-
sider any evidence it chooses-then its deliberations cannot be con-
tained within the boundaries of a prior notice.
2. The Statement of Basis and Purpose Requirement
Once the notice is given, anyone may send the agency a com-
ment, and agencies always accept these comments (indeed, how could
they not, unless they returned the envelope for insufficient postage?).
The fighting issue is the extent to which the agency must take the
comments into consideration in formulating its final rule, or, as more
commonly stated, the extent to which it must give reasons for re-
jecting comments in the statement of basis and purpose that accompa-
nies the final rule. The APA does not explicitly require agencies to
respond to the comments they receive, and there may thus be good
reason for concluding that such a requirement does not exist. But if
the agency is not required to respond to comments, how much con-
trol do they really impose on the rulemaking process?
As is well established from its statutory history, the APA repre-
sents a compromise between those who wanted to place restrictions
on the regulatory process and those who wanted to leave the process
unencumbered. 93 The comment requirement, in its present form, re-
flects this compromise in that the opposing factions met each other
State, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1044, 1050-51 (1984) (discussing the Londoner-Bi-Metallic distinction).
This distinction is central to the theory of the legal process school. SeeJESSE M. CHOPER,
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 60-128 (1980); JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 7-8 (1980); Lon L. Fuller, The
Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 394-404 (1978).
92 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
93 See ROHR, supra note 4, at 154-70; Rabin, supra note 7, at 1263-66; Shapiro, APA,
supra note 7, at 452-54.
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halfway. Unfortunately, they were meeting each other halfway on the
wrong path-the path toward adjudicatory procedures. 94 A judge, in
the interest of fairness, should respond to all the parties' relevant
claims, since their legal status is at stake. In addition, the adversary
system demands such responses because the parties' assertions are the
judge's only source of information. This task will not be overly bur-
densome because there are a small number of parties, typically two,
and the issues have been limited by the notice and record
requirements.
In the more open-ended, diffuse, and complex rulemaking pro-
cess, the obligation to respond to every argument advanced by private
parties is much more cumbersome as well as conceptually unstable.
There is no limit to the number of comments that the agency can
receive, nor is there any requirement that commentators have a signif-
icant stake in the issue under consideration. One comment may
come from a public interest group working exclusively in the field that
the proposed regulation covers, and thus would represent the consid-
ered judgments of many leading experts in that field; another may be
the casual ravings of a deranged or dyspeptic amateur. As a result,
requiring the agency to respond to every comment, and to justify its
final decision in its response, would have as sclerotic an effect as the
formal rulemaking procedures. More importantly, responding to
comments by interested parties is not a promising approach to mak-
ing public policy. It precludes systematic analysis, is likely to ignore
creative and long-term solutions, which private parties have no incen-
tive to propose, and provides no method for distinguishing among
alternative proposals. As a result, while the compromise was intended
to control informal rulemaking through the adjudication-inspired
idea of private comments, it effectively reduces that control to a weak
formality by not requiring any particular response to the comments.
Moreover, even this weak formality was thought to be too burdensome
to be applied to the innumerable rules that govern the agency's inter-
nal practices and management of resources.95 Consequently, these ac-
tions were exempted from the notice and comment procedure, and
thus from legal restriction by the APA. 96
94 It is in precisely this sense that the requirements for informal rulemaking, stated
exclusively in § 553 of the statute, are a weakened version of the fully adjudicatory formal
rulemaking requirements, which begin with the same section and include the additional
obligations of §§ 556 and 557, which also govern formal adjudication.
95 Such rules are necessary for any agency, even if it does not engage in regulation.
See JAMISON COLBURN, TOWARD AN ARCHITECTURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE ADAPTATION
(forthcoming).
96 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2) (2000) (excluding from coverage "matter[s] relating to
agency management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or con-
tracts"); id. § 553(b) (3) ("this subsection does not apply (A) to interpretative rules, general
statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice"). For argu-
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The APA's halfhearted effort to judicialize the informal rulemak-
ing process has produced a dilemma and a tribulation for reviewing
courts. The adjudicatory instinct behind the statutory requirement
creates the impression that the statute's drafters contemplated some
level of judicialization. 97 But the emptiness of the requirement that
the statute actually imposes suggests that any effort to exercise real
control, by adjudicatory mechanisms or otherwise, has been re-
nounced. Thus, the statute tempts its interpreters to begin proceed-
ing down the path toward judicialization, only to abandon it at some
indeterminate but very early point along the way. This has proven to
be particularly excruciating for reviewing courts, which, as Strauss,
Rakoff, and Farina note, are singularly susceptible to temptations of
this sort.98
Courts have responded in a variety of ways, but the leading re-
sponse is certainly the "hard look" doctrine.9 9 There is some question
whether this doctrine means that the agency must take a hard look at
the evidence or that the court will take a hard look at the agency's
decision making process.10 0 Under either interpretation, the agency
is required to provide more specific responses to the comments it re-
ceives.10 1 This provides substance for the comment requirement, but
the resulting judicialization of informal rulemaking creates the bur-
ments supporting this exemption, see Anthony, supra note 6, at 1372 (arguing that rules
with a binding effect on the public should be subject to notice and comment procedure);
Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 382
(arguing that nonbinding rules should be subject to post-adoption comments); Arthur Earl
Bonfield, Some Tentative Thoughts on Public Participation in the Making of Interpretative Rules
and General Statements of Policy Under the A.P.A., 23 ADMIN. L. REV. 101, 105-06 (1971) (con-
tending that the imposition of notice and comment procedure would discourage adoption
of interpretive rules and policy statements); Ronald M. Levin, Nonlegislative Rules and the
Administrative Open Mind, 41 DUKE L.J. 1497, 1499 (1992) (asserting that agencies should
not be discouraged from stating policies publicly by requiring notice and comment on
these policies); Kevin W. Saunders, Interpretative Rules with Legislative Effect: An Analysis and a
Proposal for Public Participation, 1986 DUKE L.J. 346 (stating that rules with binding effect on
public should be subject to notice and comment procedure); Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemak-
ing Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1480-87 (1992) (arguing that interpretative rules should
be exempt from comment procedure providing that notice is provided).
97 For an argument that this is a plausible interpretation of the statute, see Nathaniel
L. Nathanson, The Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Opinion: A Masterpiece of Statutory Misin-
terpretation, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 183, 189-90 (1979).
98 STRAUSS, RAKOFF & FARINA, supra note 79, at 510-15, 549.
99 The term originated in a decision by Judge Harold Leventhal. See Greater Boston
Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (stating that a court must
intervene if it becomes aware that "the agency has not really taken a 'hard look' at the
salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making" (footnote
omitted)).
100 See Nat'l Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 451 n.126 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Wald, J.);
Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REv. 505, 525-42 (1985).
101 For discussions of this understanding, see James V. DeLong, Informal Rulemaking
and the Integration of Law and Policy, 65 VA. L. REv. 257, 301-09 (1979); Garland, supra note
100, at 525-42; William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J.
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dens and complexities discussed above. While courts are often able to
distinguish between comments that merit a response and those that
do not, they are not always able or willing to make the distinction, or
they may not choose to do so if they are hostile to the agency for other
reasons, or, worst of all, courts may not believe that the distinction can
be validly made because they are conscientiously extrapolating from a
judicial model where every relevant claim is entitled to a hearing.
Difficulties such as these motivated the Supreme Court to restrict
the hard look doctrine in the case of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.10 2 Vermont Yankee de-
clared that courts may not impose procedural requirements on agen-
cies beyond those provided by the A-PA. 10 3 The Court's conclusion
was bolstered by the fact that Congress sometimes specifically requires
a particular agency to respond to comments, one element of a mecha-
nism revealingly dubbed hybrid rulemaking.10 4 The resulting lack of
38, 59-64 (1975); Stephen F. Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 401, 417-25 (1975).
102 435 U.S. 519 (1978). On remand, the regulation was again invalidated, this time
on substantive grounds. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
685 F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Once again, however, the Supreme Court reversed, con-
cluding that the substantive result lay within the agency's zone of discretion. Balt. Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
103 Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 525. For commentary endorsing the Court's rationale,
see Stephen Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts'Role in the Nuclear Energy Controversy, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1833 (1978) (arguing that agencies should be free to use their scientific
expertise); Clark Byse, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure: A Some-
what Different View, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1823 (1978) (responding to Stewart, infra, and arguing
that the Vermont Yankee decision provides the agency with the correct amount of discretion
and decision making power); Thomas 0. McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in
Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA,
67 GEO. L.J. 729, 750-53 (1979) (positing that, to be effective, agencies must be permitted
to act in a flexible manner). For criticism of the decision, see Nathanson, supra note 97, at
189-202 (asserting that the Vermont Yankee opinion misinterprets the APA's commitment to
judicial review of agency action); Richard B. Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of
Administrative Procedure, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1805, 1811-20 (1978) (contending that Vermont
Yankee quashes judicial efforts to develop standards for review of agency rulemaking). For
comments stating that the decision is not as significant as it seems, see CHRISTOPHER EDLEY,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE BUREAUCRACY 227-29 (1990)
(arguing that because substantive and procedural controls are relatively interchangeable,
courts will find other ways to intervene); Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, The
D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. CT. REv. 345, 406-07 (forecasting that Con-
gress will enact more hybrid statutes, thereby circumventing Vermont Yankee's effect);
Strauss, supra note 76, at 1408-13 (arguing that the decision is more limited than its rheto-
ric suggests, as it has not been applied, either at the time or subsequently, to foreclose all
procedural innovations).
104 See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1975, 15 U.S.C. § 57a;
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651, 655 (2000); Consumer
Product Safety Act of 1972, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051, 2058; and Toxic Substances Control Act of
1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629, § 2618(c) (2000). These statutes represent a hybrid be-
tween informal rulemaking and adjudication, or between informal rulemaking and formal
rulemaking, which is essentially adjudication. 'Hybrid rulemaking statutes also include
other adjudication-derived procedures, such as oral hearings and a right of cross-examina-
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constraint on agency behavior, however, continues to trouble the
courts. As a result, the hard look doctrine remains alive, Vermont Yan-
kee notwithstanding, as courts continue to add procedural require-
ments to the minimal and readily circumvented comment procedure
that the statute specifies. 0 5
This oscillation between imposing excessively burdensome re-
quirements on agency rulemaking and leaving the process largely free
of legal supervision is not primarily the fault of the courts or the agen-
cies, but of the underlying statute. In essence, the APA has provided
all the participants in the regulatory process with an ill-fitting tool to
achieve their purposes. If ope needs to tighten a screw, and only owns
a hammer, one can either leave the screw alone or try to smash it into
the wood by brute force. To supervise informal rulemaking, and ad-
ministrative policy making in general, courts and agencies have been
given a largely vapid set of requirements derived from a judicial
model. Their only choice is to leave rulemaking essentially un-
supervised or to add further judicial features which then, because of
their inapposite nature, encumber and rigidify the process.
One might imagine that this instinctive reliance on judicial mod-
els hearkens back to the premodern belief that government fulfills an
essentially judicial function and that the agency is simply discovering
or extrapolating existing rules rather than creating new ones. But
surely this is not a correct description of modern government, and
only people who reject the administrative state and the last two hun-
dred years of social theory think that such a description is normatively
desirable. The judicial model persists because of its familiarity, com-
bined with the unfamiliarity of more modern administrative alterna-
tives. In its persistence, however, it smuggles incremental, law-
discovering, adversarial approaches into a comprehensive law-creating
context, where they encumber the process without providing any sig-
nificant control on its outcome.
tion. See Clark Byse, The Department of Energy Organization Act: Structure and Procedure, 30
ADMIN. L. REv. 193, 204-07 (1978); Ralph F. Fuchs, Development and Diversification in Admin-
istrative Rule Making, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 83, 104-08 (1977); Hamilton, Rulemaking, supra
note 57, at 1281-82; Lionel Kestenbaum, Rulemaking Beyond APA: Criteria for Trial-Type Pro-
cedures and the lTC Improvement Act, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 679, 685-90 (1976).
105 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983) (invalidating Department of Transportation's rescission of passive restraint require-
ments for automobiles, finding that the agency had failed to consider the use of airbags
and certain types of seatbelts); Ober v. EPA, 84 F.3d 304 (9th Cir. 1996) (invalidating
EPA's acceptance of Clean Air Act plan because the State of Arizona had submitted addi-
tional information without offering commentators a chance to respond); United States v.
Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977) (invalidating FDA rules for
processing fish because the notice of proposed rulemaking had not included an account of
the scientific data upon which the agency had relied in formulating the rule).
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3. Ex Parte Contacts and Impartial Decision Makers
Two other areas where courts have been tempted to judicialize
the informal rulemaking process involve the prohibition on ex parte
contacts and the requirement of an impartial decision maker.
Neither of these closely related principles finds direct support in the
text of the APA's informal rulemaking requirements. Because they
are standard features of adjudicatory procedure, however, courts natu-
rally try to give substance to the statute's flimsy controls on informal
rulemaking.
The prohibition of ex parte contacts emanates from the basic
character of adjudication as an adversary proceeding with a decision
"on the record" by an impartial decision maker. Ex parte contacts
deprive one party of an opportunity to become aware of and contest
the assertions that the other party is advancing. 1° 6 To the extent that
ex parte contacts serve as the basis for decision, they violate the princi-
ple that the decision may refer only to evidence presented as part of a
formal record. 10 7 In addition, because these contacts are not moni-
tored by any outside party, they create a risk that the decision maker's
neutrality may be compromised by threats, bribes, or flattery. The
original APA briefly addressed the issue of ex parte contacts in adjudi-
cation.10 8 The 1976 Government in the Sunshine Act 109 added de-
106 See Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534,
1539-40 (9th Cir. 1993); Prof'l Air Traffic Controllers Org. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth.,
685 F.2d 547, 563-64 (D.C. Cir. 1982); HarveyJ. Shulman, Separation of Functions in Formal
Licensing Adjudications, 56 NOTRE DAME LAw. 351, 388-89 (1981).
107 This is not meant to suggest that all proceedings in a formal adjudication must be
"on the record." Current case management practices allow for many less formal contacts
between the judge and the parties. While these practices have raised concerns, see Owen M.
Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075-87 (1984) (discussing the problems that
settlement practice raises, including problems involving ex parte contacts); Judith Resnik,
Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. Rv. 374, 424-31 (1982); Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment?
Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twen-
tieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1471 (1994), they have become an integral part of modern
judicial decision making, and they are even more appropriate in the administrative con-
text. But information obtained in these off-the-record contacts may not be used as the
basis for decision. See Shulman, supra note 106, at 388-89. Moreover, all parties must be
present, both in the interest of general fairness and to enforce the prohibition against
relying on information obtained in this setting. Thus, despite the prevalence of off-the-
record proceedings, the prohibition against ex parte contacts and the link between this
prohibition and a decision on the record remains part of our adjudicatory practice.
108 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2000) ("The employee who presides at the reception of evi-
dence . . . may not (1) consult a person or party on a fact in issue, unless on notice and
opportunity for all parties to participate."); see also id. § 556(e) ("The transcript of testi-
mony and exhibits, together with all papers and requests filed in the proceeding, consti-
tutes the exclusive record for decision .... "). In addition, courts relied on general
considerations of due process to prohibit ex parte contacts. See, e.g., WKAT, Inc. v. FCC,
296 F.2d 375, 383 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (invoking due process concerns to prohibit ex parte
contacts in administrative adjudication).
109 Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1246 (1976) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 557(d)).
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tailed provisions to § 557 that prohibited "an ex parte communication
relevant to the merits of the proceeding," required that any ex parte
contact that did occur be "place[d] on the public record of the pro-
ceeding" and prescribed sanctions for private parties who violated the
prohibition." 0
These provisions do not apply to informal rulemaking under
§ 553, of course, and their underlying rationale is equally inapplica-
ble. Informal rulemaking is not an adversarial proceeding-it is ex-
plicitly not a decision on the record-and it does not require an
impartial decision maker. On the contrary, policy makers are ex-
pected to collect empirical data on a wide variety of issues from a wide
variety of sources, and much of this data gathering is necessarily ex
parte. Moreover, the diffuse and open-ended nature of the comment
process means that there will be no parties, in the traditional sense,
but rather a number of interest groups with complex, cross-cutting
relationships to each other.
The quasi-adjudicatory conception that lies behind the notice
and comment provisions of § 553, however, seems to demand some
limit on ex parte contacts. If the agency can consult anyone it chooses
at any time, what is the point of the comment process? There is some-
thing vaguely troubling, especially to a judge, about the image of all
those legally required written comments flowing in, to be time-
stamped and filed by the back-room myrmidons, while interest group
representatives whisper into the ears of the agency's top officials over
steak and champagne dinners. Having promulgated its preliminary
regulation and established a delimited comment period of sixty or
ninety days, it would seem that these officials should devote their at-
tention to the comments and make their revisions on the basis of the
ideas and information they receive. A ban on ex parte contacts dur-
ing this period seems necessary if the ultimate decision is to be based
on the reasoned arguments of the commenting parties."' 1
The leading case that advances this principle is Home Box Office,
Inc. v. FCC,"2 which involved an FCC regulation that severely re-
stricted the ability of cable and subscription television providers to
broadcast sports events and feature films.il l The court's adjudicatory
110 5 U.S.C. § 557(d). The sanction for private parties compels the decision maker to
"require the party to show cause why his claim or interest in the proceeding should not be
dismissed, denied, disregarded, or otherwise adversely affected on account of such viola-
tion." Id. §557(a)(1)(D).
For cases reviewing adjudicatory decisions on the basis of this provision, see Portland
Audubon Soc', 984 F.2d at 1542-48; ProJ'l Air Traffic Controllers, 685 F.2d at 557-75.
111 See Fuller, supra note 91, at 388-91 (positing that a decision based upon the argu-
ments presented is the essence of the judicial process).
112 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
113 Id. at 18-19. More precisely, the regulation continued, with some modifications, a
previous restriction to this effect. Id. at 17-18. In the proceeding at issue, the television
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instincts, set in motion by the implications of § 553's comment re-
quirement, were further stimulated ,because the regulation repre-
sented a final determination of extremely valuable commercial
opportunities, and because the agency had chosen to hold oral hear-
ings on the matter. The court's response was a complete prohibition
on ex parte contacts during the comment period, and a requirement
that any such contacts that occur be documented in the rulemaking
record.14 In imposing these controls on informal rulemaking, the
court relied on rationales drawn from the adjudicatory context, high-
lighting the benefits of "adversarial discussion,"' 15 insisting on "funda-
mental notions of fairness implicit in due process,"' 1 6 and citing the
Sunshine Act's parallel provisions governing formal adjudication." 17
From a doctrinal perspective, Home Box Office is a mess, but it re-
sponds to the deeply felt instinct that private party comments, the
APA's one means of controlling informal rulemaking, should count
for something.I 8 Because the opinion lacks any statutory foundation,
however, the principle it established was quickly undermined by sub-
sequent decisions.1' 9 In Sierra Club v. Costle,120 the District of Colum-
bia Circuit Court of Appeals refused to apply this principle to ex parte
contacts by the President, on the ground that the President possesses
constitutional authority to monitor agency decision making, and to
members of Congress on the ground that they have constitutional au-
thority to express their views to agency officials. 12 1
networks argued that subscription television and pay cable could outbid the networks for
the most desirable programs, thus leaving free television in a weakened financial condition
and leaving nonpaying viewers without desirable programming. The cable and subscrip-
tion companies countered that the restriction would leave them in a weakened financial
condition and deprive the entire viewing public of program diversity. Id. at 25.
114 See id. at 57.
115 Id. at 55. The court also uses the phrase "adversarial critique." Id.
116 Id. at 56.
117 Id. In a footnote, the court acknowledged that these provisions "are couched as an
amendment to 5 U.S.C. § 557, and as such the rules do not apply to rulemaking under
[§ 553]." Id. at 56 n.125. Judge MacKinnon, in a concurring opinion, justified the deci-
sion by noting that "[tihe rule as issued was in effect an adjudication of the respective
rights of the parties vis-a-vis each other." Id. at 62 (MacKinnon,J., concurring). While the
regulation certainly allocated valuable broadcast rights to one group of private parties at
the expense of another, to characterize it as an adjudication runs counter to the entire
structure of the APA.
S18 See Ernest Gellhorn & Glen 0. Robinson, Rulemaking "Due Process": An Inconclusive
Dialogue, 48 CHi. L. REv. 201, 239-43 (1981); Glen 0. Robinson, The Federal Communications
Commission: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REv. 169, 227-30 (1978).
119 See, e.g., Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 473-75 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (refusing to apply the rule stated in Home Box Office because to do so would be "a
clear departure from established law when applied to informal rulemaking proceedings").
120 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
121 See id. at 404-10. Commentators have generally supported these conclusions, par-
ticularly regarding the President. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 2245, 2331-46 (2001); Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Con-
2003]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Concerns about the impartiality of agency decision makers are
closely related to the issue of ex parte contacts, since a predominant
fear associated with such contacts is that they will compromise imparti-
ality. The idea of an impartial decision maker, one who knows the
applicable rules but has no prior knowledge or views about the facts
until she hears the presentations of the opposing parties, is inherently
linked to adjudication. In contrast, policy makers are expected to
have prior knowledge of the situation and to initiate the rule making
process on the basis of that knowledge. If the agency decision maker
is a member of an executive agency, her task is to move policy in par-
ticular directions dictated by the President. If the decision maker is a
member of an independent agency, her task is to develop her own
policy directions within the general, and often capacious, ambit of the
statutory authorization. In doing so, the policy maker is expected to
draw upon an accumulated knowledge of the complex subject matter
she is regulating. Thus, the quintessential image of an effective ad-
ministrator becomes a person with both expertise and vision. 122 This
image of a decision maker with definitive views and extensive knowl-
edge is problematic because it is not the image of an open-minded
individual who will pay attention to comments and reach conclusions
on the basis of the views that they present. Without an impartiality
inappropriate to the policy making context, the statutorily required
comments are once again reduced to readily ignored annoyances.
Judges are intimately familiar with issues of impartiality, of
course, and they are alert to the distinction between rulemaking and
adjudication. While they have overturned the results of adjudications
because the decision maker had expressed strong views on its subject
matter prior to the proceedings, 23 they have been quite reluctant to
do so for informal rulemaking. Very often, courts have based this re-
fusal on the nature of the policy making process.' 24 Unwilling to
tacts by the White House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 961-62 (1980); Patricia M. Wald &Jonathan
R. Siegel, The D.C. Circuit and the Struggle for Control of Presidential Information, 90 GEO. L.J.
737, 764-67 (2002).
122 See, e.g., THOMAS K. MCCRAw, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 17-56, 261-99 (1984)
(describing Charles Francis Adams as exemplary member and chair of the Massachusetts
Board of Railroad Commissioners and Alfred Kahn as visionary chair of the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board). See generally CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 144-54 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing the process that occurs
within an agency when it generates and writes rules).
123 See, e.g., Cinderella Career & Finishing Schs., Inc. v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583, 589-92
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (vacating order and remanding for further proceedings); Texaco, Inc. v.
FTC, 336 F.2d 754, 760-63 (D.C. Cir. 1964), vacated on other grounds, 381 U.S. 739 (1965)
(remanding to FTC with instructions to dismiss).
124 See, e.g., PLMRS Narrowband Corp. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 995, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1999); C
& W Fish Co. v. Fox, 931 F.2d 1556, 1564-65 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United Steelworkers of Am.
v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1208-09 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Ass'n of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC,
627 F.2d 1151, 1168-69 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 118, at
[Vol. 89:95
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
abandon the adjudicatory principle of impartiality in its entirety, how-
ever, they have declared that a decision maker must be disqualified if
there is clear and convincing evidence that he has "an unalterably
closed mind on matters critical to the disposition of the proceed-
ing." 1 25 The double hurdle of a demanding standard of proof and an
extremely exacting substantive rule testifies to the judges' lurking
sense that adjudicatory standards are simply inapplicable in the
rulemaking context. Yet the rule itself remains, and serves as an indi-
cation that judges feel the need to exercise some control despite hav-
ing no conceptual alternative to the judicial standards they recognize
as inappropriate.
D. Modes of Administrative Action: Informal Adjudication
As already noted, informal adjudication is the APA's residual cat-
egory, the undefined artifact of the statute's simultaneous distinctions
between rulemaking and adjudication on one hand, and between for-
mal and informal action on the other. The APA defines adjudication
as an "agency process for the formulation of an order,"'126 and it de-
fines order as "the whole or a part of a final disposition, whether af-
firmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form."1 27 In theory,
the definitions suggest that orders represent some subset of adminis-
trative actions, namely "final dispositions," and that other agency ac-
tions lie outside the defined category. Because the statute imposes no
procedural limits on informal adjudication, however, nothing turns
on the question of inclusion or exclusion at the present time.
For the purpose of rewriting the APA and deciding whether to
impose some procedural requirements, the problem with the existing
definition of adjudication is that its categories of "affirmative, nega-
tive, injunctive and declaratory" action, and the term "adjudication"
itself, are irretrievably judicial. What the drafters seem to have envi-
sioned for informal adjudication, if they were envisioning anything at
all, is a hearing of some sort, where evidence is taken or arguments
are heard and a decision is rendered, even though that decision
would not involve the rights of private parties and thus demand a for-
mal process. 128 Civil trials, at least in England, had their origin in
216-17; Peter L. Strauss, Disqualfications of Decisional Officials in Rulemaking, 80 COLUM. L.
REv. 990, 994-95 (1980).
125 Ass'n of Nat' Advertisers, 627 F.2d at 1170.
126 5 U.S.C. § 551(7) (2000).
127 Id. § 551(6).
128 As noted above, the "prompt notice" requirement of § 553(e), the one provision
that imposes procedural requirements on informal adjudications, seems to be limited to
situations of this kind. See supra note 64.
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proceedings of this sort, 129 and they still constitute an important
mode of administrative action, but they obviously represent only a
small portion of the actions that fall outside the categories of rulemak-
ing and formal adjudication. If one ignores the term "final" in the
definition of an order, on the ground that any definitive action can be
regarded as final, many more agency actions will be included in the
category of informal adjudication, but one is still left without a
description or framework for conceptualizing these actions, other
than the attenuated and irrelevant judicial one.
Considering some of the administrative actions that are neither
rulemaking nor formal adjudication illustrates the problem. One of
the most distinctive and important aspects of administration is strate-
gic planning, the process by which an agency decides how it will allo-
cate its human, legal and physical resources in the future to achieve its
goals.1 30 For example, a regulatory agency might decide to devote
more staff time to information gathering, a public health agency
might decide to increase its stock of a vaccine, and a school district
might decide to sell off some of its land or buildings. At what point
does a conclusion reached in the planning process become a "final
disposition?" More importantly, does answering this question tell us
anything useful about the kinds of legal controls that should be im-
posed upon these actions?
Another important category of decisions, and one that implicates
the same issues regarding the fair treatment of individuals as formal
adjudications, involves policy implementation. Even in a situation
where the agency is ultimately required to engage in formal adjudica-
tion, many of its crucial decisions lie outside the adjudicatory frame-
129 In the Middle Ages, the government often obtained information by royal inquest.
For example, Domesday Book, which represented the dawn of administrative government
in England, was compiled by convening twelve knights or lawful men from every hundred
to provide the desired information. 1 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 313 (A.L. Goodhart & H.G. Hanbury eds., 7th ed. 1956) (1931); F.W. MAITLAND, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 122-23 (1911); THEODORE PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW I11 (5th ed. 1956); 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 642 (2d ed. 1959).
When trial by ordeal was abolished in 1219, see supra note 70 and accompanying text,
England adapted the inquest to resolve disputes, see 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra, at 310-14;
PLUCKNEY-F, supra, at 119; VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 70, at 73-76. As Maitland points out,
the "royal process of ascertaining facts and rights by the sworn testimony of a body of
neighbours [was] now placed at the disposal of ordinary litigants." MAITLAND, supra, at
125.
130 See, e.g., JOHN FRIEDMANN, PLANNING IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: FROM KNOWLEDGE TO
ACTION (1987); KELMAN, supra note 38, at 88-93; E.S. QUADE, ANALYSIS FOR PUBLIC DECI-
SIONS 19-20 (1975). With respect to organizations generally (as opposed to specifically
governmental organizations), see ROBERT N. ANTHONY, PLANNING AND CONTROL SYSTEMS: A
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 24-68 (1965); NORMAN MACINTOSH, MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING
AND CONTROL SYSTEMS: AN ORGANIZATIONAL AND BEHAVIORAL APPROACH (1994); HENRY
MINTZBERG, STRUCTURE IN FIVES: DESIGNING EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATIONS 72-81 (1983).
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work. A regulatory agency must investigate before it brings an
enforcement proceeding, and because it typically lacks the resources
to investigate all, or even a significant proportion, of the potential vio-
lators, it must make choices about the deployment of its scarce re-
sources.131 These targeting decisions often have a greater impact
upon regulated parties than does the sanction imposed by the result-
ing adjudication. 132 An indictment, civil complaint, citation or cease
and desist order produces an immediate effect on a firm's employees,
investors, coventurers and contracting parties-the punishment or
vindication will come many years later, often as an anticlimax. Moreo-
ver, many implementation decisions are unrelated to adjudication.
Agencies can use investigations themselves-repeated visits by inspec-
tors or demands for documents-as sanctions. In addition, they regu-
larly negotiate, cajole, threaten, and plead with firms and
individuals.13 3 The agencies' ability to affect private behavior in these
situations may not come from the possibility of imposing a formal
sanction, but from granting or withholding a benefit or facilitating
compliance with a regulation that the private party feels compelled to
obey. Once again, it is difficult to know which of these actions repre-
sents a final disposition, and still more difficult to derive anything use-
ful from this inquiry. The kinds of controls that might alleviate some
of the fairness concerns raised by these administrative processes are
absent from the APA.
It is notable that the APA was drafted with regulatory agencies in
mind and that scholarship and teaching in administrative law have
focused almost entirely upon such agencies. They are, of course,
enormously important, but their staff members constitute a small frac-
tion of federal employees, and their expenditures represent a corre-
spondingly small proportion of the federal budget.1 3 4 Most
administrators work for, and most of the money is spent by, agencies
that deliver services, generally through institutions. At the federal
level, these include the armed forces, the veteran's hospitals, the intel-
131 See EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF
REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS: A TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND REPORT 165-71 (1982).
132 See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 19-53 (1992); EUGENE BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: WHAT
HAPPENS AFTER A BILL BECOMES A LAw 119-24 (1977); BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 131,
at 31-39; JOHN BRAITHWAITE, To PUNISH OR PERSUADE: ENFORCEMENT OF COAL MINE SAFETY
(1985);John Braithwaite et al., An Enforcement Taxonomy of Regulatory Agencies, 9 L. & POL'Y
323 (1987).
133 See BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 131, at 123-51.
134 It is difficult to separate operational from regulatory employees. At the agency
level, the independent agencies having primarily regulatory functions (i.e., excluding the
General Services Administration, the National Archives, NASA, the Peace Corps, the Postal
Service, and the Smithsonian) employ about 7.5% of all federal employees. See U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2002, at 321 tbl. 475 (2002).
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ligence services, such as the CIA and NSA, the national parks, monu-
ments, wildlife refugees and forests, embassies and consulates,
prisons, and the Federal Reserve Banks. 135 Nearly all the activities in-
volved in the operation of these institutions-all the planning,
budgeting, training, supervision, and actual implementation-pre-
sumably fall into the category of informal adjudication, at least to the
extent that they are final. Clearly, therefore, the APA offers few con-
ceptual resources for controlling the manner in which these institu-
tions carry out their functions and interact with the public.
Judicial interpretation has not closed this lacuna in the APA.
Even in the federal courts' more adventuresome days before Vermont
Yankee, the APA simply provided no foothold, no conceptual frame-
work, for imposing requirements on most actions that lay beyond the
ambit of rulemaking and formal adjudication. Courts have been able
to intervene only in certain types of cases, most notably when the ac-
tion is sufficiently similar to an adjudication so that they could rely on
their judicializing instincts, or when some legal requirement external
to the APA provided them with a conceptual entry point.
Perhaps the best known example of the first type ofjudicial inter-
vention is Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe. 136 The case in-
volved the Department of Transportation's decision to route an
interstate highway through a public park in Memphis, despite two fed-
eral statutes stating that parkland should not be used for highways
unless there was no "'feasible and prudent alternative." 137 Clearly
the Department was subject to some sort of legal limitation, but the
statute seemed to afford it considerable latitude and provided no stan-
dards for reviewing its decision. In responding to a citizens' group
challenge, the district court " 8 and the Supreme Court 39 had to rely
on the APA. Under the APA, however, the decision fell into the cate-
gory of informal adjudication, since it involved an allocation of a gov-
ernment resource, specifically a reallocation of land from one use to
another. 140
135 The Federal Reserve is also a major regulatory agency. Most of its staff and budget,
however, are devoted to direct services: collecting checks, processing electronic payments,
supplying cash, and buying and selling government securities to control the money supply.
See MARTIN MAYER, THE BANKERS 125-83 (1974).
136 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
137 See id. at 404-06, 404-05 nn.2, 3 (citing 23 U.S.C. § 138 (2000) and 49 U.S.C.
§ 1653(f) (2000)).
138 See Overton Park, 309 F. Supp. 1189, 1193-95 (D. Tenn. 1970), rev'd, 401 U.S. 402
(1971).
139 401 U.S. at 413-21.
140 See id. at 411-15. There were, of course, several levels of government involved,
since the State of Tennessee, through its municipal creature, the City of Memphis, owned
the land, and the federal Department of Transportation was making the challenged deci-
sion. Id. at 404-06. Under the federal highway program, states made the basic decisions
on highway routing, and the Department of Transportation, which provided the bulk of
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The Court was able to obtain a conceptual framework for analyz-
ing the case because the Department of Transportation held a public
hearing on the proposed route through the park. Hearings create a
record, and that record can be reviewed by an appellate court to de-
termine whether the challenged party-in this case, the Department
of Transportation-violated the law.141 Moreover, hearings invoke
public participation, and thus place the Department's decision mak-
ing process within the range of APA procedures. Of course, since this
hearing related to a decision that fell within the category of informal
adjudication, there was no requirement that the decision be made "on
the record after the opportunity for a hearing," and no requirement
that the Department elicit public participation, but this gave the
Court only momentary pause. 142 While the decision did not need to
be based on the record and no findings of fact were required, the
Court nonetheless declared that a record was necessary so that the
reviewing court could assess the legality of the agency's action. 143 This
record must consist of "the full administrative record that was before
the Secretary at the time he made his decision." 144 Moreover, if this
record failed to disclose "the factors that were considered or the Sec-
retary's construction of the evidence," 145 the reviewing court "may re-
quire the administrative officials who participated in the decision to
give testimony explaining their action.' 46 Thus, although the APA
does not require the agency to create a formal record in informal ad-
judications, it must nonetheless create some form of a record so that
courts can review their actions, and that record must be comprehen-
sive or the reviewing court can compel agency officials to testify.
the funding, approved them. See Oscar S. Gray, Section 4(1) of the Department of Transportation
Act, 32 MD. L. REv. 327, 330-31 (1973). Despite the fact that the state and federal govern-
ment were acting jointly, the decision was nonetheless an allocation of a governmental
resource. Hence, the decision did not provide a general rule, nor did it affect any individ-
ual's legal rights.
141 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 256 n.2 (1970); HenryJ. Friendly, "Some
Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267 (1975).
142 See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 417.
143 See id. at 419-21. The Court deepened the confusion that the case engendered by
declaring that judicial review would aim to determine whether the agency had made a
"clear error of judgment." Id. at 416. The clear error, or clearly erroneous standard, is
what an appellate court uses to review the findings of fact in a bench trial. See FED. R. Cv.
P. 52. This is almost certainly a more demanding standard than the Court intended. See
NAACP v. FCC, 682 F.2d 993, 998 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("Clear error of judgment is not
synonymous with 'clearly erroneous.' It is a more limited criterion of review." (citation
omitted)); infra note 216 (discussing use of clearly erroneous standard as part of substan-
tial evidence test).
144 Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420.
145 Id.
146 Id.
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The expansion of the APA's procedural requirements that Over-
ton Park effects is readily apparent.147 Here the Department of Trans-
portation, like most agencies in most cases, was subject to legislatively
prescribed standards, and such standards should not be ignored or
unreasonably distorted. Yet the controlling statute did not require a
hearing, and thus the Court was only able to effect the expansion in
Overton Park because the agency voluntarily decided to hold a hearing
for an informal adjudication in the particular instance. It would be
difficult to imagine the Supreme Court requiring the Department of
Transportation to create a record had it decided, in a meeting of
high-ranking administrators, to devote more resources to traffic safety
research, or to allocate discretionary funds to public transit. It is
equally difficult to imagine such a requirement if the Department had
reached some agreement in a negotiation with a state or private firm.
The procedural requirements that Overton Park devised are therefore
parasitic on the agency's fortuitous choice to engage in trial-type pro-
cedure for collecting information. Reliance on such procedures will
attract judicial attention the way honey attracts bears, and any agency
that wants to avoid the added scrutiny attendant to an informal adju-
dication would be well advised to use some other mechanism for ob-
taining the public's views.
A second situation where judges tend to impose procedures on
informal rulemaking is the cases that implicate some legal require-
ment external to the APA. The challenges to administrative informa-
tion-gathering provide a prime example. Effective regulation
demands large quantities of information, and this is frequently ob-
tained by on-site inspections of regulated facilities. 148 But the entry
of government investigators onto private property for the purpose of
discovering violations of the law necessarily raises search and seizure
concerns under the Fourth Amendment. Of course, the courts could
have simply required the agency to obtain a warrant, which would
have produced an extension of Fourth Amendment doctrine, but no
distinctive body of administrative law. Instead, courts have discerned
147 See Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Probing the Mind of the Administrator: Hearing Variations
and Standards ofJudicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act and Other Federal Statutes,
75 COLUM. L. REv. 721, 767-68 (1975) (arguing the Overton Park outcome was a "distor-
tion[ ] of the original meaning of the APA"); Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park:
Political and Judicial Controls Over Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1251, 1328-29 (1992) (criticizing decision as imposing unjustified standard of
review).
148 There are, of course, numerous other ways in which agencies obtain information,
and some of these have also been challenged on constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Braswell
v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988) (rejecting Fifth Amendment challenge to agency sub-
poena of business records); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950) (re-
jecting Fourth Amendment challenge to agency requirement of special reports regarding
compliance with prior cause and desist order).
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that inspections by a regulatory agency are not quite the same as
searches by the police, reasoning that while the two have obvious simi-
larities, the imposition of a regulatory program by the legislature al-
ters the balance between privacy and state necessity.
In Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Fran-
cisco14 9 and See v. Seattle,'50 the Supreme Court held that both private
residences and businesses may not be subjected to administrative in-
spections unless the agency obtains a warrant.' 5 1 However, the Court
has subsequently recognized an exception for closely or pervasively
regulated industries, such as firearms and ammunition, alcoholic bev-
erages, mining, and, somewhat surprisingly, automobile junkyards. 152
More significantly, the Court held in Camara and reiterated in the sub-
sequent decision Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,153 involving inspections
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), that the
agency did not need to demonstrate "probable cause in the criminal
law sense" in order to obtain a warrant. 154 Rather, as the Court said in
Barlow's, the agency need only demonstrate that "a specific business
has been chosen for an OSHA search on the basis of a general admin-
istrative plan for the enforcement of the Act derived from neutral
149 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (requiring compliance with Fourth Amendment prior to entry
by health inspector to determine whether building was being improperly used as a per-
sonal dwelling).
150 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (requiring compliance with Fourth Amendment prior to entry
by fire department inspector to determine whether warehouse complied with fire code).
The result in See extended Fourth Amendment protection to commercial properties as well
as to administrative inspections. See id. at 544-46.
151 Camara, 387 U.S. at 540; see id. at 546. Camara and See were companion cases that
overruled Frank v. Mayland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959) (holding that an entry by city health
inspector to determine whether home was infested with rats did not require a warrant
because it was part of a regulatory scheme).
152 New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (automobile junkyards); Donovan v.
Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (mining); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (fire-
arms and ammunition); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970)
(alcoholic beverages). While firearms, liquor and mining can all be reasonably described
as businesses that pose distinctive dangers to either the workers or the public, and that
have been historically subject to stringent regulation (a point for which, with respect to
liquor, one can offer a rare citation to the Eighteenth Amendment), automobile junkyards
do not appear to fall into this category. In Burger, New York's stated concern was that some
junkyards provided parts for stolen vehicles, see 482 U.S. at 708-09, but that is merely the
sort of concern about crime that leads to police searches. The State's regulatory scheme
simply requiredjunkyards to register the business and maintain records of the vehicles and
parts in the junkyard. See id. at 694 n.1. That is far removed from the usual idea of perva-
sive regulation, where entry is restricted by licensing, regular reports are required, and a
specialized administrative agency, with its own officials, regularly monitors the activities of
the licensed firms. There was no such agency in New York forjunkyards, and the adminis-
trative agents who searched Burger's junkyard were uniformed police officers. See id. at
693-94.
153 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (invalidating warrantless inspection of electrical and plumbing
installation business by OSHA official).
154 Id. at 320.
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sources."' 55 To complete the circle, the Court has also held, in the
autojunkyard case New York v. Burger, that the creation of such a gen-
eral administrative plan by the agency was an important factor in de-
termining whether a pervasively regulated industry could be subjected
to warrantless searches. 156
These administrative inspection cases are a doctrinal farrago.
The recognized meaning of the warrant requirement is that a police
officer must demonstrate to a judge that there is probable cause to
conclude that the person has committed an offense before searching
the person's residence or business.' 57 If one eliminates probable
cause and substitutes a completely different standard, such as "a gen-
eral administrative plan," there is little reason to describe the new re-
quirement as a warrant. While this can certainly be regarded as
diluting Fourth Amendment protection, 158 the accusation is beside
the point. The judges who decided these cases had no intention of
undermining the use of warrants in criminal law; rather, they were
using the claim that a warrant is required to fashion an essentially new
procedural requirement for one form of informal adjudication. Fed-
eral judges are fully aware that administrative agencies must collect
large quantities of information, and they know that the probable
cause requirement, designed for criminal cases, would be unaccept-
ably disruptive in a regulatory context.' 59 However, they are also
155 Id. at 321.
156 Burger, 482 U.S. at 701. Burger identified three criteria for determining whether an
industry was pervasively regulated: whether there was a substantial government interest in
the regulatory scheme, whether warrantless searches were necessary to further the regula-
tory program, and whether the government's inspection scheme, because of the "certainty
and regularity of its application," was a "constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant."
Id. at 702-03 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Burger estab-
lished a rather permissive test for pervasive regulation, see supra note 152 and accompany-
ing text, and because the necessity of warrantless searches is easy to assert, this test will
often reduce to the third criterion. Thus, the certainty and regularity of the inspection
plan is simultaneously the basis for obtaining a warrant and the test for determining that
no warrant is required.
157 See FED. R. CrM. P. 41(c).
158 See Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. at 326-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Geoffrey G. Hemphill,
The Administrative Search Doctrine: Isn't This Exactly What the Framers Were Trying to Avoid?, 5
RECENT U. L. REv. 215, 217 (1995).
159 The Barlow's, Inc. decision is positively apologetic about imposing any kind of war-
rant requirement on OSHA. Requiring warrants, it assures us, will not "impose serious
burdens on the inspection system or the courts." Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. at 316. To begin
with, "the great majority of businessmen can be expected in normal course to consent to
inspection without warrant." Id. (This is a bit like arguing that we should allow free
speech because most people will keep their mouths shut.) Moreover, the agency inspector,
having obtained a warrant, will still be able to show up and surprise the property owner.
See id. at 317. Having provided these reassurances, the Court goes on to dispense with
probable cause. Id. at 320. The dissent, written by judge Stevens and joined by justices
Blackmun and Rehnquist, was grounded in concern for the integrity of the Fourth Amend-
ment, not for the privacy of the regulated parties, and would have authorized administra-
tive searches without a warrant. See id. at 328-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, the Court
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aware that such inspections can serve as an independent sanction and
can be used in an unfair or abusive manner. Unfortunately, the APA
provides no standards whatsoever for assessing the propriety of on-site
inspections or most other forms of informal adjudication. So the
judges fashioned the new requirement of a general administrative
plan and used the Fourth Amendment as a vehicle to impose it on
administrative agencies. 160 This provides some measure of supervi-
sion for on-site inspections, but it is something of a gimmick, and, as
such, is unavailable for the great majority of other actions that reside
within the vast, vacuous APA category of informal adjudication.
E. Legislative and Executive Supervision
Apart from prescribing procedures for rulemaking and formal
adjudication, the original APA accomplishes one further task-it es-
tablishes standards for judicial review of administrative decisions.
These standards and their application in particular cases have at-
tracted a great amount of scholarly attention in the ensuing years,16 '
but the more basic and important point about the APA's judicial re-
view provisions is that they codify only one mechanism for supervising
and controlling administrative agencies. That mechanism, not sur-
prisingly, is the one that prevailed in the pre-administrative era.
When courts were the government's primary implementation mecha-
nism, as well as the primary public policy makers, the only institution
that had the authority and expertise to provide ongoing supervision of
courts were other courts. Courts, in this supervisory or appellate role,
remain an important source of legal control, and it would be wasteful
and precipitous to dispense with them after eight hundred years of
experience with this mechanism. In the modern administrative state,
however, courts are only one means of controlling administrative
agencies, and they are possibly the least important of the govern-
ment's three traditional branches. The legislature, even excluding
the act of legislation itself,1 62 and the executive, defined as comprising
was unanimously unopposed to permitting administrative searches without a finding of
probable cause.
160 It is common for courts, when engaged in policy making, to use positive law autho-
rizations such as constitutional or statutory provisions as a basis forjudicial jurisdiction, but
not as a source of standards. For a general description and ajustification of this approach,
see FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 43, at 14-15, 204-48. On-site inspection cases discussed
above are a particularly clear example of judicial policy making.
161 See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74
MINN. L. REV. 689 (1990); Cynthia Triyi, Availability of Judicial Review in Administrative Ac-
tion, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 729 (1987).
162 If control of the sort that the courts exercise means the supervision of an existing
institution, then legislation creating an institution, such as the Federal Trade Commission
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2000), or giving it a major new assignment, such as the Wheeler-
Lea Act, Pub. L. No. 75447, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (amending the Federal Trade Commission
Act and charging the FTC to regulate the advertising of products under the purview of the
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the President and his immediate advisors,1 63 exercise much more reg-
ular and powerful control over the administrative apparatus.
The APA, in its original form, made no attempt to codify these
non-judicial means of controlling administrative agencies; in fact, it
barely acknowledged their existence. The only exception is that the
statute allows for, but does not require, agency review of adjudicatory
decisions, following the pattern of appellate review.1 6 4 The APA's fail-
ure to address nonjudicial supervision may be a wise decision, because
some of these control mechanisms are either too basic, such as legisla-
tion, or too informal, such as intra-agency communication, to be cap-
tured by a procedural statute. But many other mechanisms have been
subsequently codified, albeit haphazardly, 65 or are clearly amenable
FDA) is not properly regarded as control. Less major legislation, designed to restructure
or redirect an agency, such as the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980,
15 U.S.C. § 57a, may be properly regarded as a form of control, however. See JAMES R.
BowERs, REGULATING THE REGULATORS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT
OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING 79-99 (1990) (discussing "corrective legislation"). Even if
such legislation is excluded, the legislature exercises extensive control of the administra-
tive apparatus through the oversight process, the budget process, and the ongoing interac-
tion with administrative staff. See id. at 18; MORRIS S. OGUL, CONGRESS OVERSEES THE
BUREAUCRACY: STUDIES OF LEGISLATIVE SUPERVISION 11-22 (1976); RichardJ. Lazarus, The
Neglected Question of Congressional Oversight of EPA: Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes (Who Shall
Watch the Watchers Themselves)?, 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 208-10 (1991); Matthew D.
McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire
Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 167 (1984) (comparing the various styles of oversight and dis-
cussing the types of oversight that Congress tends to employ in deciding the regulatory
issues); Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative
Arrangements and the Political Control ofAgencies, 75 VA. L. REv. 431, 434 (1989). With respect
to the legislative veto, see infra notes 166-72 and accompanying text.
163 The traditional three branch model of government places the President and the
administrative agencies together in the executive branch. As modern legal and political
science scholarship fully recognizes, the President is separate from the agencies, and one
of his principal responsibilities is to control them. See, e.g., AARON WILDAVSKY, THE POLIT-
ICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS 18-31, 181-87 (4th ed. 1984); Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2245 (2001); Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a
System of Checks and Balances: The Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REv. 161
(1995). In contrast, the President's immediate staff, individuals, and small groups that
interact directly with him and are not responsible for program implementation are prop-
erly regarded as part of his own office as chief executive, and not as administrative agencies
that he is trying to control. See BRADLEY H. PATTERSONJR., THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF: INSIDE
THE WEST WING AND BEYOND 9-11 (2000); NELSON W. POLSBY, CONGRESS AND THE PRESI-
DENCY 77-84 (4th ed. 1986).
164 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2000). Most agencies provide some sort of internal review for
adjudicatory decisions. See, e.g., 12 CFR § 19.40 (2003) (Comptroller of the Currency,
Treasury); 16 CFR § 3.52 (2003) (Federal Trade Commission); 17 CFR §§ 9.1-9.33 (2003)
(Commodity Futures Trading Commission); 47 CFR § 1.276 (2002) (Federal Communica-
tions Commission).
165 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (review of regulation by Congress); Exec. Order No.
12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Fed. 17, 1981), amended by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed.
Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993), amended by Exec. Order No. 13,258, 67 Fed. Reg. 9,385 (Feb.
26, 2002) (regulatory analysis by OIRA); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 57,735
(Sept. 30, 1993) (regulatory planning by OIRA).
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to codification, and their continued omission from the APA creates
uncertainty and makes the statute incomplete.
First, neither the oversight process nor the innumerable staff-to-
staff contacts that occur between Congress and the administrative
agencies make any appearance in the APA. Although these are well-
developed practices, or sets of practices, following rules that are well-
known to those involved in them, they have eluded any systemization
and often eluded much official scrutiny as well. In fact, the only legis-
lative control mechanism that has been scrutinized and ultimately
codified is the legislative veto. Before 1983, a significant number of
statutes, including several enacted before passage of the APA in 1946,
were drafted with legislative veto provisions.1 66 These allowed one
house of Congress, or the relevant Congressional committee, to coun-
termand the legislation and thereby exercise supervisory control over
agency rulemaking.167 When the Supreme Court invalidated the legis-
lative veto in INS v. Chadha'68 on rather questionable separation of
powers grounds, 69 Congress responded by openly disobeying the de-
cision and enacting legislative vetoes despite the decision,17 0 or by
switching to "report and wait provisions," which require the agency to
submit a regulation to Congress, and then wait for some designated
period of time before implementing it.' 71 In 1996, Congress enacted
a general report and wait provision for all "major" regulations, and
this was codified as an amendment to the APA.1 72 It seems unlikely
that such codification would have occurred, however, without the
rather extreme provocation that the Supreme Court provided. Cer-
166 See BARBARA CRAIG, THE LEGISLATIVE VETO 26-30 (1983);James Abourezk, The Con-
gressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52
IND. L.J. 323, 324 (1977).
167 See Abourezk, supra note 166, at 323-24; William N. Eskridge, Jr. &John Ferejohn,
Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern
Regulatory State, 8J. L. ECON. & ORG. 165, 177 (1992).
168 462 U.S. 919 (1983). For an account of the case, see BARBARA HINKSON CRAIG,
CHADHA: THE STORY OF AN Epic CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE (1988).
169 See E. Donald Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution,
and the Legislative Veto, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 125, 173-76; Peter L. Strauss, Was There a Baby in
the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789,
794-801. But see Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 207, 221-22 (1984) (defending the decision as "ensuring the fairness of legislation").
170 Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES 224-27 (1988);Joseph Cooper, The Leg-
islative Veto in the 1980s, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 364 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I.
Oppenheimer eds., 3d ed. 1985);Joseph Cooper, Postscript on the Congressional Veto: Is There
Life After Chadha?, 98 POL. ScI. Q. 427, 428 (1983) [hereinafter Postscript].
171 FISHER, supra note 170, at 227-29; Cooper, Postscript, supra note 170, at 429. During
the waiting period, Congress of course has the opportunity to enact legislation that would
prohibit the regulation. More practically, it has the opportunity to express its disapproval,
something few agencies will have the temerity to ignore.
172 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2000); see Daniel Cohen & Peter L. Strauss, Regulatory Reform
& the 104th Congress: Congressional Review of Agency Regulations, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 95, 96-97
(1997).
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tainly, no effort has been made to systematize the oversight process, or
any aspect of the ongoing, staff-level contact between Congress and
the agencies.
The President and his immediate staff play an even more central
role in supervising administrative agencies. 173 The Constitution ap-
parently designates the President as the head of the executive
branch, 174 but it is rather vague about his relationship with executive
agencies, and says nothing about the identity or structure of these
agencies. This lacuna became increasingly troublesome during the
Progressive Era, as the number of executive officials and independent
agencies proliferated without any organizing principle or internal
logic. 17 5 In 1926, the massive, highly contested, and weakly argued
decision in Myers v. United States176 confirmed the President's authority
to remove politically appointed officers in executive agencies, and, by
natural implication, held that these administrators serve at his will,
and must therefore follow his instructions. Nine years later,
Humphrey's Executor v. United States177 clarified the scope of the Presi-
dent's removal power and effectively insulated politically appointed
officers in independent agencies from termination at will. Despite
this history of ambiguity, controversy and ad hoc evolution, the APA
chose to say nothing about the authority structure of the executive.
Congress made no effort to specify the differences between executive
and independent agencies, the nature of Presidential commands with
respect to each type of agency, the internal command structure of
those agencies, or any other aspect of executive supervision and
control.
Even with respect to the executive agencies alone, it has long
been apparent to students of the Presidency, and to Presidents them-
selves, that the President cannot personally supervise this massive ap-
173 See THEODORE J. Lowi, THE PERSONAL PRESIDENT: POWER INVESTED, PROMISE UNFUL-
FILLED 55-58 (1985); PATTERSON, supra note 163, at 16; PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H.
BRUFF, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 343-66 (1988); Kagan, supra note 163, at
2281-2318 (examining Presidential oversight of agencies during the Clinton
administration).
174 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President");
id. § 2, cl. 1 ("[The President] may require [an] Opinion, in writing, of the principal Of-
ficer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their
respective Offices"); id. § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . all other Officers of the United
States").
175 See LEWIS L. GOULD, REFORM AND REGULATION: AMERICAN POLITICS FROM ROOSEVELT
TO WILSON (2d ed. 1986); MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY: PUBLIC POLICY
AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1900-1933, at 23-34 (1990); GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRL-
UMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916, at 94-112
(1963); Thomas K. McCraw, Regulation in America: A Review Article, 49 Bus. HIST. REV. 159,
161-62 (1975).
176 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
177 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
[Vol. 89:95
2003] THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
paratus. A formal response to this problem began when Richard
Nixon created what was to become the Office of Information and Reg-
ulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the statutorily-established Office of Man-
agement and Budget (OMB) .178 This regulatory effort expanded
during the two subsequent administrations.1 7 9 In 1981, President Rea-
gan issued an executive order 80 that required every executive agency
to submit to OIRA any regulation with significant economic impact,
together with a cost-benefit analysis of the regulation's impact.18 1
OIRA then reviews this material and disallows promulgation of any
regulation whose benefits do not exceed its costs in OIRA's judg-
ment.18 2 In 1985, Reagan extended OIRA review to earlier stages of
the rulemaking process.18 3 Every agency, including independent
agencies, was also required, by executive order, to prepare an annual
regulatory plan, describing all the initiatives that it expected to under-
178 The creation of OMB coincided with the reorganization of the Bureau of the
Budget. See Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-13, § 207, 42 Stat. 20, 22
(1921) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 702 (2000) (creating the Bureau of the
Budget); Morton Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control of Agency
Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 80 MICH. L. REv. 193, 221-24 (1981) [hereinafter
Rosenberg, Executive Power]; Morton Rosenberg, Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking: An
Analysis of Constitutional Issues that May Be Raised by Executive Order 12,291, 23 ARIZ. L. REV.
1199, 1217-18 (1981) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Presidential Control]. The process was called
"Quality of Life" review under Nixon, and focused primarily on the regulations of the
Environmental Protection Agency. See Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency
Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 533, 546-47 (1989).
179 See Exec. Order No. 11,821, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,501 (Nov. 27, 1974) (Gerald Ford);
Exec. Order No. 11,949, 42 Fed. Reg. 1,017 (Dec. 31, 1974) (Gerald Ford); Exec. Order
No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (Mar. 32, 1978) (Jimmy Carter). Carter created the Regu-
latory Analysis and Review Group (RARG) to carry out the review of regulations. See Regu-
latory Reform Message to Congress, 1 PuB. PAPERS OF JIMMY CARTER: 1979, at 492 (1980);
GEORGE C. EADS & MICHAEL Fix, RELIEF OR REFORM? REAGAN'S REGULATORY DILEMMA 54-57
(1984).
180 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981) (Ronald Reagan),
amended and combined with Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1,036 (Jan. 4, 1985)
(Ronald Reagan) in Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (William
Clinton), amended by Exec. Order No. 13,258, 67 Fed. Reg. 9,385 (Feb. 26, 2002) (George
W. Bush).
181 OIRA was created by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511,
§ 3503, 94 Stat. 2812, 2814-15 (codified as re-enacted at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (2000)).
Reagan's Executive Order 12,291 then assigned regulatory review to OIRA, thus making it
the functional successor of Carter's RARG (although not the legal successor, because
RARG was created by Presidential order, while OIRA was created by statute).
182 For descriptions of this process, see James F. Blumstein, Regulatory Review by the
Executive Office of the President: An Overview and Policy Analysis of Current Issues, 51 DUKE L.J.
851, 863-70 (2001); Bruff, supra note 178, at 549-51; Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power
and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451 (1979); Rosenberg, Executive Power, supra
note 178, at 193-94; Rosenberg, Presidential Control, supra note 178, at 1203-04.
183 Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1,036 (Jan. 4, 1985) (Ronald Reagan),
amended and combined with Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1985)
(Ronald Reagan) in Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (William
Clinton), amended by Exec. Order No. 13,258, 67 Fed. Reg. 9,3851 (Feb. 26, 2002)
(George W. Bush).
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take in the upcoming year. 18 4 This regulatory analysis has been sup-
plemented by at least three -legislative enactments: the Regulatory
Flexibility Act,185 which requires OMB to pay particular attention to
the impact of regulation on small businesses, the Paperwork Reduc-
tion Act,' 86 which gives OMB authority to review and approve agency
requests for information; and the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of
1915, 187 which requires cost-benefit analysis of regulations that have
economic impact on state and local governments, as well as private
parties.
The evolution of regulatory analysis has been a major and contro-
versial development in modern administrative practice. 188 It occurred
subsequent to the enactment of the APA and has not been incorpo-
rated into the statute, perhaps because the APA does not address ex-
ecutive supervision of the agencies, and thus provides no obvious site
for attachment of these new requirements. The ad hoc and uncodi-
fled character of this evolution has led to a number of lacunae and
ambiguities, regardless of whatone thinks of the regulatory analysis.
First, most aspects of regulatory analysis, because the President estab-
lishes them by order, do not apply to independent agencies,' 8 9 al-
though little rationale exists for, distinguishing these agencies from
their executive counterparts. Second, the procedural mechanism of
regulatory review has been unnecessarily tied to the substantive tech-
nique of cost-benefit analysis, reducing the range of the technique
and tinting it with an antiregulatory tone that is not always either in-
tended or justified. Finally, OIRA and OMB, because they must ap-
prove new regulations, have become a locus for lobbying efforts, a
184 Exec. Order 12,866 § 4(C).
185 Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (2000)).
186 Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (1980) (codified as re-enacted at 44 U.S.C.
§§ 3501-3520).
187 Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
188 See, e.g., Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsberg, White House Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1081 (1986) (contending that OIRA review im-
proves the quality of regulation by "encourag[ing] policy coordination, greater political
accountability, and more balanced regulatory decisions"); E. Donald Elliott, TQM-ing
OMB: Or Why Regulatory Review Under Executive Order 12,291 Works Poorly and What President
Clinton Should Do About It, 57 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 168-71 (1994) (asserting that
OIRA review is reactive and uncoordinated, failing to realize its potential for effectiveness);
Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regula-
tion, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1064-71 (1986) (arguing that OIRA review improperly inter-
feres with the rulemaking processes of administrative agencies); Richard H. Pildes & Cass
R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 43-95 (1995) (positing
that OIRA review undermines agency authority and imposes the wrong values).
189 Executive Order 12,291, § 2. The exception, as noted above, is that independent
agencies are required to submit a regulatory agenda. This is merely a reporting require-
ment, however. In contrast, executive agencies are required to obtain OIRA approval
before proceeding. Independent agencies have been urged to engage in regulatory review
of their own, see U.S. REGULATORY COUNCIL, A SURVEY OF TEN AGENCIES' EXPERIENCE WITH
REGULATORY ANALYSIS (1981), and sometimes do so.
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second bite at the proverbial apple of governmental action for those
who wish to delay or derail the administrative process.1 90 These mat-
ters might benefit from systematic legislative resolution; moreover,
they are precisely the kinds of issues that an act governing administra-
tive procedure would be expected to address.
F. Judicial Control
The one control mechanism specified in the APA-and thus the
only one incorporated into the general statutory scheme of adminis-
trative procedure-is judicial review. This Article has already dis-
cussed the inherently premodern nature of the judicial approach to
governance. Having done so, it might seem otiose to describe the stat-
ute's approach to judicial review as itself premodern. Indeed, ifjudi-
cial review is to be utilized-and this would certainly seem to be
advisable1 9 -then the resulting supervision would likely be judicial in
character. Perhaps the APA should have provided for special adminis-
trative courts, similar to those in France,1 92 or to those that Congress
subsequently created for the review of patent cases. 193 Administrative
cases are often brutally complex, and judges who hear them regularly
clearly benefit from the repeated exposure, while judges who do not
may find their ordinary docket disrupted and their lives made rather
190 See Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management & Budget Supervision
of Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT. RE-
SOURCES L. 1, 55-64 (1984); Morrison, supra note 188, at 1067; Pildes & Sunstein, supra
note 188, at 4-6.
191 Courts tend to agree, and display marked hostility to claims that a particular statute
precludes judicial review. See McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991)
(holding that Immigration Reform and Control Act's preclusion ofjudicial review of deci-
sions regarding application does not preclude review of procedures employed for making
these decisions); Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986) (holding
that while Medicare Act precludes review of "amount determinations," it does not preclude
substantial statutory and constitutional challenges); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361
(1974) (holding that statute declaring that decisions by Veterans Administration shall be
final and conclusive does not preclude judicial review in case of constitutional challenge);
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) (holding that Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
by specifying procedures for review of certain decisions, did not intend to preclude review
of other decisions where procedures were not specified); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Presump-
tion of Reviewability: A Study in Canonical Construction and Its Consequences, 45 VAND. L. REV.
743, 751-65 (1992).
192 See L. NEVILLE BROWN &JOHN S. BELL, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 41-165 (4th ed.
1993); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE COMMON-LAW WORLD
(1954).
193 See KENNETH J. BURCHFIEL, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT (The Bureau
of National Affairs, Inc., 1995); GILES S. RICH, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF CUSTOMS AND PATENT APPEALS (1980); Arti Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-
Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035 (2003). In 1982, the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was merged with the appellate functions of the
Court of Claims to form the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See Pub. L. No. 97-
164, 96 Stat. 36 (1982) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000)); Harold H. Bruff, Specialized
Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 332-33 (1991).
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miserable for the duration of the case. 194 But specialized courts bring
disadvantages as well, and the emergence of the District of Columbia
Circuit as the dominant administrative venue secures many of the
countervailing advantages. 195
On a deeper level, however, the APA's judicial review provisions
are indeed premodern and overly judicial. The problem does not re-
side in the authorization of judicial review, or in the structure or pro-
cedures of the reviewing courts, but in the APA's characterization of
the decision being reviewed. APA cases generally review the decisions
of an administrative agency, a massive, hierarchical, specialized organ-
ization, with different decision-making levels and its own internal pro-
cedures for appeal and review. The APA, however, treats the decision
under review as either legislation or a judicial adjudication. That is, it
relies on the dichotomous division of government action that
emerged from the pre-administrative era and ultimately prevailed in
the statute's implicit four-box grid. This has the virtue of familiarity,
but since an agency is a very different institution from either a legisla-
ture or a court, the approach creates serious perplexities.
In providing for judicial review, the APA states two substantive
standards which apply to actions that the court is reviewing. All ac-
tions, including rules, must be struck down if they are "arbitrary and
capricious,"196 while formal adjudications must be reversed if they are
"unsupported by substantial evidence." 197  These standards have
proven difficult to apply, and many commentators have noted that
there is little difference in the ways in which they are employed. 98 In
addition, the statute does not provide any procedural standard for the
court to follow in making these substantive determinations. 199 Evi-
194 See Bruff, supra note 193 (suggesting the creation of a separate administrative court
to hear cases that have certain characteristics).
195 Venue rules centralizing review in the District of Columbia Circuit have generally
been replaced by the general venue statute, allowing a person to sue an agency in her
district of residence, where the action arose, or where a defendant resides. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(e) (2000); see Cass R. Sunstein, Participation, Public Law, and Venue Reform, 49 U.
CHi. L. REv. 976, 978-79 (1982). Because most important cases are brought by organiza-
tions, see supra notes 34-37, and because these organizations, or their government relations
departments, are located in Washington, the D.C. Circuit remains the court of choice for
litigation against administrative agencies.
196 See5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (2000).
197 See id. § 706(2)(E).
198 Friendly, supra note 141, at 1313-14; Garland, supra note 100, at 533-34; Pedersen,
supra note 101, at 48-49; Antonin Scalia & Frank Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the Con-
sumer Product Safety Act, 20 UCLA L. REv. 899, 935 n.138 (1973); Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial
Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REv. 185, 222-23 (1974).
199 One possible exception is the de novo standard. Section 706(2)(F) states that
courts should overturn any agency action "unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the
facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F). In other
words, the substantive standard is "unwarranted by the facts" and the procedural standard
is "trial de novo," that is, the court exercises its own judgment, giving no weight to the
[Vol. 89:95
2003] THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 139
dently the authors of the Act were so focused on the idea that agency
action was either legislation-like or adjudication-like that they ne-
glected to consider the institutional realities of the courts, and specifi-
cally the need to tell courts by what standard the moving party would
need to prove its claim that the agency action was arbitrary and capri-
cious or lacking in substantial evidence.
An action that violates the more lenient arbitrary and capricious
standard appears to lack any possible justification and thus to be irra-
tional. As a result, this standard of review appears equivalent to the
modern due process standard of minimum rationality, which applies
to legislation that does not implicate a specified constitutional
right.200 In fact, Justice Brandeis authored a unanimous Supreme
Court decision to this effect a few years before Congress began draft-
ing the APA.20 1 The problem is that the actions involved are not those
of a legislature-a popularly elected body with supreme policy making
authority-but of an agency, an institution composed of appointed
officials that must operate according to the commands of, and within
the confines established by, that policy making authority. Therefore,
to uphold any agency action that meets such a lenient standard seems
inappropriate, and courts have instinctively resisted this result. Their
resistance provides a way to understand what Merrick Garland has de-
scribed as the substantive aspect of the "hard look" doctrine, the as-
pect that courts have used to guide their own decision making
agency decision. This standard was common at the time the APA was drafted, see Ronald
M. Levin, Scope-of-Review Doctrine Restated: An Administrative Law Section Report, 38 ADMIN. L.
REv. 239, 273-77 (1986), but it has largely been abandoned, see Citizens to Preserve Over-
ton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971); Levin, supra, at 273-74. A rare exception
is Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1979), in which the appellate court concluded
that facts related to constitutional claims should be considered on a de novo basis. Id. at
782.
200 See FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc, 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993) ("On rational-
basis review, a classification in a statute such as the Cable Act comes to us bearing a strong
presumption of validity" (citation omitted)); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297,
303 (1976) ("Unless a classification trammels fundamental personal fights or is drawn
upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage, our decisions pre-
sume the constitutionality of the statutory discriminations and require only that the classifi-
cation challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest."); Williamson v. Lee
Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) ("It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction,
and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to
correct it."); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) ("So far as the requirement of
due process is concerned,... a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reason-
ably be deemed to promote public welfare. . . ."). See generally JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL
REVIEw AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980) (arguing that judicial review should
be reserved for situations involving human rights or fundamental interests where there is a
breakdown in the political process); ELY, supra note 91, at 43-72, 181-83 (same).
201 Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 186 (1935) ("[W]here the
regulation is within the scope of authority legally delegated, the presumption of the exis-
tence of facts justifying its specific exercise attaches alike to statutes .. .and to orders of
administrative bodies.").
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process. 20 2 What Garland called the quasi-procedural hard look doc-
trine, the requirement that agencies take a hard look at the evidence
provided in the notice and comment process, was ostensibly rejected
by the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee.20 3 But the substantive hard
look doctrine, which announces that courts will take a hard look at
the quality of the agency's overall decision making, remains in force.
Reviewing courts are not willing to accept the APA's implication that
they should treat an agency like a legislature. Further, the APA pro-
vides no guidance on procedural standards, and, as a result, courts
may feel more free to fashion such standards for themselves.
The leading case on this point, and one of the most important in
modern administrative law, is Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 204 State Farm challenged the Na-
tional Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) rescission of
a regulation. 20 5 NHTSA, apparently responding to the policy objec-
tives of the Reagan administration, 20 6 had rescinded its regulation re-
quiring the installation of passenger safety devices on automobiles. 20 7
In this decision and a separate opinion, every member of the Court
agreed. The Court held that an agency could not simply rescind a
previously enacted regulation without explaining why its previous con-
clusions concerning the necessity for the regulation no longer ap-
plied. 20 8 Clearly, this is a different standard from the one imposed on
a legislature, which can repeal a statute without explanation, and is
regarded as fully justified if it does so on the basis that the majority of
the repealing legislature has a different political affiliation from the
majority of the enacting one.
Further judicial resistance to the APA's apparent analogy be-
tween legislation and rulemaking is provided by the Supreme Court's
decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC,20 9 perhaps the most impor-
tant case in modern administrative law. Decided one year after State
202 See Garland, supra note 100, at 532-42.
203 See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 439
U.S. 961 (1978); Garland, supra note 100, at 528-31.
204 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
205 Id. at 33-34.
206 See id. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The
agency's changed view of the standard seems to be related to the election of a new Presi-
dent of a different political party."); CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RE-
THINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 63-65 (1990); Garland, supra note 100, at
543; Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 5, at 312-13.
207 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 34.
208 See id. at 57. In so doing, the Court specifically rejected the assertion that arbitrary
and capricious review was equivalent to minimum rationality review of a statute: "We do
not view as equivalent the presumption of constitutionality afforded legislation drafted by
Congress and the presumption of regularity afforded an agency in fulfilling its statutory
mandate." Id. at 43 n.9.
209 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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Farm, Chevron grappled with the standard that courts should employ
when evaluating an agency's interpretation of a statute in the
rulemaking process, that is, the procedural standard for review of
agency interpretations. Again, the APA is silent on the subject. There
is no question that the agency, in carrying out its statutory authority to
make rules, is interpreting the statute itself, because its rules are sup-
posed to implement the statute's policy. 210 Recognition of this obvi-
ous fact, however, acknowledges the breakdown of the APA's implicit
analogy between legislation and agency rulemaking, because a legisla-
ture generally does not engage in statutory interpretation. 21 1 When
the legislature speaks, at least through legislation, it does so with the
same level of authority as it did in drafting prior legislation. 212 There-
fore, even if the legislature refers to a pre-existing statute, its new pro-
nouncement changes that statute to whatever extent it is inconsistent
rather than interpreting the statute. 2 13 Simply asking the initial ques-
tion in the Chevron case, even before the Court provided its answer,
thus represented a rejection of the idea that an agency rulemaking is
equivalent to legislation.
Chevron's answer reveals further conceptual difficulties. The case
holds that agency interpretations are to be reviewed according to a
two-step formula. First, "[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." 214 Second, "if
the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
210 SeeJerry L. Mashaw, Agency Statutory Interpretation, in ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
(2002): Article 9, at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art9; Edward Rubin, Dynamic Statu-
tory Interpretation in the Administrative State, in IssuEs IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (2002): Article
2, at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art2.
211 It does, of course, interpret legislation through the oversight process and staff level
contacts. See BowERs, supra note 162, at 18-27; MARCUS E. ETHRIDGE, LEGISLATIVE PARTICI-
PATION IN IMPLEMENTATION: POLICY THROUGH POLITICS 38-66 (1985). But this is not the
analogy upon which the APA's rulemaking procedures are based.
212 There is nothing to stop the legislators from enacting a statute that binds them, see
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 42-43 (1961), but there is likewise nothing to stop
them from repealing the statute. The Constitution places at least one limit on the repeal
of legislation by means of the Contracts Clause, but it is only applicable to state legislation,
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977)
(invalidating repeal of statutory covenant limiting use of bond funds); Fletcher v. Peck, 10
U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (invalidating legislation annulling land titles granted by legisla-
ture), but this simply forbids one type of statute, just as the First Amendment forbids cer-
tain types of statutes, and does not affect the legislature's general ability to repeal its prior
enactments.
213 It is theoretically possible that the legislature could make a statement in a statute
that declared itself to be merely an interpretation of a prior statute, that is, say something
about a prior statute but declare that the prior statute controlled, and that judicial inter-
pretations of the prior statute would take precedence over the legislatuire's own
interpretation.
214 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
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permissible construction of the statute. '21 5 Thus, if the statute is
clear, the agency interpretation will be reviewed de novo, with no def-
erence given to the agency, but if the statute is deemed ambiguous,
deference will be extensive. This is reminiscent of the standard that
an appellate court uses when reviewing a bench trial: the appellate
court will review questions of law de novo, but will recognize a zone of
discretion for matters that lie within the special expertise of the trial
court, and will reverse only if the trial court's decision is "clearly erro-
neous."216  Chevron seems to analogize unambiguous law in the
rulemaking setting to legal conclusions in the bench trial, and ambig-
uous law to factual determinations by the judge. 217 In other words,
once the analogy between rulemaking and legislation failed, as it nec-
essarily did when the Court envisioned the agency as an interpreter of
law, the Chevron Court had recourse to the only other model that the
APA suggests and the only model that was conceptually available-the
model of judicial adjudication. Just as the APA and the courts, in at-
tempting to impose procedural requirements on rulemaking, have
turned to the judicial model because their preferred model, legisla-
tion, offers no procedural requirements, the Chevron Court, in its ef-
fort to fashion a standard of review for statutory interpretation in
agency rulemaking, turned to the judicial model because the legisla-
tion model offered no standards of its own for interpreting a
statute.218
215 Id. at 843. For discussions of this two-step test, see Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Inter-
pretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452, 456-67
(1989); Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 Cri.-KEN'r L.
REv. 1253 (1997); RichardJ. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency
Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REv. 301 (1988); Mark Seidenfeld, A Synco-
pated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Stat-
utes, 73 TEx. L. REv. 83, 103-24 (1994); Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-
Chevron Era, 3 YALEJ. ON REG. 283, 287-88 (1986); Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases
Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency
Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1117-26 (1987); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration
After Chevror. 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071, 2083-85 (1990).
216 FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."). This is likely
not the clearly erroneous standard that the Court adopted in Overton Park. See supra note
143 and accompanying text; infra note 229 and accompanying text.
217 The analogy between ambiguous statutes and findings of fact is buttressed by the
idea that, in both cases, the decision maker being reviewed-the agency or the trial
court-has been authorized to use its expertise to gather evidence and make a judgment.
This judgment is based on direct exposure to the evidence, which would be difficult for an
appellate court to second-guess. The agency gathers its evidence in the notice and com-
ment process, which is, as noted above, a partial judicialization of agency rulemaking.
218 The Court's recent decision in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), held
that agency interpretations that are not based on an explicit grant of Congressional author-
ity are not entitled to deference under the Chevron rule, but only to a lower level of defer-
ence specified in the earlier case of Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). These
additional distinctions will only add to the complexity of a rule that is already difficult for
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The APA's substantial evidence standard for reviewing adjudica-
tion is somewhat similar to the Chevron doctrine.2 1 9 The reviewing
court examines questions of law de novo, while questions of fact-
when the decision maker being reviewed has direct exposure to the
evidence-are to be treated with deference. The analogy that under-
lies this standard, however, is not found in appellate practice, but
rather in the review of a jury finding by a trial judge. The federal
courts established the substantial evidence test 220 in a series of pre-
APA cases interpreting the National Labor Relations Act, 22 1 and de-
scribed substantial evidence as being "enough to justify, if the trial
were to ajury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought
to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury."222 When the APA was
drafted, it incorporated the judicially developed substantial evidence
test, in preference to formulae that were perceived as more demand-
ing, thus implying Congressional acceptance of the trial verdict anal-
ogy.2 2 3 The statute did add, however, that the court, in making this
determination, "shall review the whole record."224
Ajudicial analogy of this sort might not appear to create the same
conceptual difficulties with respect to adjudication as it does when ap-
plied to rulemaking. While it may be problematic to treat agency
rulemaking like a bench trial, it would appear, at first, to be must less
troublesome to treat an agency adjudication like ajury determination.
Both agency adjudications and jury verdicts are, after all, fact finding
decisions in an adjudicatory context. Nonetheless, an agency is not
comparable to a jury; it is a multilevel, hierarchical institution with its
own internal review procedures. Once agency decision makers other
than the original hearing officer or administrative law judge become
involved in the decision, the analogy between an agency and a jury
breaks down. A breakdown of this sort was apparent in the most fa-
courts to follow. See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empiri-
cal Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DuKE LJ. 984, 1023-36.
219 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2000).
220 See NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939) (stat-
ing that substantial evidence "must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the
fact to be established"); Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) (explaining
that substantial evidence "means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion"); Wash., Va. & Md. Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142,
146-47 (1937) (implicitly construing the term "evidence" in the statute to mean "substan-
tial evidence").
221 Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-169 (2000)). The Act provides: "The findings of the Board as to the facts, if sup-
ported by evidence, shall be conclusive." Id. § 10(e), 49 Stat. at 454.
222 Columbian Enameling, 306 U.S. at 300.
223 One of these more demanding standards was the "clearly erroneous" standard for
review of a judge's findings of fact by an appellate court, see FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a), or a
master's findings by a trial court, see id.
224 5 U.S.C. § 706.
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mous case construing the APA's substantial evidence test, NLRB v.
Universal Camera Corp.225
In Universal Camera, the National Labor Relations Board's trial ex-
aminer found that the dismissal of an employee, who was somewhat
confusingly named Chairman, was not an unfair labor practice.2 26
The Board reversed, finding that Chairman had been dismissed in re-
taliation for his pro-union testimony at a representation hearing, and
ordered his reinstatement.227 When the case was appealed, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit had to determine the meaning of
the substantial evidence test in this procedural setting. Judge Hand,
writing for the majority, 228 concluded that taking the trial examiner's
conclusion into consideration would necessarily impose a higher stan-
dard of review than the substantial evidence test allowed. 229 The only
way to preserve the relatively lenient standard of review that the sub-
stantial evidence test required was to ignore the conclusions of the
trial examiner, and look only to the facts that the examiner had found
and to the plausibility of the Board's decision. 230 In assessing this de-
cision, Judge Hand declared, the proper institutional analogy was to a
225 179 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1950), vacated by 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
226 See id. at 750.
227 See id. at 751.
228 Judge Frank joined the opinion, and Judge Swan dissented. Id. at 775 (Swan, J.,
dissenting).
229 Id. at 753. Hand reasoned:
[I]t is practically impossible for a court, upon review of those findings
which the Board itself substitutes, to consider the Board's reversal as a fac-
tor in the court's own decision. This we say, because we cannot find any
middle ground between doing that and treating such a reversal as error,
whenever it would be such, if done by a judge to a master in equity.
Id. Analogizing review of the Board's response to its trial examiner to review of a trial
judge's response to a master is problematic because the latter situation involves a higher
level of scrutiny, due to the fact that a trial judge is only supposed to reverse the master's
findings when they are "clearly erroneous." FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e) (2) ("In an action to be
tried without ajury the court shall accept the master's findings of fact unless clearly errone-
ous."). In contrast, an agency board is permitted to review the facts found by the trial
examiner de novo-the board is allowed to substitute its own findings for those of the trial
examiner.
The clearly erroneous standard, as discussed above, see supra note 143 and accompany-
ing text, is considered more demanding than the substantial evidence test. In the latter
test, the clearly erroneous standard is not used as the standard by which an appellate court
reviews an agency decision but as a comparison with the standard by which the court
should judge that agency's treatment of its trial examiner's conclusions. In that context, it
appears to be too weak a standard because the agency has the authority to review its trial
examiner's findings de novo, that is, to substitute new findings. To hold the agency to the
clearly erroneous standard that a district court must use to evaluate a master's findings
would excessively restrict the agency's authority. Judge Hand wanted to avoid this result,
which he anticipated if a reviewing court treated an agency reversal of its hearing officer as
less authoritative than an agency affirmance.
230 Of course, the trial examiner's finding of fact would still be considered, as it was
part of the record.
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special verdict of a jury, which must be sustained if the conclusion was
"within the bounds of rational entertainment. 23'
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Frankfurter,
reversed the Court of Appeals. 232 Citing the statutory language, the
Court held that the substantial evidence test required an examination
of the entire record, excluding the trial examiner's conclusions, and
could not be limited to an assessment of the Board's decision
alone. 233 Justice Frankfurter rejected Judge Hand's binary choice be-
tween ignoring the conclusions of the hearing examiner and applying
the more demanding clearly erroneous standard. "[W]e do not find
ourselves pinioned between the horns of his dilemma, ' 234 Frankfurter
wrote, while conceding that "to give the examiner's findings less final-
ity than a master's and yet entitle them to consideration in striking the
account, is to introduce another and an unruly factor into the judg-
matical process of review." 235 The rule of Universal Camera is still the
leading interpretation of the APA's substantial evidence test.
This rule does not resolve the conceptual difficulties of treating
an agency like a jury, however, and criticisms of the substantial evi-
dence test's coherence have bedeviled it ever since.2 36 One of the
best indications of these difficulties is the disposition of the case on
remand.2 37 Although Judge Hand was famous as a judicial craftsman,
he simply refused to follow the Supreme Court opinion. Having one
horn of his dilemma-that is, ignoring the trial examiner's decision-
cut off by the Court, he simply chose the other horn. He reversed the
Board's order, holding that the trial examiner's "findings on veracity
must not be overruled without a very substantial preponderance in
the testimony as recorded."238 Apparently, Judge Hand felt it would
be impossible to formulate a coherent standard of review if one read
substantial evidence an assessment of the entire record, including the
conclusions of the trial examiner. This quandary, of course, arises
from the complexity of reviewing a decision by the Board of an admin-
istrative agency that is itself an appeal from an administrative hearing
231 179 F.2d at 754.
232 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
233 See id. at 488-89.
234 Id. at 493.
235 Id.
236 See, e.g., Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review: "Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record, "64
HARV. L. REv. 1233 (1951); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and
Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DuKE L.J. 1051 (1995); Paul
R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 679,
682-93 (2002).
237 See NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1951).
238 Id. at 430. Judge Frank, in a concurring opinion, took issue with Judge Hand's
intransigence, but he did so very gently, characterizing it as excessive modesty. See id. at
431.
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officer. The APA's analogy to judicial practice in this setting, like that
analogy in other settings, and like the APA's analogies to legislation, is
too perplexing to serve as an effective means of controlling and legal-
izing the administrative apparatus.2 3 9
II
SUGGESTIONS FOR AN ADMINISTRATIVE APA
As stated at the outset, the purpose of this second Part of the
Article is not to draft a new statute or even to resolve all the issues that
would arise if such an effort were to be undertaken. Rather, drawing
from Weber's theory of bureaucracy, it suggests general principles
that should govern an administrative procedure act for the adminis-
trative state, and uses these principles to identify the major provisions
that such an act would include. 240 This Part will present these princi-
ples in the order of the existing act-rulemaking, adjudication, infor-
mal rulemaking or executive action, and judicial review. This is not
meant to suggest that the order should be used in drafting a revised
statute, but only to facilitate a comparison between the proposal and
the existing APA.
A. The Nature of Administrative Government
The natural starting point for drafting an effective administrative
procedure statute is a basic understanding of administrative govern-
ment.241 Max Weber, writing at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury, provided such an understanding,242 and while some of his
specific conclusions have been challenged, 243 his underlying insight
239 Nor does the Supreme Court itself seem willing to live with the standard it articu-
lated. In Allentown Mack Sales and Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998), the Court
reversed an NRLB adjudication by re-evaluating the evidence presented to the ALJ in a
much more searching manner than its opinion in Universal Camera would suggest. See id. at
366-71. The decision was at least partially motivated by the Court's longstanding dissatis-
faction with the NLRB's refusal to use its rulemaking authority, and to instead make policy
through adjudication, see NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764-66 (1969) (up-
holding NLRB adjudicatory decision, but stating that the Board violated APA procedures
in establishing a rule through adjudication); id. at 781 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (reasoning
that the decision could not stand because the NRLB violated the APA); Joan Flynn, The
Costs and Benefits of "Hiding the Ball": NLRB Policymaking and the Failure ofJudicial Review, 75
B.U. L. REV. 387 (1995); William T. Mayton, The Legislative Resolution of the Rulemaking Ver-
sus Adjudication Problem in Agency Lawmaking, 1980 DUKE L.J. 103, 117-19, but it also indi-
cates the instability of the Court's standard of review for agency adjudication.
240 For the view that some of the suggested results could be achieved through a differ-
ent interpretation of the existing APA, see COLBURN, supra note 95.
241 See Croley, supra note 9, at 166-68.
242 1, 2 WEBER, supra note 13, at 212-26, 956-1002, 1393-1405.
243 See ALVIN W. GOULDNER, PATTERNS OF INDUSTRIAL BUREAUCRACY 15-29 (1954) (ar-
guing that Weber's theory incorporates outmoded ideas about managerial efficiency);
WOLFGANGJ. MOMMSEN, THE AGE OF BUREAUCRACY 14-20 (1974) (contending that Weber's
theory uses ideal types, rather than being grounded in actual historical developments);
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remains central to almost all contemporary accounts of bureaucracy
in sociology, political science and political theory.244 The principal
elements of his theory of bureaucracy, 245 which will be discussed in
turn below, are instrumental rationality, the rational-legal mode of le-
gitimate domination, jurisdiction, hierarchy, vocation, and con-
tinuity. 2 4 6 While Weber is philosophically sophisticated, and made
important contributions to epistemology, 247 there is nothing abstract
about his theory of bureaucracy. He was, and conceived of himself as,
a sociologist devoted to describing modern political, social and eco-
nomic relations as they actually exist.248
1. Purpose
According to Weber, there are two kinds of rationality-instru-
mental rationality and value rationality.249 The simplest explanation
of this distinction is that value rationality involves the choice of ulti-
mate ends, while instrumental rationality involves the choice of means
that are best suited to achieve a pre-established end. 250 This simple
Carl J. Friedrich, Some Observations on Weber's Analysis of Bureaucracy, in READER IN BUREAU-
cRAcY 27 (Robert K. Merton et al. eds., 1952) (positing that Weber's theory incorporates
outmoded management techniques).
244 For contemporary administrative law accounts that highlight the distinctive charac-
ter of bureaucracy, see COLBURN, supra note 95; Croley, supra note 9; Mark Seidenfeld, A
Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511 (1992).
245 Although Weber uses the term "bureaucracy" it will be avoided here, except when
quoting or paraphrasing his work, because of its excessively negative associations, see gener-
ally MICHAEL BARZELAY, BREAKING THROUGH BUREAUCRACY (1992) (expressing the view that
bureaucracy creates rigid, unimaginative governance); F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM
(15th ed. 1994) (asserting that bureaucracy destroys personal freedom); HowARD, supra
note 16 (arguing that bureaucracy suppresses beneficial public and private initiatives);
HENRY JACOBY, THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF THE WORLD (Eveline L. Kanes trans., 1973)
(contending that bureaucracy displaces diversity of culture); LEON TROTSKY, THE REVOLU-
TION BETRAYED: WHAT Is THE SOVIET UNION AND WHERE IS IT GOING? 284-90 (Max Eastman
trans., 1937) (positing that bureaucracy destroys genuine Communism); David Luban et
al., Moral Responsibility in the Age of Bureaucracy, 90 MICH. L. REv. 2348, 2348-56 (1992)
(claiming that bureaucracy breeds fascism).
246 See I WEBER, supra note 13, at 217-20.
247 MAX WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (Edward A. Shils & Henry
A. Finch eds. & trans., 1949). See THOMAS BURGER, MAX WEBER'S THEORY OF CONCEPT FOR-
MATION: HISTORY, LAWS AND IDEAL TYPES (1976); L6WITH, supra note 15 (same); FRITZ
RINGER, MAX WEBER'S METHODOLOGY. THE UNIFICATION OF THE CULTURAL AND SOCIAL SCI-
ENCES (1997); W.G. RUNCIMAN, A CRITIQUE OF MAx WEBER'S PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
(1972) (critiquing Weber's philosophy of the social sciences, while acknowledging that
Weber's work was "fundamental" to the subject).
248 1 WEBER, supra note 13, at 3-56; see BENDIX, supra note 15, at 41-48, 417-94;
LOWITH, supra note 15, at 44-49.
249 See 1 WEBER, supra note 13, at 24-26. These are two of the basic modes of "mean-
ingfully oriented" social action, in Weber's view. They are ideal types, which are usually
mixed together in actual social behavior. See id. at 25-26. For Weber's concept of ideal
types, see id. at 19-22; WEBER, supra note 247, at 89-99; see also RINGER, supra note 247, at
110-21 (discussing Weber's concept).
250 See 1 WEBER, supra note 13, at 24-25.
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distinction, for purposes of understanding administrative govern-
ment, is problematic because the two terms are relative within a hier-
archical governmental structure. As Herbert Simon points out, the
means of a superior tend to become the ends of a subordinate.2 5 '
The police chief's end is fighting crime, for example, and her means
is to put more patrol officers on the streets; for her subordinate, put-
ting more patrol officers on the street becomes the end, and reducing
the amount time that the officers spend filing reports or attending
training sessions becomes the means.
In fact, Weber's distinction is more complex, and ultimately more
useful for analyzing modern administrative government. An action is
value rational, in his view, when it arises from a truly deontological
commitment, that is, a commitment that is carried through regardless
of its consequences. 252 It acquires its rational character because it
stems from a conscious choice, not from either habit or emotion. 253
An action is instrumentally rational when it is governed by the actor's
expectations about its consequences, that is, "when the end, the
means, and the secondary results are all rationally taken into account
and weighed. ' 254 When the ends are determined by value rationality,
instrumental rationality will be used only for the choice of means.255
Alternatively, the actor may treat the ends as "subjective wants" rather
than predetermined values, and "arrange them in a scale of con-
sciously assessed relative urgency. '2 56 Taking consequences into ac-
count, the actor can then satisfy these wants "in order of urgency, as
formulated in the principle of 'marginal utility.'- 25 7 Thus, the actor's
ordering of his goals, or ends, would be partially determined by his
subjective desires, and partially determined by the consequences of
his rational efforts to achieve those desires.
According to Weber, instrumental rationality is the dominant
principle of modern bureaucratic government. 258 We create agencies
251 See HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 62-65 (3d ed. 1976). Simon re-
fers to this as a "means-ends" chain. Id. at 62.
252 See 1 WEBER, supra note 13, at 24-25.
253 Weber's other two nonconscious types of social action are affectual, action deter-
ninpd hy emntions and feelings, and traditional action "determined by ingrained habitua-
tion." See id. at 25.
254 Id. at 26.
255 See id. From the perspective of an instrumentally rational actor, Weber says, value
rationality is always irrational because it does not subject the ends to consequentialist as-
sessment. Id.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 See], 2 WEBER, supra note 13, at 223-26, 954,1393-95; see also MICHAEL OAESHOTr,
Rationalism in Politics, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 5, 9 (1991) ("That
anything should be allowed to stand between a society and the satisfaction of the felt needs
of each moment in its history must appear to the Rationalist a piece of mysticism and
nonsense. And his politics are, in fact, the rational solution of . .. practical conun-
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and authorize them to act in a far-ranging and often domineering
manner because we want them to implement our basic commit-
ments-our value choices-as effectively as possible. We know that
our economic system is bureaucratized, that it is dominated by hierar-
chically organized institutions with credentialed employees possessing
high levels of technical expertise, 259 and we understand that only an
equivalently rational, technical mode of governance can achieve our
collective purpose of controlling, these institutions. As Weber notes,
"the purely bureaucratic type of administrative organization-that is,
the monocratic variety of bureaucracy-is, from a purely technical
point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and
is in this sense formally the most rational known means of exercising
authority over human beings."2 60
But this effectiveness comes at a price and creates a danger.
Weber analyzed the danger most fully in his first major work, The Prot-
estant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.261 The Protestant ethic, which
saw material success as a sign of predestined salvation, was a form of
value rationality that induced instrumental rationality in economic be-
havior.262 But this pursuit of wealth has been "stripped of its religious
and ethical meaning"-particularly in the United States, Weber as-
serts263 -and become a freestanding. and self-sustaining mechanism
"which [today] determine[s] the lives of all the individuals who are
born into [it]" and may do so "until the last ton of fossilized coal is
burnt. '264 This is, in Weber's famous phrase, the "iron cage" of mo-
dernity. 265 It closes on us because the instrumentally rational mode of
action can only evaluate its ends as wants, rather than values, and be-
drums."). Oakeshott is even more critical of this process than Weber. See id. at 41
("[A]mong much else that is corrupt and unhealthy, we have the spectacle of a set of
sanctimonious, rationalist politicians, preaching an ideology of unselfishness and social
service to a population in which they... have done their best to destroy the only living root
of moral [behavior].").
259 See 2 WEBER, supra note 13, at 1394 ("The 'progress' toward the bureaucratic state,
adjudicating and administering according to rationally established law and regulation, is
nowadays very closely related to the modern capitalist development."). Numerous com-
mentators have discussed the prevalence of bureaucracy in modem industry, see PETER F.
DRUCKER, THE NEW SOCIETY. THE ANATOMY OF INDUSTRIAL ORDER (Transaction Publishers,
1993) (1950); EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (W.D. Halls trans.,
1984); GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY (1968); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,
THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985).
260 1 WEBER, supra note 13, at 223.
261 MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Talcott Parsons
trans., 1958).
262 See id. at 178-81.
263 Id. at 182.
264 Id. at 181.
265 See id. Certainly, this is one of the best-known metaphors in modern sociology. For
indications of its notoriety, see ARTHUR MITZMAN, THE IRON CAGE: AN HISTORICAL INTER-
PRETATION OF MAX WEBER v-vi, 107 (1969); PaulJ. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron
Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, in
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cause the consequentialist character of this action repeatedly revises
those ends in terms of their practical effects, that is to say, their costs.
The same spirit of instrumental rationality, operating in the equiva-
lently bureaucratic political system, generates a governmental system
that is divorced from its ethical and moral origins, a soulless mecha-
nism that, because of its technical superiority, becomes "escape-
proof."2 6 6 We are thus imprisoned in an iron cage of technocratic
rule that is impervious to democratic control or redirection.
Habermas, whose work is strongly influenced by Weber, offers an
alternative view of modem government. At first, he was inclined to
accept Weber's "diagnosis of the times,"267 arguing that bureaucracy
created a "legitimation crisis"268 by separating the "instrumental func-
tions of the administration from expressive symbols" 269 and the nor-
mative resources of civil society.270 But in The Theory of Communicative
Action,271 he expands Weber's concept of value rationality, pointing
out that one can engage in a rational debate about norms or deonto-
logical ends just as one can engage in such a rational debate about
empirical or instrumental means to achieve desired ends. 272 The ra-
tionalization of government, with its separation from its religious ori-
gins and its development into a technocratic, instrumental
mechanism, does not foreclose debate about deontological value, he
argues, but rather facilitates such a debate. 273 Once norms are sepa-
rated from governmental mechanisms, rather than being embedded
in them, they are easier for social actors to perceive and discuss. Such
discussion is carried out, in Habermas's view, through the medium of
communicative action, that is, human interaction directed toward
achieving understanding. 274 In a subsequent work, Between Facts and
Norms, he argues that this communicative debate about norms can be
institutionalized through the mechanisms of liberal democracy. 275
THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 63 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J.
DiMaggio eds., 1991).
266 2 WEBER, supra note 13, at 1401; see BENDIX, supra note 15, at 458-59.
267 This phrase comes from HABERMAS, supra note 15, at 243.
268 . p rifl cN HARERMAS I,.C.ITIMATION CRISIS 68-75 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1975).
269 Id. at 70.
270 See id. at 97-102 (critiquing Weber's theory of legitimation).
271 HABERMAS, supra note 15. Habermas' explicit discussion of Weber, see id. at
143-286, 345-66, occupies nearly half of the book. In fact, it can be argued that the entire
work is a critique and re-evaluation of Weber. The second volume of this work further
discusses Weber's work. See HABERMAS, supra note 15, at 303-31.
272 HABERMAS, supra note 48, at 282-337.
273 Id. at 248-70.
274 Id. at 286-337.
275 JORGEN HABERPMAS, BETWEEN FACrS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996).
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2. Mechanisms
Governance, according to Weber: depends on domination, "the
probability that certain specific commands (or all commands) will be
obeyed by a given group of persons."276 While physical force or eco-
nomic incentives may induce such obedience, governments always try
to create a belief in their legitimacy, that is, the idea that their com-
mands are to be obeyed.277 Weber's three pure types of legitimate
domination are traditional, "resting on an established belief in the
sanctity of immemorial traditions", charismatic, resting on devotion to
an extraordinary individual, and rational, "resting on a belief in the
legality of enacted rules."278 The rational-legal mode of legitimate
domination, or governance, to use a more contemporary and palat-
able term, is typically implemented by a bureaucracy, and it is the
growth of a rational-legal approach to governance that provides the
basis for modern bureaucratic systems.279
Of course, most traditional societies have law. What makes ra-
tional domination uniquely legal, according to Weber, is that it sepa-
rates law from its traditional or natural law origins, and treats it as a set
of positive enactments that can be used to define agreed-upon ends
and implement the means by which those ends are achieved. 280 In
other words, positivized law functions as the essence of the instrumen-
tal rationality that characterizes bureaucratic governance. For Weber,
this positivization process is part of bureaucracy's iron cage, the pro-
cess by which instrumental rationality becomes stripped of its ethical
meaning and transformed into a machine for satisfying subjective
wants. This is precisely the point that Habermas contests in challeng-
ing Weber's pessimistic prognosis of bureaucracy. According to
Habermas, Weber has lost track of his own distinction between instru-
mental rationality and value rationality.28 1 At the theoretical level, the
276 ] WEBER, supra note 13, at 212.
277 See id. ("[E]very genuine form of domination implies a minimum of voluntary com-
pliance"). One of the many gaps in Weber's account is that he never really defines legiti-
macy. Contemporary writers have filled that gap by discussing legitimacy at length. For a
standard definition, see RODNEY BARKER, POLITICAL LEGITIMACY AND THE STATE 11 (1990)
("[L]egitimacy is precisely the belief in the rightfulness of a state, in its authority to issue
commands, so that those commands are obeyed not simply out of fear or self-interest, but
because they are believed in some sense to have moral authority, because subjects believe
that they ought to obey."). For general discussions of legitimacy, see DAVID EASTON, A
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE 278-310 (1965); LEGITIMACY AND THE STATE (William
Connolly ed., 1984); PATRICK RILEY, WILL AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY (1982); RONALD Ro-
GOWSKI, RATIONAL LEGITIMAC, A THEORY OF POLITICAL SUPPORT (1974); TOM R. TYLER,
WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 19-68(1990).
278 1 WEBER, supra note 13, at 215.
279 See id. at 218-20.
280 See 2 WEBER, supra note 13, at 866-76, 880-95. For a general discussion of Weber's
sociology of law, see ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, MAX WEBER (William Twining ed., 1983).
281 HABERMAS, supra note 15, at 243-54.
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positivization of law does not obviate the need for its moral justifica-
tion; at the empirical, or historical, level, this positivization can make
the need for an independent moral justification more apparent. "Pre-
cisely the posttraditional structure of legal consciousness sharpens the
problem of justification into a question of principle that is shifted to
the foundations but not thereby made to disappear. 282
The structural features of bureaucratic governance emerge from
its instrumentally rational mode of action and its use of positive law as
a means of rational domination.28 3 To begin with, modern bureau-
cratic agencies are defined by their jurisdiction over specified and ra-
tionally described aspects of society.2 8 4 Prior to the advent of modern
administrative government at the end of the eighteenth century,28 5
the officials who served Western European monarchs were organized
along traditional, path-dependent, or entirely idiosyncratic lines. For
example, in the period before the French Revolution, one depart-
ment of the royal government organized to take advantage of a partic-
ular minister's talents exercised control over "agriculture, mining, and
postal communications; provincial affairs; stud farms and secretarial
matters."286 Second, modern agencies are organized hierarchically,
with "a clearly established system of super- and sub-ordination in
which there is a supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones."287
Hierarchy, of course, existed in premodern regimes as well, 288 but the
282 Id. at 261.
283 Because Weber's discussion focuses on ideal types, see supra note 249 and accom-
panying text, the features of bureaucracy emerge from its underlying conceptual structure,
but do not necessarily evolve from that structure. In fact, Weber is quite vague about the
historical status of his account. See MITZMAN, supra note 265; MOMMSEN, supra note 243, at
1-21; 1 WEBER, supra note 13, at xxxvii (Guenther Roth's introduction).
284 See 1, 2 WEBER, supra note 13, at 218, 956.
285 Periodization is always a contentious point, but there is a general consensus among
modernization scholars that the crucial transition to modern administrative government in
Western Europe occurred between 1775 and 1825. See BARKER, supra note 4, at 6; HOWARD
G. BROWN, WAR, REVOLUTION, AND THE BUREAUCRATIC STATE 1 (1995); SIR NORMAN
CHESTER, THE ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM 1780-1870 (1981); CLIVE H. CHURCH,
REVOLUTION AND RED TAPE: THE FRENCH MINISTERIAL BUREAUCRACY 1770-1850 (1981); SA-
MUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 93-139 (1968); GILES
MAcDONOGH, PRUSSIA 40-43, 273-76 (1994); PARRIS,, supra note 4, at 22-35; POGGI, supra
mechanics of government, also identify this era as a critical one. See E.J. HOBSBAWM, THE
AGE OF REVOLUTION 1789-1848 (1962); PAULJOHNSON, THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN: WORLD
SOCIETY 1815-1830 (1991); RAYMOND WILLIAMS, THE LONG REVOLUTION 184-90 (1961).
286 CHURCH, supra note 285, at 31. The largest division of the French government
during the Ancien RMgime was the Contr6Le Gentral, which Church describes as "a rambling
agglomeration of commissions, services, semi-independent functionaries, and others, all
held more or less together by a small and still very personal team of clerks." Id.
287 2 WEBER, supra note 13, at 957; see 1 WEBER, supra note 13, at 218.
288 Current usage of the term can be traced to a sixth-century Christian mystic who
assumed the name of Dionysius the Areopagite, and is consequently called Pseudo-
Dionysius, or Pseudo-Denis. Hierarchy originally referred to priestly rule; Pseudo-Denis
developed the idea that both priests and angels were organized in a set of orderly ranks.
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strictly defined levels of command, responsibility and appeal by subor-
dinates to a higher authority is a feature of the administrative state.
This is one of the aspects of bureaucracy that contemporary reformers
criticize severely,289 but there is no indication that it will disappear in
the foreseeable future. It would be a near impossibility to make the
Department of Health and Human Services or the Federal Reserve
Board nonhierarchical.
A third distinctive feature of modem bureaucracy is that the bu-
reaucrats are full-time, salaried employees, chosen on the basis of
their educational or experiential credentials, and expected to use the
skills derived from those credentials in performing their tasks. 290
Weber's terminology here, which is that office holding in a bureau-
cracy is a "vocation" or a "calling" does not translate well into En-
glish;29 ' thus the word "expert," which is more familiar, will be used
instead. 292 Prior to the advent of the modern state, governmental po-
sitions were regarded as private property, to be awarded to favorites
and political allies, or to be purchased by entrepreneurs. Rather than
receiving a salary, the official was compensated by retaining the fees
that his office entitled him to collect.29 3 Thus, a political ally would be
placed in control of a port and given the ight to retain most of the
tariffs, or an entrepreneur would purchase the right to collect taxes in
DiONYSIUS, THE PSEUDO-AREOPAGITE: THE ECCLESIASTICAL HIERARCHY (Thomas L. Campbell
trans., 1981); DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE: THE CELESTIAL HIERARCHIES (eds. of the Shrine
of Wisdom trans., 1935); see RONALD F. HATHAWAY, HIERARCHY AND THE DEFINITION OF OR-
DER IN THE LETTERS of Pseudo-Dionysius: A Study in the Form and Meaning of the Pseudo-
Dionysian Writings (1969).
289 See, e.g., GORE, supra note 3, at 23; HOWARD, supra note 16, at 62-83; Doff & Sabel,
supra note 17, at 292-314.
290 See 1, 2 WEBER, supra note 13, at 220-23, 958-59.
291 See 2 WEBER, supra note 13, at 958-59. The German word that Weber uses is
"Beruf" Replacing it with "expert" does some violence to Weber's meaning, since Beruf is
one of the most important concepts in his opus. See Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in
FROM MAX WEBER 77 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946), Max Weber,
Science as a Vocation, in id. at 129; WEBER, supra note 261, at 79-183. In The Protestant Ethic
and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber translates Beruf into the English word "calling," but notes
that this term is more clearly "a religious conception, that of a task set by God" in English
than it is in German. Id. at 79. It is precisely because "calling" has these religious implica-
tions that Beruf is generally translated as "vocation" when Weber uses it in a secular context.
But Weber's use of the same term in both contexts reflects his assertion that modern in-
strumental rationality is an outgrowth, and a distortion, of the Calvinist religious sensibility.
See supra notes 261-64 and accompanying text.
292 This approach has its own problems, of course, since it implies that the administra-
tors actually know what they are doing, a contestable claim in many cases. Here, it merely
means that they are specially trained, and the word "credentialed" will be added at various
points to emphasize this more restricted meaning.
293 See BARKER, supra note 4, at 34-36, 61-64; JOHN P. MACKINTOSH, THE BRITISH CABI-
NET 70-73 (3d ed. 1977); PARRIs, supra note 4, at 33-35; 2 WEBER, supra note 13, at 966-67.
In order to effect the transition to salaried bureaucracy, the British government, lacking
the advantage of a revolution, was required to compensate the former office holders for
their loss of property.
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a given area.294 The replacement of such officials with salaried bu-
reaucrats not only increased government revenues and administrative
competence, but also eliminated the autonomous character of the of-
ficials and subjected them to hierarchical control. 295
This feature of officeholding leads, in turn, to the final feature of
bureaucracy: continuity. Because the official is granted her position
on the basis of her credentials rather than her political affiliations, she
generally holds it as long as she remains competent to perform its
functions, or until she is promoted on the basis of her perform-
ance. 296 Because the official is understood to be filling a predefined
role for which she has been selected on the basis of objective criteria
such as education, she can be replaced with an equivalent official
when she leaves.2 97 Similarly, the jurisdiction, purposes and proce-
dures of the agency are set by law, and thus remain constant until the
authorizing statute is amended. Bureaucracies, moreover, maintain
records that provide them with institutional memory. 298 This con-
tinuity of official action, which sometimes persists through periods of
enormous political upheaval, combines with defined jurisdiction, hier-
archical organization, and credentialed expertise to give modern bu-
reaucracy its characteristic form.
An important theme in contemporary administrative law scholar-
ship has been the criticism of command and control regulation, which
is often characterized as excessively bureaucratic. 299 In its place,
scholars suggest that the agency recognize the organizational struc-
ture of regulated entities, open a dialogue with them, and allow them
to play an active role in the implementation process.300 Clearly, this is
a promising approach to regulation, but it is important to understand
that it does not address the internal structure of the agency or the way
it functions with this mode of regulation. In fact, it seems unlikely
294 For a discussion of entrepreneurial tax-farming, see 2 WEBER, supra note 13, at
965-66.
295 For accounts of this development in England, see CHESTER, supra note 285, at
123-68; EMMELINE W. COHEN, THE GROWTH OF THE BRITISH CIVIL SERVICE 1780-1939
(Frank Cass & Co., Ltd. 1965) (1941); R.R. NELSON, THE HOME OFFICE, 1782-1801 (1969);
PARRIs, sup/ra note 4, at 22-45; SIR EDWARD TROUP, THE HOME OFFICE, 1908-1922, at 7-25
(1925).
296 2 WEBER, supra note 13, at 962.
297 See id. at 960-61.
298 See id. at 957.
299 See infra notes 319-20.
300 See, e.g., AvRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 132; BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 131;
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 104; NEIL CUNNINGHAM & RICHARD JOHNSTONE, REGULATING
WORKPLACE SAFETY: SYSTEM AND SANCTIONS 141-72 (1999); CHRISTINE PARKER, JUST LAW-
YERs: REGULATION AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE 121-37 (1999); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Gov-
ernance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997);Jody Freeman, The Private Role
in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employ-
ment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUN. L. REV. 458, 479-522 (2001).
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that the adoption of this creative and promising approach would have
any significant effect on the agency's structure. After all, Weber's
description of bureaucracy is not tied to command and control regula-
tion; indeed, it does not specify the mode of regulation that the bu-
reaucracy employs.30 1 The development of this or other innovations
should not blind us to the very basic, underlying facts about the struc-
ture of administrative agencies.
3. Conflicts and Complexities
Weber's account of bureaucracy explains its efficacy,30 2 but un-
deremphasizes its internal tensions and ignores some of the complexi-
ties that arise when elected officials supervise, and even control,
administrators. 30 3 General tension exists between the hierarchical
structure of the administration and the expertise of its members.
Credentialed experts possess the capacity for independent judgment;
their training, at least in theory, enables them to devise effective, per-
haps optimal, and possibly even creative solutions to the problems
that lie within their defined jurisdiction. But hierarchy involves com-
mand; thus, this independent judgment will sometimes, or often, be
overruled by the expert's superior. The tension becomes even
greater, of course, if the superior is not a credentialed expert, but an
elected official. 304 An elected chief executive can issue instructions to
301 In fact, Weber may be regarded as an intellectual progenitor of responsive regula-
tion or collaborative governance, since he is one of the scholars who suggests that an un-
derstanding of an individual, organization or cultural form requires active participation by
the observer. See MAX WEBER, "Objectivity" in Social Science and Social Policy, in WEBER, supra
note 247, at 49, 59.
302 See 1, 2 WEBER, supra note 13, at 223- 26, 973-75, 1401-03.
303 One reason for this is that Weber treats elected officials as charismatic leaders, see 1
WEBER, supra note 13, at 266-71, rather than as rational-legal ones. He notes the parallel
development of democracy and bureaucratic governance, see 2 WEBER, supra note 13, at
983-85, but his main conclusions are that bureaucratization levels social class distinctions
and that political parties tend to become bureaucratized, see id. at 984-85. This account of
electoral government as a form of charismatic domination seems to conflate charisma with
charm, or appeal. Certainly, an elected official needs to appeal to the voters, but this
appeal operates within the limits of a legal, rationally organized system. When Weber
speaks of charisma, he is referring to a personal force that functions as an independent
mode of domination. The charismatic leader sweeps pre-existing institutions to the side
and attracts followers who are motivated by personal loyalty, not established roles. Few
elected officials exercise this level of appeal, or need to do so-they need only be more
appealing than their opponent. By treating elected officials as exercising charismatic au-
thority, Weber overlooks their relationship to bureaucratic government as well as the struc-
tural connections between electoral democracy and rational-legal domination.
304 Whether these elected officials represent the will of the people, and whether the
resulting regime is properly characterized as a democracy, is an issue that will not be ad-
dressed here. See Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a
Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 987, 997 (1997); Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democ-
racy, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 711 (2001). The tension arises from the presence of a politically
motivated actor as the hierarchical superior of an agency staffed by experts. See Rubin,
supra, at 711-12. Even if such a political appointee is herself a credentialed expert, her
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administrative agents, backed by threat of dismissal, that are based on
political will rather than expertjudgment.3 1 15 In theory, the same stat-
utes bind the President and the agencies alike, but most statutes are
open-ended, and all are subject to interpretation. Elected legislators
cannot issue instructions, but they can often achieve similar results by
threatening budget cuts, conducting aggressive oversight hearings, or,
until recently, exercising a legislative veto. 30 6
The tension between executive control and expertise has been
partially resolved through the Civil Service System, which preserves
the expertise principle by insulating most government officials from
political control, 30 7 while preserving the hierarchy principle by al-
lowing the President to appoint the top officials in each agency and
terminate the executive agency officials at will. The expertise princi-
ple has been reasserted, however, by granting some agencies indepen-
dence, which prevents the President from dismissing even the top
officials.308 This restriction greatly attenuates hierarchical control, al-
commands may not be based on the application of expertise to the particular problem that
her subordinate has addressed, but rather on political considerations.
305 This is at least one aspect of the conflict between expertise and pluralist models of
administration, although discussions of this conflict often emphasize the imposition of plu-
ralist views at the administrative level, that is, without the direct intervention of elected
officials. See Frug, supra note 27, at 1318-34, 1355-77; Sargentich, supra note 27, at
410-38; Stewart, supra note 8, at 1760-81.
306 Of course, the legislature initially defines the agency's mission and thus sets the
general goals that its expertise was designed to achieve. But legislative interventions may
be motivated by views that are not necessarily consonant with the governing statute or the
legislative majority. In addition, as the statute ages, the views of individual legislators and
the commands of the statute are likely to diverge even further. See GuiDo CALABRESI, A
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 131-35 (1982); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,JR., DYNAMIC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 50-57 (1994).
307 See ARi HOOGENBOOM, OUTLAWING THE SPOILS: A HISTORY OF THE CIVIL SERVICE RE-
FORM MOVEMENT 1865-1883, at 7-12 (1961); RONALD N.JoHNSON & GARY D. LIBECAP, THE
FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM AND THE PROBLEM OF BUREAUCRACY : THE ECONOMICS AND
POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 12-47 (1994); FRITZ MORSTEIN MARX, THE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE STATE: AN INTRODUCTION TO BUREAUCRACY 51-53 (1957).
308 See supra note 176-77 and accompanying text. The constitutionality of indepen-
dent agencies has been a matter of controversy. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B.
Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 593-99 (1994) (arguing
that independent agencies violate Constitution's allocation of executive power to the Presi-
Plural Judiciary, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1153, 1165-71 (1992) (same); Martin S. Flaherty, The
Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996) (expressing the view that independence
of agencies counterbalances shift of power to President); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sun-
stein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REx'. 1, 40-42 (1994) (asserting that
no evidence exists to indicate that Framers intended to prohibit independent agencies);
Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 41 (contending that indepen-
dent agencies violate text, structure and intent of Constitution); Peter M. Shane, Indepen-
dent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A Constitutional Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH L. REV. 596,
597 (1989) (positing that the Constitution permits Congress to decide to make some agen-
cies independent); Strauss, supra note 68, at 583-86 (arguing that the Constitution does
not prevent Congressional innovation below the level of constitutionally-defined institu-
tions); Paul R. Verkuil, The Status of Independent Agencies After Bowsher v. Synar, 1986 DUKE
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though it does not eliminate it. The tension between legislative con-
trol and expertise, in contrast, remains largely unresolved. The
Supreme Court intervened to strike down the legislative veto, but, as
described above, Congress was able to recapture much of this mecha-
nism's effect through subsequent legislation.30 9
As elections are regular and frequent occurrences, they tend to
disrupt the continuity of administration. Not only will the agency's
elected hierarchical superiors change, but the politically appointed of-
ficials who head the agency will generally change as well, particularly
if the election brings a new party to power. Since agencies implement
most of the policies contested in any specific election, 10 this change
of personnel is likely to be accompanied by a demand that the agency
make at least some changes to its mission. Such demands are likely to
create a conflict with the agency's expert staff members, who will have
developed a different sense of mission and style of implementation as
a result of their own interpretation of the statute or of the commands
of their previous, politically appointed superiors. This conflict be-
tween expert staff and political superiors, between the continuity of
administration and its political redirection, remains unresolved.
B. The Dominant Principle: Instrumental Rationality
With these very basic considerations of the nature of administra-
tive governance established the principal contours of a new, adminis-
trative procedure act can be considered. The first and most basic
feature of such an act is that it should be controlled by the overarch-
ing principle of instrumental rationality, rather than by the principle
of public participation that controls the present APA. Unlike public
participation, instrumental rationality is a control that can be imposed
on all aspects of the administrative process. Rulemaking and adjudi-
cation should be instrumentally rational, but so should planning, re-
source allocation, prosecution, inspections, advice, promises, threats,
denials of applications and all the other actions that currently fall
under the category of informal adjudications, but are better described
L.J. 779, 792-94 (concluding that independent agencies serve constitutionally valid pur-
poses). However, the present Article simply recommends revision of a particular law, and
does not intend to implicate constitutional issues. Therefore, it takes the current interpre-
tation of the Constitution, which permits Congress to create independent agencies, as a
given.
309 See supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
310 There are, of course, exceptions. Some contested issues are largely symbolic, like
family values. SeeJEAN BAUDRILLARD, IN THE SHADOW OF THE SILENT MAJORITIES (1983);
JEAN BAUDRILLARD, SIMULATIONS 147-49 (1983); RONALD COLLINS & DAVID SKOVER, THE
DEATH OF DISCOURSE 16-22 (1996); MURRAY EDELMAN, CONSTRUCTING THE POLITICAL SPEC-
TACLE 12-36 (1988); DOUGLAS KELLNER, TELEVISION AND THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY (1990).
A few other contested matters, such as abortion, involve constitutional matters that can be
primarily implemented by Supreme Court nominations.
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as executive action. A new APA should establish instrumental ration-
ality as both the controlling principle for agency action and as the
substantive standard for executive and judicial review of agency ac-
tion. Actions based on any motivation other than instrumental ration-
ality-on traditionalism, political favoritism, laziness, arbitrariness,
stupidity, cupidity, necromancy or accident-should be struck
down. 3 11
Instrumental rationality is not a free standing principle, however,
at least if we want to avoid the iron cage. Rather, it is an internal
norm for administrative agencies that exist within a rational-legal
mode of legitimate domination or governance. According to this
mode of governance, political authority is exercised primarily through
legal means, and the primary lawmaker, that is to say, the legislature,
is supreme. American constitutionalism leads to the same conclusion,
of course, but the principle of rational-legal domination is more basic,
since it explains the primacy of the Constitution itself, and is also
more informative, because it explains the rationale behind the Consti-
tution's implicit declaration of legislative supremacy. Applied to the
administrative apparatus, the rational-legal principle establishes that
agencies must obey statutory commands. When combined with the
hierarchical principle of administrative governance, this principle es-
tablishes that the President must follow these commands, and that
those agencies established by the legislature as the President's hierar-
chical subordinates must follow his interpretation of statutory com-
mands, as well as the policy initiatives that he has established through
his own authority.
The administrative agencies' hierarchical superiors are not re-
stricted to the principle of instrumental rationality that controls the
agencies themselves. Rather, as Habermas insists, the legislature 12
and the chief executive, 313 as elected officials, can act on the basis of
311 Such a standard would conform to the civic republican ideal for agency action that
Mark Seidenfeld has articulated, see Seidenfeld, supra note 244, at 1528 ("According to
civic republicanism, the state acts legitimately only if it furthers the 'common good' of the
political community." (footnote omitted)).
312 This is not to say, of course, that legislators may engage in any form of value ration-
ality. Certain value choices, such as theocracy, are forbidden by the Constitution, while
others, such as those at a complete variance with the views of their constituents on a non-
constitutional matter, can be said to represent bad legislative practice in our system. The
point, rather, is that it is never wrong for the legislature qua legislature, to engage in value
rationality for at least some set of values.
313 The President's nominations, treaties, and legislative proposals will not have legal
effect unless the Senate (and for legislation, the House as well) approves. Congress can
countermand many of his military decisions through the war power and can override his
veto. This inability to take unilateral action in most areas of constitutional authority does
not alter the fact that he may justifiably act, in any of these areas, on the basis of value
rationality. In contrast, where his authority stems from his responsibility to "take Care that
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value rationality.3 14 It is by virtue of this value-based, deontological
approach that the populace exercises policy control over the adminis-
trative apparatus and society escapes the iron cage of mindless instru-
mentalism.3 1 5 Agencies are obligated to obey these value rational
choices of the legislature, and executive agencies are obligated to
obey the value rational choices of the chief executive. The judiciary
can enforce these obligations. 3 16 Judicial decision making incorpo-
rates its own value rationality,317 but agencies may not engage in value
rationality, that is, purely ideological decision making. They are lim-
ited to instrumental rationality when implementing the value rational
policies of other governmental institutions, or when generating their
own policies.
In asserting that the dominant principle for administrative agen-
cies is instrumental rationality, and that they are forbidden from rely-
ing on value rationality, the complexity of the principle as defined by
Weber must be kept in mind. Instrumental rationality is not limited
to identifying the best means for implementing a predetermined end,
but also involves a rational assessment of the ends according to their
pragmatic consequences.3 1 8 To subject administrative agencies to a
general standard of instrumental rationality, therefore, does not pre-
clude them from defining their own goals in the absence of clear legis-
lative direction, but rather demands that they must establish these
goals in a particular way.3 19 More precisely, agencies must make rela-
tive assessments among different ends, and "arrange them in a scale of
consciously assessed relative urgency."32 0
Defined in this way, instrumental rationality irresistibly suggests
cost-benefit analysis, where the social benefits of a particular policy are
measured against the costs that it incurs, and only policies that prom-
ise net social benefits are implemented. Weber himself makes this
the Laws be faithfully executed," U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, there is some expectation that his
decisions should be instrumentally rational.
314 See 1 HABERMIAS, supra note 15, at 243-71.
315 See supra notes 261-70 and accompanying text.
316 The obligations of obedience are not necessarily absolute, however. See MORTIMER
R. KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH, DISCRETION To DISOBEY. A STUDY OF LAWFUL DEPARTURES
FROM LEGAL RULES 37-95 (1973); Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by
Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 682-83 (1989) (disputing view that agency's
nonacquiescence with an adverse judicial result is per se unconstitutional).
317 See PHILIP BOBBrrr, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 135-38 (1991) (noting that
ethical interpretation is one of the accepted modes of constitutional discourse); MICHAELJ.
PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS AND LAw 145-48 (1988) (expressing view that judicial enter-
prise is inherently ethical); Fiss, supra note 107, at 1085 (contending that an essential func-
tion of judges is to articulate ethical values of society).
318 See supra notes 254-57 and accompanying text.
319 This is the essence of administrative policy making. See Charles H. Koch, Jr., Essay,
Judicial Review of Administrative Policymaking, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 375, 381-82 (2002).
320 1 WEBER, supra note 13, at 26.
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connection, observing that the instrumentally rational ordering of
goals can be performed according to the principle of "marginal util-
ity."3 2 1 As Matthew Adler and Eric Posner point out, cost-benefit anal-
ysis is best regarded as a "welfarist decision procedure"-the
procedure most likely to achieve overall well-being in a large range of
situations.3 22 Overall well-being, or the eudemonic principle of gov-
ernment, is often regarded as the essential goal of a modern adminis-
trative state. Certainly, it is the consensus among citizens at present,
and the position an agency should adopt when elected representatives
do not provide more specific guidance. But as an aspect of instrumen-
tal rationality, rather than a moral principle for governance in gen-
eral,323 cost-benefit analysis must yield to the commands of elected
representatives. Because they are elected, these representations are
entitled to make decisions based on ideology, or value rationality,
which does not imply cost-benefit analysis at all.3 24 Moreover, when
elected representatives prescribe ends, or goals, for administrative
agencies, the agency need not, and often should not, implement these
goals by means of cost-benefit analysis. 325 Rather, they should choose
whatever method is most likely, on rational grounds, to instantiate the
values that the controlling institution has established. To impose cost-
benefit analysis on the value rational goal choices of non-administra-
tive institutions is to once again enclose the governmental process in
Weber's iron cage. 326
321 Id.
322 Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE LJ.
165, 194-225 (1999).
323 See Matthew Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. PA. L. REv.
1371, 1373 (1998) (clarifying that cost-benefit analysis is a decision procedure, not a moral
criterion); Adler & Posner, supra note 322, at 216-25 (same).
324 See Thomas 0. McGarity, The Expanded Debate over the Future of the Regulatory State, 63
U. CHI. L. REv. 1463, 1464-67 (1996); Alfred S. Neely, Jr., Statutory Inhibitions to the Applica-
tion of Principles of Cost/Benefit Analysis in Administrative Decision Making, 23 DuQ. L. Rv. 489,
502-09 (1985). Legislators are free to adopt cost-benefit analysis as their overall approach
to governance if they so choose, see Cass R. Sunstein, Legislative Foreword: Congress, Constitu-
tional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REv. 247, 292-96 (1996), but the insis-
tent appeal of deontological positions makes it unlikely that legislators would actually do so
for any extended period of time.
325 Thus, Stephen Williams' idea, advanced as both a judge and a scholar, that all
regulatory legislation must rely on cost-benefit analysis, is unjustified. See Am. Trucking
Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1051-53 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Williams, J.), affd in part, rev'd in
part sub nom. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); Stephen F. Williams,
The Era of "Risk-Risk" and the Problem of Keeping theAPA Up to Date, 63 U. CH. L. REv. 1375,
1377-81 (1996).
326 See generally Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, REG., Jan.-Feb.
1981, at 33 (arguing that a cost-benefit analysis is inappropriate in areas of environmental,
safety, and health regulation); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems:
A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REv. 387 (1981) (arguing that the cost-benefit analysis as employed
in policy making is incorrect).
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Indeed, the idea that administrative agencies should be guided by
a principle of instrumental rationality that includes cost-benefit analy-
sis of goals directly contradicts the work of several contemporary
scholars, such as Friedrich Hayek, Theodore Lowi, and David Schoen-
brod. 3 27 In their view, all policy decisions-all decisions about the
goals or ends of governance-should be made by the legislature, and
the role of administrative agencies should be restricted to the imple-
mentation of these decisions. 328 This allocation of responsibility cer-
tainly corresponds to our traditional ideas about government,3 29 but
those traditional ideas are of premodern origin and are unrealistic in
a modern administrative state. As described above, the relationship
between ends and means is relative, with the means envisioned by a
higher level of government becoming the end that its subordinates
are expected to achieve.3 3 0 At what point do these subsidiary ends
count as means, rather than as the sort of purposes that administra-
tors are not permitted to define? If one must specify goals even a few
levels down, the amount of detail that the legislature would need to
articulate would be so great that regulation would need to be greatly
reduced, contrary to the clear preferences of the citizenry, or the leg-
islature would need to develop a massive bureaucracy of its own.
To summarize thus far, instrumental rationality can serve as a
general standard for an administrative procedure act. It can be ap-
plied to all actions taken by administrative agencies. To the extent
that Congress sets a goal, or the President sets a goal for an executive
agency, instrumental rationality demands that the agency implement
such a goal in an effective manner. Where no goal is specified, the
principle demands that a goal be defined by means of cost-benefit
analysis, or some similar technique that ranks goals according to their
consequences. Once the goal is defined, the principle then requires
that actions taken at each successive stage of the implementation pro-
cess are plausibly designed to achieve that goal, and are not motivated
by avarice, laziness, or traditionalism. Of course, instrumental ration-
ality cannot, by itself, provide a fully articulated set of standards for
the administrative process; there are additional standards, such as fair-
ness, that must be incorporated, and other standards that are neces-
327 See F.A. HAYEK, 3 LAw, LEGISLATION AND LiBERT. THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE
PEOPLE 20-40 (1979); Lowi, supra note 6, at 92-126; David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes and
Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30 UCLA L. REv. 740, 818-28 (1983); see generally
Aranson et al., supra note 6 (positing that delegation of policy decisions to administrative
agencies enables legislators to enact legislation that sounds publicly oriented while simulta-
neously allowing agencies to undercut that legislation in favor of special interests).
328 For the contrary view,. see Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Wy Administrators Should
Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 81 (1985).
329 See Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Delegation Debate and Competing Ideals of the Adminis-
trative Process, 36 Am. U. L. Rv. 419, 423-25 (1987).
330 See supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text.
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sary to translate this general idea into specific requirements. But the
principle of instrumental rationality, like the principle of private par-
ticipation that the current APA employs, can provide a dominant, or-
ganizing theme to guide most major statutory choices.
C. Rulemaking
1. Required Procedures
Rulemaking is the most direct, and perhaps the most important,
modality by which administrative agencies make public policy. 33' The
APA rather awkwardly defines a rule as an "agency statement of gen-
eral or particular applicability and future effect."332 Because adjudica-
tory decisions inevitably exercise future effect, particularly for repeat
players like regulated firms, this formulation has proved to be concep-
tually unstable.33 3 A more appropriate definition in the administra-
tive context would be the one suggested by Justice Holmes' opinion in
Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization,334 which held
that the Due Process Clause does not require a hearing when the state
takes action that applies generally, rather than to particular individu-
als.33 5 Holmes reasoned that generally applicable government action
is policy making, and therefore people must seek recourse in the po-
litical process if they are displeased with the outcome.336 In contrast,
when the government is adjudicating a particular individual's status,
the individual has no access to the political process, and trial-type pro-
cedures provide a necessary source of fairness. 337 This idea of general
331 See KERWIN, supra note 122, at 1-36; Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Admin-
istrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REv. 393, 409-13 (1981); Keith Hawkins &John M. Thomas, Rule
Making and Discretion: Implications for Designing Regulatoy Policy, in MAKING REGULATORY POL-
ICY 263, 265-70 (Keith Hawkins &John M. Thomas eds., 1989); Seidenfeld, supra note 244,
at 1559-62.
332 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2000).
333 See Scalia, supra note 103, at 382-83. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
has avoided the use of its rulemaking authority, and relied almost exclusively on adjudica-
tion. See, e.g., Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966). Excelsior Underwear was
an adjudicatory decision with all the indicia of a rule: it was described as a rule, reversed a
previous line of decisions, was applied only prospectively, and was declared effective thirty
days from the date of decision, as required in the case of informal rules by § 553(d). Id. at
1246-47. Tie dccisiuI l6C1ii, il adduiuoi LO LiC uuclylig IN L ,II piLorey, ,, UCC,, U lly
criticized by both courts and commentators, see NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759,
764-66 (1969); Bell Aerospace Co. v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 485, 495-97 (2d Cir. 1973), affd in
part and rev'd in part, 416 U.S. 267 (1974); Flynn, supra note 239, at 423-24; Mayton, supra
note 239, at 117-19, but the Supreme Court has been unable to articulate a principle that
would require the agency to use its rulemaking powers in particular situations, see Bell Aero-
space Co., 416 U.S. at 294-95.
334 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
335 Id. at 445-46.
336 See id. at 445.
337 See id. at 445-46. If this standard were that used in the APA to distinguish between
rulemaking and adjudication, it might be possible to counteract the NLRB's recalcitrant
refusal to use its rulemaking power, see supra note 333, because courts could recognize a
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action should be used as the definition of rulemaking in a revised
administrative procedure act. It effectively separates the cases in
which specific procedures are needed to ensure fairness those in
which fairness is one of several general goals to be achieved through
considerations of instrumental rationality.
The standard of instrumental rationality considers whether the
rule that the agency has promulgated is likely to achieve its stated
goal. Identification of the goal sets the general direction for agency
policy making. It represents the embodiment of three different prin-
ciples, depending on the source of the goal: the rational-legal princi-
ple by which the legislature, as supreme lawmaking body, gives
commands to the administrative agency; the hierarchical principle, by
which the chief executive, as structural superior of an executive
agency, gives commands to the agency; and the instrumental rational-
ity principle, by which the agency defines its own goal by consequen-
tialist analysis. Thus, when the agency decides to make a rule, the first
step is to identify the goal, or purpose, that the rule is expected to
achieve.3 38 A new APA should require that a document published at
the time the agency decides to proceed with rulemaking explicitly
state this goal before any effort has been made to determine the
means by which the goal should be implemented. No sustained or
detailed consideration of implementation methods should be under-
taken without a clearly defined goal.33 9 To do so is to imprison one-
self in the iron cage.
Goal statements are a familiar feature of the policy planning pro-
cess, 340 and a substantial amount of collective cultural experience
exists in formulating them. Generally, the goal statement must recite
a measurable outcome, allowing the means of implementation to be
analyzed in advance and evaluated in retrospect. "Improving air qual-
ity" is not a properly formulated goal; "reducing the number of peo-
ple who suffer from pollution-related respiratory ailments," although
vague, is nevertheless acceptable. While greater specificity is often de-
sirable, it must be directed to a genuine end, and not to a means.
situation in which the agency was acting in a general manner that did not demand proce-
dural protection, but did affect a general category of cases.
338 See Diver, supra note 331, at 413-15.
339 Rulemaking, when defined as general action, does not implicate issues of fairness
to individuals. As Peter Schuck has pointed out, however, clarity regarding the goals of a
rule can contribute to fairness by helping adjudicators discern when it is appropriate to
make an exception to the rule in the interest of equity. See Peter H. Schuck, When the
Exception Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity and the Formation of Energy Policy Through an Excep-
tions Process, 1984 DUKE L.J. 163, 176-80.
340 See STUART S. NAGEL, POLICY EVALUATION: MAKING OPTIMUM DECISIONS (1982);
CARL V. PATTON & DAVID S. SAWICKI, BASIC METHODS OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND PLANNING
25-38 (1986); EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 5-6
(1978); Diver, supra note 331, at 396.
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"Creating a mechanism for auctioning new broadcast licenses" does
not state a goal; a proper formulation would be "developing a means
to assign new broadcast licenses according to market principles." Of
course, once the agency had established this goal and adopted auc-
tions as its implementation mechanisms through a valid rulemaking
procedure, a subsequent rulemaking to modify this mechanism could
treat the creation of an effective auction as its goal. Similarly, if Con-
gress enacted legislation requiring auctions, then "creating a mecha-
nism for auctioning new broadcast licenses" would be the goal of
agency rulemaking. Whatever the source of the goal, it should be
clearly stated. This requirement connects with one of the defining
features of the administrative state-its explicit policy intervention in
the economic and social system through rational-legal action, that is,
the conscious promulgation of new laws and regulations.3 41
The agency should be required to submit its goal statement to all
the institutions expected to participate in the rulemaking process: the
President, Congress, other agencies, and the general public. Com-
ments from all these sources relating to the validity of the goal and the
possible means of implementing it should then be received by the
agency within a defined comment period. All this commentary, like
the comments currently provided for by the APA, should be submitted
in written form and subsequently included in the rulemaking record
that is subject to judicial review. Recognizing the hierarchical struc-
ture of modern administration, an executive agency could be re-
quired to follow comments from the President, if the President so
chose. Recognizing the principles of expertise and continuity, how-
ever, all other comments would be advisory, including the President's
comments to an independent agency. Despite their precatory charac-
ter, these other comments coming from important governmental ac-
tors as well as private parties are likely to be taken seriously by the
agency. It is possible that they will be taken too seriously at this early
stage in the process, and disrupt the agency's ability to deploy its ex-
pertise,3 42 particularly if executive or legislative inputs become a
source of additional private party influence. There is evidence, how-
e 7er thnt tho Jnfluipnc,- nf 'npi-rnl inttroptq nn onx7ornmont dpcipinn
341 If an agency were improperly using adjudication in place of rulemaking, see supra
note 333, its action could be overturned as violating the requirement that all rules must
include an explicit statement of their goal.
342 For examples of disruptive influences affecting the rulemaking process, see
KATZMANN, supra note 5, at 79-151; Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and
Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DuKE LJ. 1255 (1997); Morrison, supra note 188
(discussing OMB review); Rossi, supra note 5, at 211-41 (discussing negotiated rulemak-
ing). See generally Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive
Influence in Political Institutions, 88 MicH. L. REv. 917 (1990) (discussing the disruptive ef-
fect of information on political decision making process).
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makers is less disproportionate than is often assumed,34 3 and the mul-
tiplicity of voices may ultimately counterbalance each other. The ad-
ditional input from other agencies may also have a beneficial effect,
since the contributions will often be less adversarial and more com-
prehensive than private party inputs, speaking directly to the agency's
strategic planning efforts that constitute the essence of the rulemak-
ing process.3 4 4
Once the agency has received comments from all these sources
on its proposed goal, it would be required to publish its goal state-
ment, as revised, before proceeding with the creation of the rule.
There would be no judicial review of this goal statement. On a prag-
matic level, such review would unnecessarily proceduralize the pro-
cess, creating the possibility of severe delay. On a more theoretical
level, comments on the agency's goal function as part of an ongoing
process of supervising the agency, and the judiciary would not be ex-
pected to participate until the process is complete and its participa-
tion is invoked by an aggrieved party. Although judicial review would
only be available at the end of the process, the initial goal statements,
written comments, and revised goal statement would all be part of the
rulemaking record, and thus be factored into the court's assessment
of the rule's validity in any subsequent challenge. 345
343 See Ross E. CHEIT, SETTING SAFETY STANDARDS: REGULATION IN THE PUBLIC AND PRI-
VATE SECTORS 211-21 (1990); A. LEE FRITSCHLER, SMOKING AND POLITICS: POLICY MAKING
AND THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 10-11 (4th ed. 1989); WESLEY A. MAGAT ET AL., RULES IN
THE MAKING: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY AGENCY BEHAVIOR 135-58 (1986);
Croley, supra note 38, at 54-84.
344 Moreover, the input from goveirnmental actors would be recorded and subject to
review. That does not preclude undesirable threats and illegitimate arguments, but the
potential for such threats and arguments exists under the present system; the proposed
APA would at least subject intragovernmental interactions to some procedural require-
ments. At a minimum, a revised APA should explicitly endorse the holding in D.C. Federa-
tion of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971), that an administrative decision
should be invalidated if it can be shown to have been based on irrelevant factors (such as
threats of political punishment). See id. at 1246. The revised APA would clarify this stan-
dard by providing a test for determining relevance-instrumental rationality.
345 An explicit statement of the goal serves as an important aspect of exercising control
through the principle of instrumental rationality. As an illustration in a vastly different
context, consider the following exchange between Alice and the Dormouse at the Mad
Hatter's tea party:
"Once upon a time there were three little sisters," the Dormouse began
in a great hurry; "and their names were Elsie, Lacie, and Tillie; and they
lived at the bottom of a well-"
"What did they live on?" said Alice ....
"They lived on treacle," said the Dormouse, after thinking a minute or
two.
"They couldn't have done that, you know," Alice gently remarked.
"They'd have been ill."
"So they were," said the Dormouse; "very ill."
LEWIS CARROLL, Alice's Adventure in Wonderland, in THE ANNOTATED ALICE 100 (1960) (an-
notations omitted). Living on treacle is instrumentally rational, provided one's goal is to
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This proposal does not radically depart from existing practice.
The annual regulatory plans that executive agencies have been re-
quired to submit to OIRA since 1985 are essentially equivalent to pres-
idential review of a goal statement for these agencies.346 Regulatory
agencies do not submit a statement of their goals to Congress pres-
ently, but each agency's oversight committee is typically aware of the
agency's plans at this early stage and can communicate its views about
them through informal channels. Private parties also communicate
regularly with the agency long before it publishes a preliminary rule.
Indeed, the court in Home Box Office v. FCC,3 4 7 which imposed unex-
pectedly severe restrictions on ex parte contacts after publication .of
the proposed rule, 343 described these communications received prior
to publication as the "'bread and butter"' of the administrative pro-
cess, and declined to restrict them.349 In addition, the Negotiated
Rulemaking Act of 1990 provides a mechanism for public participa-
tion prior to the publication of the preliminary rule. 350 Thus, requir-
ing a goal statement and instituting an early comment period are
more properly regarded as efforts to systematize and codify existing
practice than as endeavors to radically depart from it.
Moreover, some language in the current APA is not very different
from the proposed requirement, and highlights the rationale for pro-
viding comments to the agency at such an early stage. Section 553 of
the APA requires that the notice of a proposed rulemaking include
remain ill. That goal, however, is irrational. An action is almost always instrumentally
rational with respect to some goal, but the actor is then compelled to admit to an unac-
ceptable goal, which he typically will not want to do.
346 See Blumstein, supra note 182, at 866-67; Bruff, supra note 178, at 551; supra note
149 and accompanying text.
347 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
348 See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
349 Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 57.
350 5 U.S.C. §§ 561- 570a (2000); see Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The Actual
Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVrL. L.J. 32, 36 (2000) (describing statutory
provisions and their operation in practice) [hereinafter Harter, Assessing the Assessors]. The
practice, see PhilipJ. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Curefor Malaise, 71 GEo. L.J. 1 (1982)
(describing that negotiated rulemaking, which is voluntary on the agency's part, has both
its critics antcl tetenders). For criticisms, see Cogiiacise, 5ujiu iuic .42, W.i.iar .nk
When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the Public Interest-EPA's Woodstove
Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 55 (1987); Rossi, supra note 5, and for endorsements, see Jody
Freeman & Laura 1. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 60 (2000); Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra. Negotiated rules are a form of
prepublication input, but they contemplate a much more intensive involvement of private
parties in the process than the proposal presented in this Article, and most of the criticism
is directed toward that pervasive involvement. As the range of cited scholarship indicates,
the wisdom of negotiated rulemaking is a formidable topic, which cannot be adequately
addressed in an Article of this generality. Nothing in the proposed procedures, however,
would preclude negotiated rulemaking. Current negotiated rulemaking practice would be
modified so that the agency would be required to state its revised goal before initiating the
negotiated rulemaking process.
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"either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of
the subjects and issues involved." 351 The second alternative, that is, "a
description of the subjects and issues" is similar to the recommended
goal statement. But the APA also allows a text of the proposed rule to
serve as notice. For the adjudication-inspired purpose of notifying in-
terested private parties, the APA approach is probably correct, be-
cause either a description of the subjects and issues or the actual text
of the proposed rule will provide sufficient information to elicit rele-
vant comments. 35 2 From the perspective of effectuating control over
the agency by outside parties, however, the two forms of notice are
almost diametric opposites. One form of the required notice-identi-
fying the subject matter-and the other form of the notice-drafting
a proposed rule lies perhaps eighty or ninety percent of the policy
making process. 53 Identifying the subject matter or stating the goal is
the very first step in policy making. To draft a proposed rule, in con-
trast, the agency must investigate the problem, identify possible solu-
tions, assess the potential effectiveness of each alternative, select the
preferred solution, and draft legal language reflecting that solution.
Thus, while these two forms of notice are close equivalents for the
judicially inspired purpose of notifying private parties, they are dra-
matically different for the administratively oriented purpose of ena-
bling those parties to actually affect the agency's decision making
process. The agency is most likely to be receptive to comments from
outside parties at an early stage in the process, such as when the
agency has merely identified the goal. By the time the agency has
undertaken all the other steps necessary to draft a proposed regula-
tion, it has invested enormous staff resources in that particular regula-
tion, its members have become convinced that the draft represents
the ideal solution to the problem. Furthermore, any legal or political
deadline for promulgation of the regulation is likely to be fast ap-
proaching. Comments suggesting major changes in the regulation at
this stage are likely to be viewed as an annoying intrusion to be either
ignored, or, if necessary, explained away. Put differently, one of the
APA's alternative forms of notice-providing a statement of the is-
sue-maximizes the impact of the comment requirement, while the
other one-releasing the text of the proposed rule-eviscerates it.
351 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (2000).
352 Barring unusual situations such as AFL-CIO v. Donovan, 757 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir.
1985), where the agency published the entire rule as notice of some relatively minor
amendments, see id. at 338-39, publication of the proposed rule may be marginally prefera-
ble for notice purposes, as it will avoid interpretive ambiguities in the actual nature of the
issues.
353 See KERWIN, supra note 122, at 40-86; JAMEs T. O'REILLY, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAK-
ING, § 4.02 (1983); Pedersen, supra note 101, at 51-59. O'Reilly identifies ten stages of
rulemaking-the publication of the draft rule is stage eight on his list. See O'REILLY, supra,
Figure 4-1, at 90.
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Whenever the agency chooses the second option, which is by far the
more common situation, it creates a real danger that the comment
requirement will be reduced to an empty formality. In contrast, re-
quiring comments at the goal definition stage would maximize the
informative value of the comments and thereby effectuate instrumen-
tally rational decision making.
Once the agency has received comments on its goal statement, it
should proceed with the other stages of policy making free of legal
constraints, as is the case under the current APA. This lack of legal
control properly reflects the principles of jurisdiction, expertise and
continuity that define the structure of the administrative apparatus. It
also comports with the principle of hierarchy, since only the President
is the hierarchical superior of any agency, and his ability to communi-
cate his views to the executive agencies does not require any further
legal facilitation. The rule that the agency drafts and proposes should
then be submitted to the President, Congress, and the general public
for a second comment period. This comports with current practice-
the APA requires submission to the general public, while the Contract
With America's report and wait provision, codified as an amendment
to the APA, requires submission to Congress, and a Presidential exec-
utive order requires submission to OIRA.354 A new APA would simply
codify and systematize these requirements, allowing one submission to
satisfy all three requirements during a single comment period. Con-
trary to current practice, rules proposed by independent agencies
would be submitted to the President, but, consistent with current
practice, only rules proposed by executive agencies could be counter-
manded by him.
Reliance on sources of supervision other than private citizens
provides a solution to the problem of rules that govern internal
agency procedures or resource management, as opposed to the so-
called legislative rules that are directed toward private citizens. As
mentioned above, 355 the agency's procedural rules are exempt from
the APA's comment requirement and, in the case of resource manage-
ment, from the notice requirement as well. Critics of this exemption
note that internal rules often significantly impact private citizens,356
while defenders respond that permitting public participation would
paralyze the agency's ability to organize its internal affairs, control its
354 See supra notes 171-72, 180-84.
355 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
356 See Anthony, supra note 6, at 1332-55; Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpreta-
tions Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALEJ. ON REG. 1, 42-63 (1990); Asimow, supra
note 96, at 403-04; Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Interpretive Rules
and Policy Statements, 75 MICH. L. Rv. 520, 528-30 (1977); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Public
Procedures for the Promulgation of Interpretative Rules and General Statements of Policy, 64 GEo.
L.J. 1047, 1053 (1976).
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employees, and operate institutions. 357 But the supervisory resources
of the administrative state are not limited to entities external to the
agency; the principle of hierarchy indicates that most supervision oc-
curs within the agency's command structure. A new administrative
APA should require that any rule adopted by agency officials that in-
volves the agency's internal operations must be reviewed and ap-
proved by the structural superior of the adopting official. As in the
case of legislative rules, the officials adopting the rule would submit a
statement of the goal and receive comments on that statement before
proceeding to draft the rule itself. That rule would then be submitted
to the same hierarchical superior before it could become effective.
Internal rules adopted at the highest level of an executive agency
would be submitted to OMB, serving as agent for the President.
Those adopted by the highest level of an independent agency would
not be reviewed, but would still be required to state their goal before
proceeding with the design and promulgation of the rule itself.
2. Applicable Standards
The standard for the agency's decision making in formulating
any rule, whether external or internal, whether subject to notice and
comment or exempted from it, should be instrumental rationality: is
the final rule a rational way to implement the stated goal, as revised in
light of the first set of comments? Of course, the agency would also be
required to follow the prescribed procedures; if it neglected to pub-
lish its proposed rule, for example, no amount of instrumental ration-
ality could save that rule from judicial invalidation. However, as
Vermont Yankee held, courts would be explicitly forbidden from impos-
ing additional procedures on the rulemaking process.
As an interpretation of the current APA, Vermont Yankee has
proven difficult for federal courts-including the Supreme Court-to
swallow, and there are numerous decisions that Vermont Yankee should
have overruled that are still regarded as good law, or that were de-
cided after Vermont Yankee and yet are arguably inconsistent with it.3 5 8
The courts seem to have choked on Vermont Yankee because, if taken
literally, the decision would leave courts with no means of supervising
most rulemaking proceedings. The only requirements that the cur-
rent APA imposes on rulemaking are procedural ones; once Vermont
357 See Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense ofSeminole Rock Deference to
Agency Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 49, 112-49 (2000) (defending ex-
emption of interpretive rules from notice and comment procedure); Peter L. Strauss, Publi-
cation Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect for an Essential Element, 53
ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 804-08 (2001) (positing that interpretive rules should be exempt from
comment procedure, so long as notice is provided); Strauss, supra note 96, at 1470-71.
358 The leading example of this class is State Farm. See supra note 105 and accompany-
ing text; Strauss, supra note 76, at 1411-13.
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Yankee forbid the courts from fabricating new procedures, these re-
quirements are minimal, and thus provide courts with few opportuni-
ties for supervision. The proposed statute would impose the
substantive standard of instrumental rationality, thus giving the courts
a basis for supervision without improvising new procedures that the
agency would be required to follow. This proposal thus moves in an
exactly opposite direction from the one that Antonin Scalia advanced
in response to the Vermont Yankee decision. 3 59 Then-Professor Scalia
suggested that the APA be amended to include ten or fifteen different
procedural formats for agency action. 360 Such a multitude of differ-
ing procedures, each with its own particular effect upon the agency,
and ultimately with its own body of judicial interpretation, would pro-
duce doctrinal complexity of epic proportions, and agencies would
need to focus increasing amounts of attention on navigating their way
through this farrago in order to enact any rules at all. The present
proposal shifts both agency and judicial attention away from procedu-
ral niceties, and focuses it on the substantive quality of the agency's
decision making.
Although a substantive standard of instrumental rationality would
obviously be a legal innovation, it would not represent a radical depar-
ture from current practice. In fact, instrumental rationality is what
many, if not most, of the cases that strike down rulemaking on proce-
dural grounds are really about. Federaljudges know that they are not
supposed to create new procedural requirements where Congress has
explicitly declined to. When confronted with agency rules that violate
the broadly accepted, if rarely stated, principle of instrumental ration-
ality, however, they have felt impelled to search for some legal basis to
invalidate the rule, and they have seized on the procedural grounds
that they know they are not supposed to use because these are the
only grounds that are presently available for striking down the
regulation.
Consider, for example, United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products
Corp.36t The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had promulgated
regulations regarding the processing of smoked or salted fish for the
purpose of minimizing the risk of botulism.362 These regulations,
adopted over the objection of variou3 .. d ..a.. .... ailU t11_ r,-
partment of the Interior's Bureau of Commercial Fisheries,3 63 re-
359 See Scalia, supra note 103, at 406-09.
360 Id. at 408.
361 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977).
362 Id. at 243-44.
363 This agency is now part of the Commerce Department's National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration (NOAA). At the time it was part of Interior's Fish and Wildlife
Service, having been transferred there in 1939 from the Department of Agriculture. See
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/.
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quired whitefish to be processed at a temperature that, the Court
concluded, would destroy the commercial marketability of the fish. 364
Nova Scotia asserted, without contradiction, that there were only eight
known cases of botulism resulting from consumption of smoked
whitefish, that all eight cases involved vacuum packed fish and oc-
curred between 1960 and 1963, that the industry abandoned vacuum
packing after 1963, that there had not been a single case of botulism
caused by any of the 17.25 million pounds of whitefish produced since
then, and that Nova Scotia itself had not had a single case of botulism
poisoning in its 56 years of doing business. 365 Its claim, supported by
the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, was that different processing
standards should be developed for each type of smoked fish.3 66
The FDA regulation at issue in Nova Scotia clearly indicates a fail-
ure of instrumental rationality, at least as the court interpreted the
facts. The stated goal of the regulation was to minimize the risk of
botulism, but the regulation would not achieve this goal, because
whitefish did not create this risk to any significant extent, particularly
after vacuum packing had been abandoned. 367 In contrast, the costs
that this regulation imposed on whitefish producers and consumers
were clearly substantial; even without employing a formal cost-benefit
analysis, one could conclude on the basis of the consequentialist ap-
proach that instrumental rationality incorporates that these costs
should only be imposed with a much greater showing of potential
harm than was present in this case. A new APA can reach this result
by imposing a substantive requirement of instrumental rationality on
agency rulemaking. Lacking such a statute, the Nova Scotia court had
to choose between upholding an irrational regulation or finding some
procedural excuse to strike it down.
The court opted for a procedural excuse. It held that the FDA
had failed to disclose the scientific data on which it intended to rely in
its notice of proposed rulemaking, and had thereby failed to comply
with the notice requirement of § 553.368 This stratagem enabled the
court to reach what it regarded as the right result, but it did so only by
creating a new procedural hurdle for more scrupulous agencies and
new possibilities for challenges by less deserving private firms. Moreo-
364 See Nova Scotia, 568 F.2d at 245.
365 Id. at 250-51.
366 See id. at 250-51.
367 The regulation was instrumentally rational, however, if its stated goal was to destroy
the smoked whitefish industry. Such a goal would generally be regarded as improper,
however, even if it had been adopted by a legislature, and would certainly be improper for
an agency. See supra note 345. While this would not be a difficult conclusion for courts to
reach, it could be reached more directly if the APA authorized courts to apply the princi-
ple of instrumental rationality to the agency's choice of goals.
368 See Nova Scotia, 568 F.2d at 251-52.
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ver, it did so by interpreting the APA in a manner that was certainly
not textual, intentionalist, or even dynamic, but at best strategic, and
arguably perverse. One might have thought that this decision would
have been effectively overruled by Vermont Yankee, but federal appeals
courts, apparently unwilling to relinquish this source of authority over
rulemaking, have continued to treat Nova Scotia as good law.3 69 Their
instinct is understandable, but a substantive requirement that agency
rulemaking comport with the principle of instrumental rationality
would be preferable.
In general, a substantive standard of instrumental rationality
would allow courts to move away from reliance on judicial models in
supervising agency rulemaking. It is always troublesome when an
agency, as in Nova Scotia, entirely ignores well-informed, persuasive
comments. Such behavior seems to vitiate the entire purpose of elicit-
ing commentary, and betokens a potentially grave defect in the
agency's decision making process. Yet the judicial model to which
courts resort in Combating this behavior tends to treat the problem as
a matter of unfairness to the commentator, a violation of its right to
be heard. Imposing this essentially adjudicatory concept on the
rulemaking process formalizes it to the point of paralysis; it suggests
that the agency must respond to every comment, no matter how igno-
rant or incoherent, since every party is entitled to equal treatment in a
judicial setting. In place of this concern with fairness, the principle of
instrumental rationality suggests a concern with validity, with the qual-
ity of the comments. The agency need not answer every comment,
nor need it be fair to any particular commentator. Rather, it is re-
quired to demonstrate that it made a rational decision, by either refut-
ing or adopting a comment that is well considered, well researched
and convincing. In other words, in the proposed revision of the APA,
giving people a chance to participate in government, or reconciling
them to an unfavorable result, would only be a secondary purpose of
the comment requirement. The primary purpose would be to provide
the agency with information and ideas in order to reach an instru-
mentally rational decision.
The substantive standard of instrumental rationality also serves to
alleviate, though not eliminate, the conflict between hierarchy and
369 For post-Vermont Yankee decisions that follow Nova Scotia, see, for example, Nat'l
Black Media Coalition v. FCC, 791 F.2d 1016, 1018 (2d Cir. 1986); Conn. Light & Power
Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 525, 530-31 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Idaho Farm
Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 839 F. Supp. 739, 748-49 (D. Idaho 1993), vacated by 58 F.3d 1392
(9th Cir. 1995).
The Nova Scotia decision also overturned the regulation on grounds that the agency's
statement of basis and purpose was inadequate, another procedural extension of § 553.
Nova Scotia, 568 F.2d at 252-53. This part of the decision has also been followed, see, e.g.,
Ishtyaq v. Nelson, 627 F. Supp. 13, 21 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
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continuity or expertise. The leading case on this point is State Farm,
where the Supreme Court found the Department of Transportation's
rescission of a safety regulation, which was clearly in response to the
policy preferences of a new President, to be arbitrary and capri-
cious. 370 The opinion fails to confront the real quandary present in
the case: that executive agencies are simultaneously conceived as neu-
tral experts bound by statutory authorizations and as necessary exten-
sions of the president, implementing the policies that the people
endorsed when they elected him. By simply applying the same stan-
dard of review to rescissions and to new regulations, the courts tend to
sidestep this quandary, treating political control of executive agencies
as a dirty secret that is best left undiscussed. The principle of instru-
mental rationality would allow both the agency and the reviewing
court to confront the issue more directly. It requires that a regulation
serve as a rational means of achieving a previously-defined goal. If the
agency wishes to rescind a rule, it must either demonstrate that it has
re-evaluated the regulation's ability to achieve the goal or that it has
re-evaluated the goal. Assuming no change in the authorizing statute,
a goal can be re-evaluated according to the instrumentally rational
process embodied in cost-benefit analysis, that is, the agency can
change its goal within the scope of the statute by re-evaluating the
goal's pragmatic consequences. Instrumental rationality thus ac-
knowledges the political control of executive agencies, but subjects
that control to the dominant standard of administrative government.
Finally, an instrumental rationality standard would address rules
designed to organize the agency's internal operations or manage its
resources. While it is questionable whether it is as important for the
public to participate in the formation of these rules as it is for legisla-
tive rules, it is just as important that these rules be designed to achieve
their stated purpose. Thus, even in the absence of statutorily required
procedure other than submission to the rule maker's structural supe-
rior, the substantive nature of an instrumental rationality requirement
would hold internal rules to the same standard as legislative ones.
The arbitrary and capricious standard, in contrast, being heavily pro-
cedural, is difficult to apply in any meaningful way outside of the no-
tice and comment process.
D. Executive Action
The administrative perspective suggested here as the basis for a
revised APA would not produce much of an impact on the APA's cur-
rent provisions governing formal adjudications subject to §§ 554, 556,
370 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46-47
(1983).
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and 557. Many of our rules for administrative adjudication are gov-
erned by the Due Process Clause, rather than by the statutory provi-
sions of the APA. The decisions in Marcello v. Bonds3 71 and Goldberg v.
Kelly372 establish the principle that due process and the APA function
independently. Marcello held that the applicability of the Due Process
Clause to a particular hearing neither implied nor compelled the con-
clusion that Congress intended that hearing to be governed by the
APA rules for formal adjudication.373 Goldberg held that provisions in
an administrative statute would not determine the applicability of due
process.3 74  Subsequent case law has weakened Goldberes distinc-
tion, 375 and administrative considerations have influenced the theory
371 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
372 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
373 See Marcello, 349 U.S. at 306-07. Marcello overruled Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339
U.S. 33 (1950), which had held that the applicability of the Due Process Clause to deporta-
tion hearing indicated a Congressional intent to subject such hearing to the APA's rules
for formal adjudication. The Wong Yang Sung Court also implied that Congress's decision
was constitutionally required by due process. Congress quickly overruled this aspect of
Wong Yang Sung. See Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 81-843, 64 Stat.
1048 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (2000)). In Marcello, the Court upheld this statutory
change against a constitutional challenge, overruling the remainder of Wong Yang Sung.
See Marcello, 349 U.S. at 309-10.
374 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266-67. Goldberg abolished the right-privilege distinction,
which essentially placed the interests created by administrative statutes outside the reach of
the Due Process Clause. Id. at 261-62. See generally Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and
Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965) (discussing constitutional
questions raised by welfare procedures); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J.
733 (1964) (discussing early attempts to distinguish rights and privileges).
3'75 See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983) (holding administrative statutes that
allow extensive discretion do not create due process interests); Logan v. Zimmerman
Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (holding that administrative statutes can create interests
that trigger due process protection); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (holding
that applicability of due process depends on whether a state has created a property inter-
est). While these decisions seem to suggest that an administrative statute can determine
the applicability of due process, they address only the statute's creation of underlying inter-
ests. At some level, this is uncontroversial; there would be no right to a welfare hearing if
the statute al olished welfare, and such general action, which is subject to the control of
the political process, is not constrained by the Due Process Clause. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co.
v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915). The Court has definitively held that an
administrative statute can only control the applicability of due process by the creation of
suha pmcnrc & - .... G
Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (involving the creation of a property interest);
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (involving the creation of a liberty interest); Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in the result, in part) ("Th[e]
right [to procedural due process] is conferred, not by legislative grace, but by Constitu-
tional guarantee."). See generally Cynthia R. Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 189, 195-96 (1991) (discussing the "bitter with the sweet" analysis rejected by the
Court in Loudermill); Jerry L. Mashaw, Dignitary Process: A Political Psychology of Liberal Demo-
cratic Citizenship, 39 U. FLA. L. REv. 433 (1987) (arguing that Loudermill "seriously misdirects
due process analysis"); Henry Paul Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property, " 62 CORNELL L.
REv. 405 (1977) (suggesting the restrictive trends in due process analysis call for a reexami-
nation of the definition of liberty and property); Rubin, supra note 68 (describing the "fall
from grace" of procedural due process); Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public
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of due process itself,- 7 6 but the basic distinction remains. In any
event, due process, however conceived, controls much of our adjudi-
catory practice independently of any provisions in the APA.
Second, those parts of the APA's rules for formal adjudication
that extend beyond the minimal requirements of due process, and are
therefore not controlled by it, function relatively well because of the
historical continuity of the underlying task. Although the fact that
administrators, as opposed to judges, adjudicate the status of individu-
als is a relatively novel feature of the administrative state, the adjudica-
tions themselves are based on culturally familiar pre-administrative
models. To be sure, the massive number of administrative adjudica-
tions and their relatively routine character 3 77 creates unique de-
mands, but agencies have been able to modify their procedures to
account for these features. 37 8 In turn, courts generally accept the idea
that such modifications can meet constitutional standards. 379 While
the modifications undeniably depart from traditional notions of adju-
dication in important ways, the strength and depth of our cultural
experience with adjudication gives us the capacity to effect these mod-
ifications in a relatively uncontroversial manner. There are certainly
some advantages to be gained by thinking about adjudications in
more modern, administrative terms, but the advantages are compara-
Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1195 (1982); Patricia M. Wald, Government
Benefits: A New Look at an Old Gifihorse, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 247 (1990) (suggesting that the
rights-benefits scheme requires constitutional reconsideration).
376 See Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985) (nonadver-
sarial nature of proceedings alters due process right to counsel); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976) (fairness and reliability of agency adjudication alters due process right to
oral hearing);JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINIsTRATIVE STATE (1985) [here-
inafter MASHAW, DUE PRocEss]; Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for
Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value,
44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28 (1976).
377 This point should not be overemphasized, however. Eighteenth and nineteenth
century debt collection cases in civil courts were numerous relative to the scale of govern-
ment at the time, and they were nonetheless quite routine. See BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC
OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 17-33 (2002); Robert A.
Kagan et al., The Business of State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 30 STAN. L. REv. 121, 137-40
(1977).
378 See MASHAw, DUE PROCESS, supra note 376 (describing modification of standard civil
trial mode by Social Security Administration).
379 Walters, 473 U.S. 305 (upholding determination of veterans benefits by non-adver-
sarial hearing where applicant is represented, free of charge, by trained service representa-
tive); Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983) (upholding a statutory scheme permitting
the use of medical guidelines for classes of disability benefits claim); Mathews, 424 U.S. 319
(validating reliance on written submissions to make social security disability determina-
tions); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (validating use of highly informal, consultative
hearing to determine whether public school student should be suspended). Although the
balance that each decision strikes between procedural protection and administrative prac-
ticality may be controversial, it is widely accepted that this balance must be struck, and that
it leads to significant modifications of the classic understanding of due process protections.
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tively minor, and cannot be explored in a discussion of this
generality.3 0
So-called informal adjudications under the APA are a different
matter. As discussed above, the descriptive term and the underlying
categorization it implies are themselves conceptual errors. The gen-
eral category is better described as executive action, but this covers
such a broad and diverse range of functions and behaviors that gener-
alizations are inevitably problematic. One possible generalization,
however, is that all executive action, like administrative action gener-
ally, should be guided by the principle of instrumental rationality. All
executive action should be designed to achieve a specified goal in an
effective manner or to formulate a goal in terms of its pragmatic con-
sequences. In some cases, there may be additional constraints on ac-
tion, such as a constitutional requirement or statutory provision. But
within the limits set by these independent constraints, there is nojusti-
fication for executive action to be governed by any other standard.
The same substantive and procedural requirements that have
been proposed for rulemaking can govern most types of executive ac-
tion. That is, before taking executive action, the agency should be
required to state its goal and identify the source from which that goal
was derived. Acceptable sources would include a direct statutory com-
mand, a reasonable interpretation of an indirect or ambiguous statu-
tory command, or the command of a hierarchical superior, including,
for executive agencies, the President. In the absence of any such
source, the agency must provide an account of the way in which the
agency itself has developed the goal. Having identified its goal, the
agency must then articulate an instrumentally rational plan by which
to achieve that goal, and both the goal and plan must be recorded.
These requirements would initially be enforced in accordance with
the principle of hierarchy-by requiring that statements of the goal
and the plan be submitted to the agency's hierarchical superior in the
administrative apparatus. Goals and plans developed at the highest
level of an executive agency would be reviewed .by the president,
through the existing mechanism of OMB; those developed at the
highest level of an independent agency would not be reviewed. Any
hierarchical superior within the administrative apparatus would have
authority to countermand any aspect of the proposed implementation
plans that were submitted to it. Alternatively, the superior could offer
comments or suggestions that would often affect the agency because
they were more internal, less adversarial, and more comprehensive
than the typical comments that agency receives from the public with
respect to rules.
380 One issue, discussed briefly above, see supra notes 332-38 and accompanying text, is
the choice between rulemaking and adjudication.
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These statements of goals and plans would be made available to
Congress and to the public, as well to the agency's hierarchical supe-
rior,3 8 ' but there would be no opportunity for participation by these
other entities prior to the implementation of the plan. Unlike
rulemaking, participation by governmental entities outside the
agency's own administrative hierarchy is not necessary. Indeed, such
participation would often be counterproductive. 38 2 Rulemaking gen-
erally involves the formation of public policy, or the most basic
choices involving the implementation of legislatively defined public
policy. It not only has the largest impact on society, but, more impor-
tantly for present purposes, it sets the direction for subsequent agency
action. Quite often, it involves a definition of the agency's goals that
would benefit from an instrumentally rational goal assessment by the
agency, or from a value rational assessment by the legislature and pri-
vate parties. Executive action, in contrast, occurs within the frame-
work of the goals that have been thus defined, and generally involves
the process by which those goals are implemented at the operational
level. This is a more constrained form of instrumental rationality,
where the means are developed to achieve a predefined goal. Value
rational input is not needed at this point, and might well interfere
with the expertise and continuity that the administrative process is de-
signed to embody.383
There are also more specific problems with allowing entities
outside the command structure of the agency to participate in the
more detailed aspects of the implementation process. Outside partici-
pation always creates the possibility of delay and an opportunity for
special interest influence to distort the administrative process. To al-
low such participation where it offers only limited positive benefits is
therefore likely to be counterproductive. In addition, agencies must
often engage in strategic behavior in order to implement a policy ef-
381 In addition to the publication requirement under the revised APA, plans would be
available to the public under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Pub. L. No. 89-487,
80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000)). The FOIA is a com-
plex topic in its own right, see HERBERT N. FOERSTEL, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE
RIGHT To KNow: THE ORIGINS AND APPLICATIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
(1999) (discussing the history of modem functionality, and future of FOIA); JAMES T.
O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE (3d ed. 2000) (same); Kathryn M. Braeman,
Overview of FOIA Administration in Government, 34 ADMIN. L. REv. 111 (1982) (same); Elias
Clark, Holding the Government Accountable: The Amended Freedom of Information Act, 84 YALE
L.J. 741 (1975) (same). A reassessment of it lies outside the scope of this Article.
382 See KATZMANN, supra note 5, at 79-151; Coglianese, supra note 342; Fitts, supra note
342; Morrison, supra note 188; Rossi, supra note 5.
383 Thus, even if INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), were overruled (which would be
desirable), and Congress could exercise a legislative veto over proposed rules, this author-
ity should not be extended to implementation plans.
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fectively manner. 384 For example, an agency that inspects industrial
facilities for safety might wish to ignore a certain category of violations
in order to save resources, but might not want the subject facilities to
know that they can engage in these violations with impunity. 385 The
hierarchical supervision provided by the agency's superior can en-
force the instrumental rationality of such strategic action, while partic-
ipation by the regulated firms would vitiate it.386
Although the purpose of this goal and plan requirement is to en-
force a standard of instrumental rationality on agency executive ac-
tion, the requirement would also have the collateral advantage of
increasing the fairness of this action for individuals. As noted above,
executive action, which the APA implicitly describes as informal adju-
dication, is not adjudication at all as that term is generally under-
stood. At least some executive action, however, resembles real
adjudication, since it involves the imposition of governmental author-
ity on particular individuals, and thus implicates issues of fair treat-
ment that are typically absent from rulemaking.387 For example,
while the destruction of park land at issue in Overton Park88 does not
raise any issue of fairness to individuals, the 'inspection of business
premises that was at issue in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. 389 clearly does.
At present, general claims to administrative discretion can conceal ac-
tions based on unfair motivations such as personal antipathy, bias,
politics, or unjustified retaliation. 390 The goal and plan requirement
384 See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 132, at 19-100; BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note
131; BRAITHWAITE, supra note 3; Robert A. Kagan & John T. Scholz, The "Criminology of the
Corporation" and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies, in ENFORCING REGULATION 67 (Keith Haw-
kins &John M. Thomas eds., 1984);John T. Scholz, Cooperation, Deterrence, and the Ecology of
Regulatory Enforcement, 18 LAW & Soc. REv. 179 (1984) [hereinafter Scholz, Cooperation];
John T. Scholz, Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement and the Politics of Administrative Effectiveness,
85 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 115 (1991);John T. Scholz, Voluntary Compliance and Regulatory En-
forcement, 6 LAw & POLICY 385 (1984).
385 The example is obviously drawn from the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA). For a extensive and insightful discussion of the strategic factors that would pro-
duce effective OSHA enforcement, see BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 131.
386 As stated, see supra note 381, this Article does not attempt a reassessment of the
Freedom of Information Act. It is likely, however, that plans for inspection or prosecution
WUUlU 1f11 11th UIC CAU11 I'hpmn. 5a . F. .. ( .b(.(...)--.
If not, this exemption would need to be amended to counteract the additional recording
requirements that the proposed APA revision would create.
387 To make a rule that affected an individual, rather than a class of individuals with at
least theoretical access to the political process, would violate the Due Process Clause as
interpreted by Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
See Rubin, supra note 91, at 1102-04.
388 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
389 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
390 Retaliation for behavior such as prior noncompliance would be justifiable under an
instrumental rationality standard. Tit for Tat, which many observers regard as the optimal
enforcement strategy, involves such retaliation. See AvRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 132,
at 20-27; Kagan & Scholz, supra note 384; Scholz, Cooperation, supra note 384. See generally
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provides an assurance of fairness in these situations by revealing ac-
tion based upon such motivations as deviations from the stated plan.
In addition, the agency's obligation to defend its implementation ac-
tion, if challenged by producing a plan, should provide individuals
with some sense that there is a purpose and a rationale for the treat-
ment they have received. Thus, instrumental rationality itself may ap-
proximate many individuals' sense of fair treatment, and provide the
sort of legitimation that Tom Tyler describes. 391 In any event, this
goal and plan requirement necessarily provides more assurance of
fairness than the current APA, which imposes no procedural controls
on executive action.
It should be noted that the procedural requirements recom-
mended for executive action are essentially the same as those recom-
mended for nonlegislative rules dealing with internal management or
resource allocation. These two types of administrative action are es-
sentially the same. Both involve the manner in which an agency im-
plements the policy that has been either established by rulemaking or
established by Congress and interpreted by rulemaking. Of course,
the APA also treats these two categories of administrative action as
essentially the same, not by the manner in which it defines them, but
rather by the fact that it does not impose any procedural constraints
on them, apart from the notice requirement for management rules.
The administrative APA proposed here, however, imposes constraints
on both. In doing so, it applies a unified standard that precludes the
need to make fine distinctions between the two modes of action. 392
This standard, moreover, should not be disruptive of agency opera-
tions because its requirements-defining a goal, stating a plan, and
communicating both the goal and plan to the actor's hierarchical su-
perior-are drawn from the general administrative standard of instru-
mental rationality. 393
The proposal is not as different from existing practice as it might
first appear. The development of explicit plans is generally consid-
ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984) (engaging in a general analysis
of Tit for Tat as an optimal strategy in repeated games). In contrast, retaliation for criti-
cism of the agency would be forbidden, and could be discerned as a deviation from the
established plan.
391 See TYLER, supra note 277, at 115-57 (finding that people who have lost a dispute
with government feel more positively toward the government if they perceive that the pro-
cedures used to resolve the dispute had been fair).
392 As stated at the outset, this Article does not attempt to draft a new APA. One
drafting point worth noting, however, is that management and resource allocation rules
are merely forms of executive action and need not be treated as separate categories.
393 There is, in addition, a similar assurance of fairness. As stated above, see supra text
accompanying notes 387-91, some executive action involves the rights of individuals, and
thus implicates fairness considerations.
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ered to be an essential feature of effective administration, 94 and most
agencies are probably reporting to their superiors in a manner that is
quite similar to the one that would be required by the proposal.
Moreover, the standards that courts have imposed on informal
rulemaking sometimes resemble the proposal as well. In the inspec-
tions cases, for example, the Supreme Court held that an agency
could comply with the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement by
demonstrating that "a specific business has been chosen for an OSHA
search on the basis of a general administrative plan for the enforce-
ment of the Act derived from neutral sources .... ,,395 Eliminating the
need to show probable cause in order to obtain a warrant might seem
to eviscerate the warrant requirement, but in the administrative con-
text, a "general administrative plan" is the functional equivalent of a
warrant. If evaluated on the ground of instrumental rationality, the
plan provides assurance that the facility is being inspected in order to
implement the agency's safety standards under OSH1A, and not to
punish political enemies, to extort money, or to further some other
impermissible purpose. Of course, it does not ensure that the facility
is suspected of wrongdoing, and thus does not preserve its privacy in
the sense that this concept applies to private homes. But that level of
privacy is not demanded by our constitutional morality, and it has
been eliminated, as a matter of positive law, by general legislation.
Recognition of this political result, however, does not require us to
abandon all constraints on administrative agencies nor does it guaran-
tee that private parties will be treated fairly. Fairness can be secured,
within the administrative context, by reinterpreting the warrant clause
in terms of the general administrative standard of instrumental
rationality. 396
Overton Park97 provides another example of the way in which
courts have approximated the instrumental rationality standard in
their efforts to impose requirements on informal adjudication under
the current APA. In Overton Park, the Supreme Court seized upon the
agency's reliance on an oral hearing to demand that the decision
must be based on an administrative record, even though no hearing,
and indeed no record, would typically be required for decisions of this
394 See FRIEDMANN, supra note 130, at 19-48; HARVEY S. PERLOFF, PLANNING THE POST-
INDUSTRIAL CITY (1980); SIMON, supra note 251, at 67; STOKEY & ZECKHAUSER, supra note
340.
395 Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 321 (1978).
396 The generality of the instrumental rationality standard, and of the goal and plan
statement as a means of securing it, eliminates the need for a complete exclusion from the
warrant requirement for "pervasively regulated industries." These industries, like any
others, could be fully regulated and inspected under the proposed standard. Thus, a re-
vised APA would obviate the need for this exclusion that was recognized, and inadequately
justified, in a series of Supreme Court cases.
397 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
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sort.39 8 The justification provided for this rather odd result was that
reviewing courts must be given the ipformation necessary to deter-
mine the legality of the agency's action.399 By legality, however, the
Court seems to have meant instrumental rationality. Congress's goal
was to build highways along routes that minimized the destruction of
parkland, and the question was whether the route that the Secretary
chose through Overton Park achieved this goal.40 0 Review of a goal
statement and plan that the Secretary submitted to the President
would provide a better means of making this same judgment, without
adding procedural requirements for the creation of a record that can
only encumber the implementation process.40 1
Further explication of the proposed requirement for executive
action would require a discussion of the various categories of action
within this enormous area.40 2 The inspection cases belong to the cate-
gory of enforcement actions, and the Secretary's decision in Overton
Park can be viewed as urban planning or infrastructure design, with
complex questions of cooperative federalism mixed in. If the facts
were varied a bit, Overton Park could also exemplify the category of
resource allocation. Suppose, for example, that the question involved
the construction of access roads through a national park, or a decision
about whether to provide federal funds to one highway or another. In
all these cases, it would be perfectly practical for the agency to state its
goal and submit a plan to its hierarchical superior, and entirely desira-
ble that the plan conform to the standard of instrumental rationality.
While there may be modes of acceptable executive action that are so
casual or ad hoc that a goal and plan statement would be burdensome
and disruptive, there are few, if any, where the instrumental rational-
ity standard would be inappropriate. Exceptions for such actions
would need to be determined at the time when actual statutory lan-
guage was being drafted. For the present, the general principle is that
a goal and plan statement must be submitted to the agency's superior,
and assessed on the basis of its instrumental rationality.
E. External Control
As described in Part I, the President, Congress, and the judiciary
all exercise control over the administrative apparatus, but, with the
exception of appeals from adjudicatory decisions, only judicial control
is codified under the APA. The proposed statute, an administrative
398 See id. at 417, 420.
399 See id. at 420; supra text accompanying note 144.
400 See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 404-09.
401 See discussion supra Part II.C.1.
402 Cf Croley, supra note 9, at 117 (arguing that the varied nature of informal adjudi-
cation creates difficulties in formulating general modes of participation).
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APA, would specify certain functions for the President, Congress, and
the administrative agencies themselves, and would define the standard
by which these functions were to be performed. In the rulemaking
process, both the President and Congress would review goal state-
ments and proposed rules for both executive and independent agen-
cies. The President's response, at either stage in the process, would
be mandatory for executive agencies, if the president so chose, but all
other responses would be merely advisory. The standard of review
would be unspecified, thus allowing for value rationality or the role of
ideology. In the implementation process, statements of the agency's
goal and plan would be reviewed within the administrative hierarchy
by the agency's superior, with plans developed at the highest level of
executive agencies being reviewed by the president. Here, the stan-
dard of review would be specified as instrumental rationality. In both
cases, review by these other governmental institutions would generally
be phrased in an internal, or governmental, discourse that would
speak more directly to the strategic planning efforts of the agency
than do the nongovernmental adversarial inputs that agencies receive
from private parties.
With respect to judicial review, the final type of control over ad-
ministrative agencies, an administrative approach would focus on two
basic and seemingly obvious aspects of the process: first, that the insti-
tutions whose decisions are being reviewed are administrative agen-
cies, and second, that the institutions carrying out the review are not
administrative agencies, but courts. In other words, the starting point
for the judicial review provisions of an administrative APA is a recogni-
tion of the institutional realities that inhere in the process. The
agency must be accepted for what it is: a hierarchical institution with a
defined jurisdiction, staffed by full-time specialists selected on the ba-
sis of their credentials, and organized around the principle of instru-
mental rationality. 40 3 Similarly, it is important to recognize that
courts, although they share certain features with administrative agen-
cies, 40 4 are a different type of institution, most notably because their
403 See supra notes 259-60, 296-98 and accompanying text.
404 They are partially hierarchical, but partially collegial; their jurisdiction is defined,
but typically more general; and they are also staffed by full-time credentialed specialists.
Both agencies and courts (in their nonconstitutional role) can be regarded as mechanisms
for the implementation of legislative policy, the role of courts being typically described as
agents of the legislature. See HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, JR., THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 350-62, 915-24 (William N. Es-
kridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., i994); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legis-
lative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 283-94 (1989); Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal
Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 179,
189-90 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REv.
405, 415 (1989).
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principles for decision making center on legal doctrine and value
rationality. 40 5
For rulemaking, the proposed revision of the APA would require
the agency to state its goals; receive comments on this goal statement
from the President, Congress, and private parties; publish a prelimi-
nary rule; and finally receive comments from these same parties.
Courts would review both the goal statement and the final rule. The
goal must fall within a statutory authorization; if the statute specifies a
goal, the agency must adopt that goal, with whatever additional speci-
ficity it chooses to provide. If the statute grants broad authority, the
stated goal is restricted only by the limits of that authority. In either
case, the agency's final rule must be instrumentally rational. If statute
specifies a goal, then the rule must constitute a rational means for
achieving that specified goal. If the goal is not specified, then the
agency must select its goal through a rational process that considers
the pragmatic consequences of its choice, and the final rule must then
constitute an instrumentally rational means of implementing the
stated goal. Courts would review agency rulemaking to determine
whether it stated a sufficiently specific goal, whether that goal was au-
thorized by statute or developed through an instrumentally rational
process, whether the final rule was an instrumentally rational means
of achieving the goal, and whether anything in the final rule contra-
vened the authorizing statute.40 6
Thus, under a revised, administrative APA, courts would be im-
posing a substantive standard of instrumental rationality on the agen-
cies because this is the dominant principle for administrative
governance. 40 7 What standard of review should the court use in deter-
mining the instrumental rationality of the agency's action or its com-
pliance with the governing statute? As noted above, the APA is silent
on this subject due to its concentration on the rulemaking or adjudi-
405 Philip Bobbitt identifies six modes ofjudicial rhetoric or discourse: textual, histori-
cal (original intent) structural, doctrinal, ethical and prudential (policy-oriented). PHILIP
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 93-94 (1982); BOBBITT,
supra note 317. Of these, courts and agencies both engage in textual, historical, pruden-
tial, and structural approaches when interpreting statutes. Judicial decision making is dis-
tinguished from agency decision making by the prominence it gives to the features that
Owen Fiss has emphasized-legal precedent, or doctrine, and ethical issues, or value ra-
tionality. See Fiss, supra note 107; Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE
L.J. 1442 (1983). With respect to doctrine, see EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 43, at 10;
FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 43, at 211-52.
406 This refers only to the review authorized by the revised APA. Constitutional review
would remain unchanged.
407 This standard bears a certain resemblance to Christopher Edley's proposed stan-
dard of sound governance, see EDLEY, supra note 103, at 213-64, but differs in its derivation
of the standard from Weberian principles of bureaucracy, see Fiss, supra note 405, at
1450-52.
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catory character of the agency action under review. 40 8 The recogni-
tion that judicial review involves a traditional, nonadministrative
agency reviewing a modern administrative one brings the issue to the
forefront. In designing a modern, administrative APA, one might be
tempted to fashion a modern, administrative standard of review for
courts to use, but this is probably the wrong instinct. Much of the
value of enlisting courts in the task of controlling administrative agen-
cies is to take advantage of our enormous historical and cultural expe-
rience with this institution. Therefore, the standard of review that
courts should use in an administrative APA should be one of the tradi-
tional standards with which courts are familiar, and that takes advan-
tage of their own institutional competencies. 40 9
When courts determine questions of fact, the traditional stan-
dards that they employ are that the moving party must prove its case
by a preponderance of the evidence, by clear and convincing evi-
dence, or beyond a reasonable doubt. This basic metric of persuasion
is entirely familiar to courts, and can be applied by them with much
greater clarity than any standard that is newly fashioned by either stat-
ute or judicial decision. Given the proper substantive standards, it is
all that is needed to guide judicial review of agencies. The relevant
question, for a court reviewing the decision of an administrative
agency, involves the level of persuasiveness that a moving party must
achieve in order to overturn an agency decision on the substantive
grounds of obedience to hierarchical commands and instrumental ra-
tionality. Once the issue is framed in these terms, the preferable
choice appears to be the clear and convincing evidence standard. A
preponderance of the evidence regime gives far too little weight to
the agency's decision, thus undermining the principles of expertise
and continuity. The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is essentially
the principle of minimum rationality that courts use in reviewing legis-
lative enactments in the postsubstantive due process era, and, for rea-
sons already described, is unacceptably deferential. 410 A clear and
convincing standard is sufficiently deferential to instantiate the exper-
tise and continuity principles, but is simultaneously rigorous enough
to exercise control over the subordinate policymaking and implemen-
tation mechanisms.
The clear and convincing standard is generally applied to factual
determinations. In civil procedure, questions of law, at either the trial
or appellate level, are to be determined by the judge's direct consider-
408 See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
409 Institutional competence was one of the defining ideas of the legal process school.
See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 152-86 (1964); Fuller, supra note 91. For an
insightful restatement in contemporary terms, see NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNA-
TIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994).
410 See supra notes 200-08 and accompanying text.
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ation of the authoritative legal sources. This approach cannot be used
for agencies, however, because an agency's expertise and continuity
applies equally to its legal interpretations as to its factual determina-
tions. Once again, the court is reviewing an agency, not a court. For
this reason, the clear and convincing standard remains the proper
one. Its novelty in the context of law interpretation is counterbal-
anced by its general familiarity, and the greater novelty of any other
standard. Thus, the moving party could not ask a court reviewing
agency action to interpret the statute anew, the way it could ask a trial
or appellate court. Rather, that party would need to demonstrate, ac-
cording to the clear and convincing standard, that the agency inter-
pretation was incorrect. With respect to the instrumental rationality
of the agency's actions, the same clear and convincing standard could
be employed.
An additional advantage of the proposed standard is that it dis-
places the Chevron decision. As discussed above, Chevron institutes a
two-step review; if the statute is deemed unambiguous, the agency in-
terpretation is reviewed de novo; if it is deemed ambiguous, the
agency is granted extensive deference. 41' Thus, a great deal turns on
the difficult determination of ambiguity and on separating one's judg-
ment on this issue from one's judgment on the merits of the regula-
tion, both of which are ferociously difficult, at best. Like Chevron, the
proposed standard involves a two-step process, but instead of the two
steps being alternative analyses of the same subject matter, they review
two separate stages of the agency's action: goal and implementation.
The agency's interpretation of the statute, whether ambiguous or un-
ambiguous, will characteristically be reviewed in the first stage, 412 and
will employ the intermediate standard of clear and convincing evi-
dence. 413 The court will review agency's implementation of the goal
as a second step, using the same clear and convincing standard. This
approach uses a traditional and familiar standard of decision while
recognizing that an agency is governed by statutory command and in-
strumental rationality. It eliminates the Chevron doctrine's unex-
plained, and essentially unjustifiable, implication that the agency is a
court whose legal interpretations are to be reviewed de novo and
411 Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
412 Statutes offer procedures as well as goals, but those procedures will typically be-
come part of the goal, since they are mandatory for the agency. Some statutes, however,
prescribe or restrict particular means of implementing their more general policies.
413 Of course, if the court finds the statute unambiguous, it will have clear and con-
vincing evidence to strike down a regulation inconsistent with this unambiguous meaning.
The court must inevitably make this determination, however difficult, but at least the pro-
posed standard does not require the court to make an antecedent determination of
whether the statute fits into the ambiguous or unambiguous category.
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whose factual determinations are to be given nearly determinative
deference. 4 14
Judicial review of executive action under the proposed revision of
the APA would follow precisely the same pattern as the review of
rulemaking. The court would examine both the agency's statement of
its goal and its implementation of that goal. The substantive stan-
dards for this review would be whether the agency's actions were a
proper interpretation of the governing statute or a superior's order,
and whether they were instrumentally rational. The procedural stan-
dard would be whether the moving party could make a clear and con-
vincing showing that the agency failed to meet these substantive
standards. Of course, executive action is a much broader category
than rulemaking, and courts would find themselves applying this ap-
proach to enforcement plans, resource allocations, guidelines, grant
approvals, and innumerable other types of actions that the APA leaves
undefined, unregulated, and essentially unreviewable. Subjecting
them to the same standard as rulemaking might appear to risk "ossifi-
cation" of the implementation process, but this would not be the case,
since the standard being imposed is not compliance with a variable set
of procedures, but with the statute and the principle of instrumental
rationality. If the moving party can demonstrate by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that an agency action violates the terms of the control-
ling statute or lacks instrumental rationality, then that action should
be overturned, whether it is a rule, an enforcement plan, a guideline,
or anything else.
Nor should it be surprising that the proposed statute merges
rulemaking and executive action into a single category for purposes of
judicial review. Two basic institutional facts govern the standard of
review-the nature of an agency and the nature of a court-and these
remain the same across the entire range of administrative action.
Rulemaking tends to operate at a more general level and have a
greater impact; as a result, there is a larger group of non-judicial par-
ticipants involved in reviewing the process. However, rulemaking also
resembles executive action in its essential feature as a means of imple-
menting Congressional or Presidential policy. Adjudication is a truly
separate and distinct category of agency action. It is distinguished by
our theory of due process, our basic cultural sense of fairness, which
414 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. Charles Koch argues that agency policy making should
be reviewed according to a different and more lenient standard than statutory interpreta-
tion by the agency. See Koch, supra note 54, at 272-75. The instrumental rationality stan-
dard would embody this principle without the need for a separate standard. In
administrative policy making, it is the agency, not the legislature, that establishes the goal.
Review of the agency's efforts to achieve its own goal would necessarily be more lenient
than review of the agency's effort to achieve a legislative goal because there would be no
question, in most cases, that the agency was interpreting its own goal correctly.
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demands a certain level of formality in the situations where it oper-
ates.415 This factor does not distinguish rulemaking from executive
action, however, and there is no similarly significant factor that does.
There is thus no reason why these processes should not be subject to
the same basic standard of review.
Under the APA, the review of adjudications requires that the
agency have substantial evidence to support its decision. As discussed
above, this term emerges from a series of cases that analogize an ad-
ministrative adjudication to a jury trial, and means that there is
enough evidence so that the trial judge will refuse to direct a ver-
dict.4 16 As also discussed, this is a misleading analogy, because the
reviewing court will often be considering an agency decision that is
itself a review of the trier of fact's determination. 417 But a standard
drawn from a supreme court's review of an appellate court is also
wrong because the appellate court receives no deference at all in this
situation. A supreme court defers to the trial court's findings of fact,
but reviews the appellate court's assessments of those facts de novo,
and reviews all legal interpretations, whether by the trial or appellate
court, de novo as well. In fact, the expertise principle suggests that
the agency's decision should be granted considerable deference, and
that this deference belongs to the agency as a whole, rather than to
the hearing officer's findings of fact.4 18
In other words, the reviewing court should not cease to treat the
agency as an agency simply because it is performing a function-adju-
dication-that is also performed by traditional, pre-administrative in-
stitutions. The adjudicatory decision, whether it is made by a hearing
officer, an appeals board, or the individual or board that heads the
agency, should be treated in essentially the same manner as other
agency decisions. Interpretations of law should be accurate, but the
agency's conclusions should be upheld unless the moving party can
clearly and convincingly demonstrate that they are wrong. Findings of
fact should also be accurate, and that conclusion should also be up-
held absent clear and convincing evidence that it is wrong.419 The
substantive standard of accuracy in factfinding is essentially equivalent
415 The definition of this class of situations, that is, the class of situations where due
process demands a formal adjudication akin to that provided by §§ 554, 556 and 557, lies
beyond the scope of this Article.
416 See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
417 See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
418 A separate principle that points in the same direction is the principle of judicial
economy. This is not generated by any aspect of the administrative state, other than its
mere size, but rather from traditional considerations regarding appellate courts.
419 Applying a uniform clear and convincing standard would essentially eliminate the
need to make the often troublesome distinction between fact and law in adjudication. See
Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 569-74 (1965); Ronald M.
Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74 GEO. LJ. 1, 12 (1985).
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to instrumental rationality. In adjudication, the goal of factfinding
remains the same: to determine whether the facts demonstrate that
the person whose case is being adjudicated fits within a particular le-
gal category that has been established by some authoritative legal
source. The substantive standard of accuracy asks whether the partic-
ular adjudication was a rational way to reach that goal, that is, whether
it found facts that led to its conclusion. This question can be an-
swered by de novo review, or by requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that it is wrong, but the appropriate administrative standard,
for reasons stated above, is clear and convincing evidence of
inaccuracy. 420
Because an administrative APA would treat the adjudicatory deci-
sion as the action of an agency, it would follow Judge Hand's treat-
ment of the hearing officer's conclusion in the first Universal Camera
decision. There, Judge Hand held that the hearing officer's conclu-
sions should be ignored, because giving them any credence would im-
pose too high a level of scrutiny on the decision of the agency as a
whole. 421 In other words, the facts found by the trial examiner should
be considered in reviewing the agency's determination, but the
agency is entitled to reach a different conclusion on appeal, and that
interpretation should be given the same deference as an affirmance of
the trial examiner's findings. Suppose, for example, the case turns on
the veracity of a witness, and the trial examiner concludes that the
witness was telling the truth. A reversal by an agency appeals board
that failed to supply any reason could be reversed by an appellate
court because there would be clear and convincing evidence-the
trial examiner's conclusion, as finder of fact-that the appeals board's
decision was wrong. But if the appeals board explained that the wit-
ness had previously demonstrated the capacity to lie convincingly, or
found an internal contradiction in his testimony, then those findings
would count against the previous finding of veracity, and no addi-
tional weight would be given to the trial examiner's finding. The
same principle applies for rulemaking or executive action. If a
subordinate official in the agency brings some data to the attention of
its decision making body, that data should be considered as part of
the reviewing court's assessment of the instrumental rationality of the
agency decision, but no extra weight should be given to that data be-
cause the subordinate official objected to the agency's decision on
that basis.
420 Judge Hand articulated a similar standard when he analogized the agency's fact-
finding decision to a special verdict, which must be sustained if the conclusion was "within
the bounds of rational entertainment." NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 179 F.2d 749,
754 (2d Cir. 1950), vacated by 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
421 See id. at 754.
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CONCLUSION
The Administrative Procedure Act is outdated because it treats
the administrative state as an ordinary legal development that can be
controlled through traditional concepts, rather than as a transforma-
tion of our mode of governance that renders those traditional con-
cepts obsolete and installs new ones in their place. The Act relies
entirely on public participation, ignoring the hierarchical controls
that are characteristic of the legislative process. It conceives adminis-
trative rulemaking as a form of legislation, and it conceives adminis-
trative adjudication as a form of civil trial. Because procedural rules
do not govern legislation, these analogies yield only one set of rules,
derived from the judicial model, which the APA then imposes in
adapted form on adjudication and, in highly adapted form, on
rulemaking as well. Executive action, which the APA implicitly de-
scribes as informal adjudication, has no obvious pre-modern ana-
logue, and so the Act imposes no rules at all on this extensive category
of regulatory action.
This Article proposes a new administrative procedure act, based
on the prevailing conception of administrative governance as an in-
strumentally rational process carried out by institutions with defined
jurisdiction, a hierarchical structure, expert staff, and continuous op-
eration. The essential requirement that such an act would impose is a
definition of the agency's goal, and a specification of the means that it
would employ to achieve that goal. In the case of rulemaking, which
represents the agency's most extensive mode of action, both the goal
and the plan would be open to input from the agency's hierarchical
superiors, the President, and Congress, in addition to input from the
public. In the case of executive action, which includes what is now
called informal adjudication and interpretive rules, participation
would be limited to the hierarchical superior of the agency or sub-
agency proposing the particular action. In establishing these goals
and plans, the agency would be guided by the commands of its hierar-
chical superiors when such commands were issued. For internally
generated goals and plans, the substantive standard that the agency
would be required to use in formulating its goals and plans in both
these areas and for assessing the value of the input it received would
be instrumental rationality. Reviewing courts would impose these very
same substantive standards of authoritative command and instrumen-
tal rationality, but preserve the extensive authority that the administra-
tive state grants agencies by requiring clear and convincing evidence
that these standards had been violated.
Finally, the proposed act, with its single standard for rulemaking,
executive action, and judicial review of these two functions, is much
simpler than the APA, with its welter of different rules for each of
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these functions. Such simplicity does not result from any conscious
effort to suggest a simple statute. Rather, it occurs because the propo-
sal is based upon a unified, coherent concept of the administrative
state as an instrumentally rational mechanism for implementing social
policy. The current APA does not rest on any such conception;
rather, it grasps at disparate and varied fragments of traditional, pre-
administrative models in its effort to understand particular functions
of administrative government, without developing an idea of that gov-
ernment as a totality. The inevitable result is a disarticulated mixture
of different procedures and standards of review, overlapping in some
areas and conflicting in others.
We have over a hundred years of experience with the regulatory
state, and over fifty years of experience with a codified effort to subject
that state to legal control. It is time to abandon the traditional ideas
of governance that we inherited from the pre-administrative era, how-
ever noble those ideas may seem, and however strong our nostalgic
feelings for them may be. We need to consciously accept the ideas of
governance that we ourselves have evolved, and use those ideas as the
basis of our legal efforts. In other words, we need to make the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act administrative.
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